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ABSTRACT
THE CITIZEN OF THE STATE AND THE STATE OF THE CITIZEN; AN  
ANALYSIS OF THE CITIZENIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY
Nalan Soyarik
Department o f Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof Ahmet l9duygu 
Co-Supervisor: Assist. Prof Fuat Keyman
September 2000
This study deals with the construction and evolution o f Turkish citizenship 
throughout the history o f the Turkish Republic. How citizenship was defined, and 
which model was adopted for Turkish citizenship are the major questions. The state 
is taken as the major constructive actor as the modernization and citizenization 
process was from above in the Turkish case. Therefore, the legal documents, 
parliamentary debates, and studies o f  the prominent intellectuals on citizenship are 
analyzed. As the nation building and citizenization process went hand in hand in 
Turkey, those laws related with the construction o f  a Turkish national identity are 
also utilized. By taking the social and political developments into account as a 
background, the changes and shifts in the understanding o f  Turkish citizenship are 
traced.
The problems Turkish citizenship encounters today has its roots in the early 
Republican period, where Turkish citizenship was developed from above and in a 
republican understanding that emphasized duties towards the state. Today there is a 
clash between aspirations for a more liberal understanding o f  citizenship and the 
republican citizens. In the core o f  the problems faced today, lies the reluctance o f
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the state to view Turkish citizenship as a notion distinct from the quest for Kemalist
modernization and official Turkish national identity.
Key Words: Citizenship; civil, political, social elements; civic republican; liberal 
democratic; national identity
ÖZET
DEVLETİN VATANDAŞI VATANDAŞIN DURUMU: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ 
VATANDAŞLAŞTIRMA SÜRECİNİN ANALİZİ
Nalan Soyarık
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Doç. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu 
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Fuat Keyman
Eylül 2000
Bu çalışma Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca Türk vatandaşlığının kuruluşu ve 
evrimi ile ilgilidir. Vatandaşlığın nasıl tanımlandığı ve hangi vatandaşlık modelinin 
kullanıldığı ana sorulardır. Türkiye deneyiminde modernleşme ve vatandaşlaştırma 
süreci yukandan olduğu için, devlet asıl kurucu aktör olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu 
nedenle, hukuki belgeler, parlamentodaki tartışmalar ve dönemin belli başlı 
aydınlarının vatandaşlık üzerine yaptıkları çalışmalar incelenmiştir. Türkiye’de 
ulusun kuruluşu ve vatandaşlaştırma süreci birlikte ilerlediğinden, Türk milli 
kimliğinin oluşumuyla ilgili kanunlar da kullanılmıştır. Sosyal ve siyasal 
gelişmeler bir arkaplan olarak ele alınarak, Türk vatandaşlığı anlayışındaki 
değişimler ve dönüşümler araştırılmıştır.
Türk vatandaşlığının bugün karşılaştığı problemlerin kökleri, Türk vatandaşlığının 
yukarıdan ve ödevlere önem veren cumhuriyetçi anlayışla kurulduğu erken 
Cumhuriyet döneminde yatmaktadır. Bugün daha liberal bir vatandaşlık anlayışı
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için istemler ile cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlar arasında bir çatışma bulunmaktadır. 
Bugün karşı karşıya kalman problemlerin özünde, devletin Türk vatandaşlığını 
Kemalist modernleşme arzusu ve resmi Türk milli kimliğinden ayrı bir kavram 
olarak ele alamaması yatmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık; sivil, siyasal, sosyal öğeler; cumhuriyetçi 
vatandaşlık; liberal demokratik vatandaşlık, milli kimlik.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship has been a key notion throughout modem history. By the rise o f  
nationalism and the emergence o f  the nation-states it became cmcial to define the 
membership status o f the people and the qualifications for acquiring citizenship. 
Therefore citizenship is often defined as membership in a nation-state.^ In that 
phase, citizenship was a notion that overlapped with the nation-state and was 
mostly designed and used within the parameters o f  the nation-state. It was 
sometimes used during the nation building process as a tool providing both the 
integrity o f  the state and the identity and sense o f belonging for its members. From 
another aspect, citizenship rights in the West emerged out o f  the rising demands o f  
the population for more rights.^ Thus, modem citizenship was defined and used in 
the West as an equalizing and universalizing phenomenon that would hold the 
people together under a certain umbrella o f  the nation-state. *
* William Rogers Bmbaker, “Introduction,” in William Rogers Bmbaker 
(ed.) Immigration and the Politics o f Citizenship in Europe and North America, 
(Lanham- New York, London: The German Marshall Fund o f  the US, University 
Press o f  America, Inc., 1989),
 ^ See, T.H. Marshall Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (Garden 
City, New York; Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) where the 
evolution o f citizenship is classified as “legal, political and social.”
With the emergence o f critiques o f  modernity, the rise o f  new strains o f  
thought like post modernism, globalization, multiculturalism and identity politics, 
citizenship fell short o f  meeting new demands. As an outcome o f  globalization and 
the increasing importance o f supra national organizations like the European Union, 
on the one hand there is the problem o f  demolishing o f  the boundaries between 
states. On the other hand, however, there is a quite opposite tendency o f  the re- 
emergence o f  nationalism at micro levels, or rather, the rise o f  the claims for 
recognition o f  distinct identities. Those claims do not come only from ethnic 
minorities; there are also the identity claims o f  various groups based on ethnicity, 
religion, gender, or sexual preferences. In addition to those challenges to the nation­
state and citizenship as membership o f  the nation-state, there is also the issue o f  
widespread migration and its outcomes, like the problem o f  dual or multiple 
citizenship and integration and naturalization o f  the migrants in the receiving 
country. Therefore, by the end o f the 20“* century, citizenship is one o f  the most 
debated and challenged phenomenon o f  modernity. Those debates vary from 
political discussions like the ones going on in for instance, Quebec or Ireland 
related with the identity and the recognition o f rights related with those distinct 
identities, to increasing concern on the academic level. ^
Turkey is witnessing similar kinds o f  debates over citizenship in recent 
years. On the one hand, there is the official definition o f  Turkish citizenship that 
dates back to the early Republican period, and on the other hand, there is a
For the rising concern on citizenship the publication o f  new academic 
journals on citizenship like Citizenship Studies might be given as example. Besides 
there is a growing literature on the issue, e g. Bryan Turner (ed.). Citizenship and 
Social Theory, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993); The 
Condition o f Citizenship, Bart van Steenbergen (ed ), (London, California, New  
Delhi; Sage Publications, 1994); and Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton (eds.). 
Citizenship: Critical Concepts, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).
challenge towards that official definition coming from various sections o f  the 
Turkish society. Turkish citizenship also emerged as a component o f  the nation 
building process. However, starting from the 1980s the official definition o f  
Turkish citizenship started to be challenged in not different aspects from those o f  
the international context. The problems related with the status o f  women, ethnic 
groups, namely the identity claims o f  Kurds, and Islam became a challenge to the 
official Turkish citizenship. On the other hand, there was the situation o f the 
Turkish workers/migrants living in Europe, and the problem o f  their naturalization 
in the countries they lived, which led to the rise o f  the problem o f  dual citizenship. 
All those problems o f  citizenship have roots in the construction. Therefore, the 
early Republican period should be and is revisited for studies on citizenship.
This thesis aims to provide a detailed documentation o f  the construction
and meaning o f  citizenship in Turkey throughout Republican history. It aims to
highlight the relation between the notion o f  citizenship and the state’s ideology and
response to certain developments in the domestic and international context, like the
transition to multi-party politics, or the aftermath o f  the Second World War. The 
thesis analyzes the state’s role in the definition, construction and evolution o f  the
understanding o f citizenship in the Turkish Republic. The conceptualization o f
Turkishness and its overlap or distinction from the official definition o f  Turkish
citizenship is searched. How do the components o f  this Turkish identity like
language, culture, and ideal"* effect the definition o f  citizenship? How was Turkish
citizenship defined? Are there any differences in definition and practice? How were
the religious minorities incorporated into Turkish citizenship? How did the
"* Unity in language, culture and ideal were regarded as the core o f  the nation 
by the early republican ideologues. See, Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M  Kemal 
Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988),
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secularization process influence the understanding o f  citizenship? How was Islam 
incorporated into the construction o f  Turkish citizenship, and how did its 
importance increase/decrease in the citizenship conceptualization? How did the 
understanding o f  citizenship change by the change in the social and political life o f  
Turkey, for instance, by the transition to multi-party politics, or after the military 
interventions, and by the changing international context? Does Turkish citizenship 
fit to ideal-types, that is, the French model, or the German model? Or are there any 
shifts from one model to the other in respective periods? Was the desired Turkish 
citizen an active citizen, or a passive one? In other words, was Turkish citizenship 
inspired from republican understanding, or liberal understanding? How does the 
state adopt itself to the changing dynamics? How was citizenship incorporated into 
social and political life? These are some o f  the questions in mind while carrying out 
this study. Besides, it is intended to trace the developments and changes during 
certain periods, and the reflections o f those changes on the understanding o f  
Turkish citizenship.
This study is almost the first attempt to cover the Republican history from 
the point o f citizenship and evaluate it through contemporary literature. There are 
studies that focus on the early Republican era and analyze Turkish citizenship 
within the context o f  Turkish modernization especially focusing on the early 
Republican era.  ^ This thesis differs from those studies mentioned by the attempt to 
cover the whole Republican history and search for the state’s attitude towards 
citizenship, including the social and political developments as the background, the
 ^ See, for instance, Artun Ünsal (ed.), 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru, 
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998); Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Modem Vatandaşlığın Farklı 
Boyutları,” in Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi (İstanbul: Metis 
Yayınları, 1999),53-72; Ahmet İçduygu; “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Kavramı üzerine
situation o f  minorities, the role o f  religion, and the problems o f  migration. In doing 
so the enlisted questions is the main focus. There might be various different 
approaches for the analysis o f  Turkish citizenship, like views o f  the opposition, or 
the minorities, or the analysis o f  certain publications or books,^ but this thesis 
focuses on the state’s role, as the determinant figure in the construction and 
inculcation o f  Turkish citizenship.
As the study concentrates on the state as the constructive figure o f
citizenship, a selective literature is used. The legal documents like the constitutions
o f  the Turkish Republic,^ Turkish Citizenship Laws,* other related laws like the
Law on Settlement, Law on Physical Education, Law o f  Family Names, and the
concerned amendments constitute the major sources. The parliamentary debates on
the concerned laws are also utilized. In addition to those, the book Medeni Bilgiler
ve M  Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları (Civic Information and Manuscripts o f M. 
Kemal Atatürk) is used as the main tool for understanding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s
views on citizenship, together with his Nutuk (Speech) and other statements. As the
Republican People’s Party remained in power for about 20 years during the
construction periods as the single party that carried out the Kemalist revolution, its
party programmes are analyzed. Besides, the works o f  the prominent ideologues o f
Tartışmaların Arka Plam,” Diyalog, 1:1 (1996),134-147; Nuri Bilgin (ed.) 
Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınlan, 1997).
 ^For instance. Füsun Üstel analyzed the schoolbooks used in the course o f  
Information about Citizenhip throughout the Republican history. See, Füsun Üstel, 
“Cumhuriyetten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili,” Yeni Yüzyıl, April 24, 1995.
’ 1921 Constitution, 1924 Constitution, 1961 Constitution, and 1982 
Constitution.
* 1312 numbered and 23.5.1928 dated Turkish Citizenship Law, and 403 
numbered and 11.2.1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law.
the Kemalist regime like Recep Peker^, SafFet Engin^” are utilized through a critical 
reading concerning citizenship.
The thesis covers the period starting from the mid-19* century, the late 
Ottoman Empire until the end o f  the 1990s. The late Ottoman Empire is studied in 
order to give a brief summary o f  the historical background o f  the emergence o f the 
citizenship notion. This background is important since it gives the clues to the rise 
o f the West as a reference point in Turkey for reflecting on the relationship between 
the ruler and the ruled. The second period covers the early Republican period 
starting from the formation o f the Grand National Assembly until the transition to 
multi party politics in 1946. This period is crucial for understanding the nation­
building process and the basis for the construction o f Turkish citizenship. During 
that period both processes went hand in hand, the citizen that was desired to be 
constructed would be laden with the duty o f carrying out the Kemalist revolution. 
The third period is from 1946 until the 1980 military intervention. That third period 
covers both the Democrat party period, which contributed to changes in the 
understanding o f  citizenship by mobilizing the periphery and incorporating Islam 
into the identity o f the citizens; moreover the period after the 1960 military 
intervention is also covered under this period. The 1960 military intervention and 
the 1961 Constitution are significant in the sense that a new and more active citizen 
was aspired for at that certain period o f  time. Later, the final period is the aftermath 
o f 1980 military intervention and the changes experienced. During the final period, 
the issue o f  citizenship began to be debated in the political and social level due to
 ^ Recep Peker, 7/îA://ûfZ> D e r s / e r / ( A n k a r a :  Ulus Basımevi, 1936);
Saffet Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Matbaası, 1938.
the rise o f identity claims from various sections o f  the population, and in relation to 
international migration and dual citizenship. The division o f  periods is crucial in 
order to understand the emergence o f  the notion o f citizenship, the new 
structuration after the proclamation o f  the Republic and the shifts it had during the 
republican history.
The second chapter provides a theoretical background for the thesis. The 
historical developments in the West and their outcomes for citizenship in different 
countries, which contributed to the theory, is analyzed. As mentioned above, 
citizenship can be defined as the membership o f a nation-state. This study benefits 
from two distinct approaches towards citizenship, which I call as historical or 
historical-comparative and philosophical approaches. Marshall, whose study is the 
key reference for students o f  citizenship, can be viewed within the historical 
approach with his analysis focusing on the social changes and their reflections on 
citizenship starting from the 18“* century.*^ I argue that Marshall’s historical 
analysis can be utilized for subsequent periods o f  the history o f  the Turkish 
Republic, Brubaker makes a historical-comparative analysis. By concentrating on 
France and Germany, he relates the different practices o f  citizenship to the different 
nation-building processes.*^ Different conceptualizations o f  citizenship is analyzed 
under the philosophical approach. For instance. Turner analyzes citizenship as to 
whether it developed from above or below (active-passive) and to what extent it 
developed in the public or private sphere. Other scholars like Oldfield, Kymlicka 
and Norman, and Stewart analyze the conceptualization o f  citizenship as a
11 T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development.
William Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
39-49.
dichotomy.*^ This dichotomy is basically centered around two dififerent strains o f  
thought. One is the liberal tradition, the other comes from the Greek civilization and 
is based on a civic republican understanding. In the liberal understanding 
citizenship is viewed as a legal status and there is a distant relation between the 
state and the citizen based on the acquisition o f rights and benefits from the state.
In civic republicanism the responsibilities and duties o f  the citizen towards the state 
and the community are at the core. An individual becomes a citizen when he/she 
performs the duties o f citizenship.*^ Those theoretical approaches are used for 
providing an understanding o f  Turkish citizenship.
The third chapter provides a historical background, covering the late 
Ottoman period and the developments starting from the Tanzimat Edict in 1839. It 
analyzes the emergence o f the notion o f  citizenship, and the characteristics o f  the 
Ottoman citizenship. The introduction o f  the notion o f  citizenship dates back to the 
end o f the 19*** century Ottoman Empire. The notion o f  citizen (vatandaş) first 
emerged during the promulgation o f  the Reform Edict in 1856. The underlying aim 
was to save the Empire from collapse by gathering the religiously and ethnically 
fragmented subjects o f the Empire under a certain identity o f  the “Ottoman citizen.” 
In acquiring this, a set o f  legal reforms were undertaken, starting with Tanzimat,
*^  Adrian Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?” Political 
Quarterly, 61:2 (1990), 177-187; Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism 
and the Modern World, (London, New York: Routledge, 1990), 1-11; Will 
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return o f  the Citizen: A Survey o f  Recent Work 
on Citizenship Theory,” Ethics, 104 (January 1994), 352-381; Angus Stewart, 
“Two Conceptions o f Citizenship,” British Journal o f Sociology, 46:1 (March 
1995), 63-78.
*^* Robert E. Goldwin, “Citizenship and Civility,” in Edward C. Banfield 
(ed ). Civility and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies, (New York. Paragon 
House, 1992), 39-55.
and continuing with the Reform Edict, Ottoman Citizenship law, and finally Kanuni 
Esasi, the constitution. This chapter covers those developments and provide a 
historical background for the Turkish Republic with respect to citizenship.
The main focus o f  the study is the Republican period that is covered in the 
fourth chapter. By the proclamation o f  the republic, the country went through a 
widespread transformation in every aspect. Citizenship had been one o f  the core 
elements for the nation building process in Turkey. The desired citizen o f  the 
Turkish Republic should be the carrier o f  the nation building and the Kemalist 
principles. In line with the theories o f  citizenship, the early republican period is 
analyzed. What kind o f a path did the Turkish republic take for nation building and 
citizenship -  does it resemble to the French or the German model? Or are there any 
shifts from one to the other in certain times or events? Or could the Turkish case be 
regarded as a case that goes beyond those two models, or merges the two models? 
As mentioned above, the republic aspired for a total transformation o f  the country, 
therefore many characteristics o f  the Ottoman Empire were rejected, like Islam. 
One o f  the questions deals with the role o f  religion, though being discarded, in the 
construction o f Turkish Citizenship. The other question is related with the situation 
o f the religious minorities during this process and their incorporation into or 
exclusion from the Turkish identity. The process o f  the construction o f  Turkish 
citizens is traced. In this process there are significant developments, one o f  them is 
the formation o f  the Halkevleri (People’s Houses) which was laden with the task o f  
the creation o f  “new, modem, conscious and responsible citizens” o f  the republic. 
In this sense, the public and private spheres were merged together in the 
constmction o f  the citizen, and the private sphere o f the individuals was organized
Oldfield, “Citizenship; An Unnatural Practice?” and Citizenship and
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as well. One o f  the implementations for the organization o f  the life o f  the citizens 
was the introduction o f  courses like ‘Information about Citizenship” to the 
curriculums o f  the schools. The main source o f those courses was a book written by 
Afet İnan together with and according to the instructions o f  Mustafa Kemal, Medeni 
Bilgiler ve M  Kemal Atatürk'ün E l Yazıları. This book is also beneficial for 
understanding how Atatürk conceived citizenship, and its main elements. Besides, 
and most importantly, through the analysis and critical reading o f  the legal 
documents, the early republican definition o f  Turkish citizenship is searched.
It is quite evident that Turkish citizenship developed from above with 
almost no demands coming from below. It was tailored for the people and they 
were regarded as passive citizens with duties and obligations towards the state. 
However, this was not much o f  an anomaly for the period concerned. It was a 
period o f the rise o f new nation-states, and when the nation-states were formed 
what they needed at first was a nation devoted to the state. Besides, it was a period 
when modernity and the Enlightenment were at stake. Within this context, the 
Kemalist regime by taking the West as its reference adopted its parameters.
Many o f  the Western countries, with a history full o f  struggles for rights, 
have adopted a liberal understanding o f  citizenship whereby the rights have the 
utmost importance. In that tradition the state-society relations are rather different 
from the Turkish tradition where there is a strong state tradition‘s and the people 
were regarded as being responsible to the state rather than the state being 
responsible to its citizens.*^ For this reason citizenship in Turkey could not strip
Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World.
‘s See, Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, (Walkington, England: The 
Eothen Press, 1985).
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itself from its obligations and claim its rights. It was centered around the themes o f  
community and common good.
The fifth chapter analyzes the period between 1946 and 1980. It is covered 
under two sub-periods. The first is the period o f transition to multi-party politics in 
1946 and the Democrat Party rule until the first military intervention o f  1960. This 
period is significant for transition in the conceptualization o f  citizenship. DP carried 
out its propaganda on the theme that “It is the nation’s turn to speak!” Therefore 
political participation was encouraged to a large extent. This period can be regarded 
as the political phase o f  Turkish citizenship by utilizing the analysis o f  Marshall. 
The second sub-period is the period after 1960 until 1980 when another military 
intervention occurred. During this time, active citizenship was at stake. The 1961 
Constitution formed the basis o f  the rise o f  the understanding o f  a more liberal and 
active citizenship. This section focuses on the 1961 Constitution and the 403 
numbered and 11.2.1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law amended during this 
period together with its social and cultural implications.
The sixth chapter focuses on the period after 1980 to the present. This 
period is critical for the citizenship debates in Turkey as challenges towards the 
official understanding o f  Turkish citizenship rose during this period. This chapter 
analyzes the legal documents o f  this period and tries to search for the attitude o f  the 
state towards those challenges. The amendments o f  the Turkish Citizenship Law 
that were used as a tool for deciding who deserves membership or not, is analyzed 
within the social and political context. Also the issue o f  dual citizenship and the 
state’s position on this issue is searched. In addition, the increasing claims for
17 Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk 'ün El Yazıları.
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identity that rose during this period, namely women, Kurds, and Islamic groups and 
the reflections o f  those claims on citizenship is analyzed.
The problem Turkey faces these days with regard to citizenship is based on
the state’s attitudes and responses toward the developments both within the country 
and in the international context. Previously the West was taken as a reference point
and citizenship was constructed according to the Western models. However the
state fell short o f  adopting the developments in the West after 1980. It could not
meet the demands coming from the society about identity problems, the recognition
o f differences within the population. Besides, the understanding o f  citizenship by
the population began to change. Rather than regarding themselves as the
responsible combatants for the Kemalist principles and modernization o f  the
country, people began to question the role o f the state in state-society relations and
began to voice their demands. In other words there occurred a major challenge in a
liberal sense, viewing the state as an apparatus designed for the well being o f  its
c itizen s.H o w ev er , quite contrary to the increasing distress among the people the
state still tries to stick to the early republican notions and parameters. This became
quite evident during the celebrations for the 75* anniversary o f  the proclamation o f
the republic. The desired citizen o f  the republic is still defined by the early
republican norms, the secular and patriotic citizen who would devote
himself/herself to the state, and who would strive for the enlightenment o f  the
public. Nevertheless, the success o f  the republic in creating that kind o f  citizen
** One significant example might be the August 1999 earthquake, which hit 
a quite significant part o f the country and its population. The state fell short o f  
providing the necessary help for its citizens and was criticized on the grounds that it 
was the “duty” o f  the state to provide for the livelihood o f their citizens. Maybe for 
the first time in the republican history people spoke o f  their rights and the duties o f  
the state. Until that time it was just the opposite, the citizens were endowed with 
duties or obligations towards the state.
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cannot be denied. However, there is a growing tension between those ideal citizens 
o f the republic and those who aspire for a more liberal version o f  citizenship.
Since the debates at the political level concerning the issue o f  citizenship 
emerged in the 1980s, the resource for the preceding eras were limited to legal 
documents. This can be perceived as a problem for a study analyzing the issue at a 
multi-dimensional platform. This problem was tried to be overcome by reading 
between the lines o f  the legal documents concerned, with a view to the political 
dynamics o f  the respective periods in which the related laws have been enacted; as 
well as by resorting to the works o f  the mainstream thinkers. This was important in 
order to avoid being limited to a descriptive framework in the study. One other 
problem arose due to the lack o f a comprehensive academic work on the topic o f  
citizenship, but this problem can also be interpreted as an advantage for the this 
study since it provides a channel for fijture works. Currently citizenship is a notion 
worldwide that is taking the interest o f  not only many academics but also a 
significant issue for many states as well. This thesis provides a documentation o f  
the construction o f  citizenship in Turkey and thus will provide a background 
information for the upcoming debates.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In recent years there has been a resurgence o f  concern and studies on citizenship 
due to the changing political and cultural dynamics o f  the world. The classical 
approaches towards citizenship have become insufficient to grasp the contemporaiy 
issues o f globalization, immigration, status and/or naturalization o f  immigrants, demands 
o f ethnic minorities, and the political apathy o f  Western citizens.’ Nevertheless, the long 
established theories and practices o f  citizenship like that o f  viewing citizenship as 
membership o f a nation-state; relations between nationhood and practices o f citizenship; 
liberal vs. republican traditions; and the crucial question o f  “who would deserve 
membership, or not?” seem to be shaping the current debates on these contemporary 
issues.
’ Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return o f  the Citizen: A Survey o f Recent 
Work on Citizenship Theory," Ethics. 104 (Januaiy, 1994), 352; Bryan S. Turner, 
"Contemporary Problems in the Theory o f  Citizenship," in Citizenship and Social 
Theory, ed. Bryan S. Turner, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1993), 1.
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Studies which link citizenship to the rise o f  nation-states perceive the former as 
an outcome o f  modernity, -i.e., a transition from status to contract.^ In its simplest 
formulation citizenship corresponds to the status o f membership in a nation-state. But 
this membership has different aspects. In other words, citizenship is a multi-faceted 
notion. For instance, Hammar delineates four interrelated meanings o f  citizenship; 
namely legal, political, social and cultural, and psychological.^ Marshall, whose analysis 
will be used in this study, enlists three elements o f  citizenship that is civil, political, and 
social elements.'* Kymlicka and Norman, on the other hand, evaluate the three 
dimensions o f  legal status, identity, and civic virtue.^ This study aims to highlight the 
evolution and merging o f  those elements in the process o f  citizenization in Turkey. The 
term citizenization is borrowed from Nisbet’s argument that citizenship in the West is 
more than simply a condition or a status; it is a process, with identifiable phases in time 
and with contexts in history which unite it in some degree with other processes such as 
individualism and secularism.”  ^ This study will also try to show that this process o f
 ^Turner, “Contemporary Problems,” 5.
 ^Tomas Hammar, “State, Nation and Dual Citizenship,” in Immigration and the 
Politics o f Citizenship in Europe and North America, ed. William Rogers Brubaker 
(Lanham, New York, London: The German Marshall Fund o f the US, University Press 
o f America Inc., 1989), 81-96.
 ^T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City, New  
York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1965).
 ^Kymlicka and Norman, “Return o f  the Citizen.”
 ^ Robert Nisbet, The Making o f M odem Society, (Great Britain: Wheatsheaf 
Books, 1986), 131.
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citizenization is not peculiar only to the West, but that we can point to “phases in time 
and contexts in history which unite with other processes” in the Turkish case as well.
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical background for the issue o f  citizenship 
and to delineate the basic approaches to the issue, which has been debated throughout 
the modem world history. However, there is a vast literature on citizenship sometimes 
focusing on different aspects o f  the issue. This study will be selective among these 
literature and focus on the studies related with modem citizenship. The theory used in 
this study is classified as historical or historical comparative, and philosophical 
approaches. Historical approach focuses on the development o f  citizenship within 
different historical contexts and its relation with the nation building process. The 
philosophical approach, on the other hand, focuses on the different understandings o f  
citizenship that stem from liberal or republican understanding.
2.1 The Path towards Modern Citizenship
The notion o f citizenship has its origins in ancient Greek civilization. Citizenship 
in the Greek city-states was a status granted to a limited portion o f  the society 
depending on ownership o f property and membership in the upper class; women, 
peasants and slaves were excluded. Aristotle defined citizen as a man “who enjoys the 
right o f sharing in deliberative or judicial office.” Citizens were those “all who share in
16
the civic life o f  ruling and being ruled in turn.”’ In other words as Turner states, 
Aristotle’s conception o f  citizenship required full ownership o f  property, self-discipline 
and education which would in turn create individuals with the capacity to govern and to 
be governed.*  Participation in public debates for making political decisions was the core
o f Greek citizenship.^ The understanding o f citizenship o f  the ancient Greeks provide us 
both a historical background and the basis o f a certain approach, that is, republican
understanding o f citizenship that will be elaborated below.
It is accepted by all the scholars o f  citizenship that modem citizenship is the 
offspring o f the French R evolution .W ith  the French Revolution nation-state and the 
idea o f nationality was brought to the agenda.'' The emergence and evolution o f  the 
nation state brought with it the question o f who the members o f  that state are. After the
French Revolution, all members o f the state regardless o f  their status were regarded 
equal and as citizens together with the preposition that sovereignty rested on the nation.
’ Aristotle, Politics (ed. E. Barker, Clarendon Press, 1946), 108 cited in Derek 
Heater, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education, 
(London and New York: Longman, 1996), 3.
* Bryan Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism, 
(London, Boston, Sydney: Allen and Urwin, 1986).
’ Derek Heater, Citizenship, 4.
Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies o f Our Changing 
Social Order (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1984), 49; 
William Rogers Bmbaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 
(London, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 35.
See, for instance, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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The development o f Western history from the sixteenth century onwards, a 
period labeled as modernization, led to an overall re-interpretation o f  basic concepts and 
phenomena related to the universe, man, and society. In the age o f  Enlightenment, the 
political and intellectual evolution which framed the process o f  modernization eventually 
provided an alternative set o f categories in the studies on society and polity. Intellectual 
transformation from the realm o f  divinity into that o f  positive knowledge accompanied 
the rise o f  the “modem” state. Thus, preoccupations in the area o f  political thought 
came to be stmctured by the zeal to provide grounds for the ideal categorization o f  the 
phenomena as requisites in the stmcturing o f  the modem state.
The modem state in the Western context corresponded to the practice o f  nation­
state. In contrast to the preceding imperial regimes, which had been commonly based on 
divine attributes, this practice o f  mle defined itself on totally different legitimization 
grounds. This connoted a shift in the formation o f  the relationship between the mler and 
the mled. The fact that man was conceptualized as an active, rather than a passive being 
in nature provided a different setting as regards the mler vs. mled.^“*
The traditional perception o f  the mled as subjects was eliminated with the rise o f  
a new concept o f citizenship. Emerging in such a context, this new conceptualization
Karl Mannheim, "The Origin o f  the Modem Epistemological, Psychological, 
and Sociological Points o f  View" in Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the 
Sociology o f Knowledge (San Diego, New York, London: Harvest/HBJ Book, 1985), 
13-33.
Levent Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi (Modernization, 
Kemalism, and Democracy), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1993) 2nd ed., 39-48.
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proposed a mutually responsive relationship between the modem state and the ideal 
citizen. The ideal citizen o f the modem era was defined in terms o f the basic traits o f the
state. 15
Poggi, while stating the developments o f the nineteenth century constitutional 
state, points to the change in the relation between man and state. As different from the 
Greek politeia, Poggi suggests that “the citizens’ commitment to the welfare and 
security o f the state is no longer activated by personal loyalty to the chief That is, 
the state while distancing itself from the people transformed them into citizens, the 
status, which was not granted on certain basis but acquired by birth, and endowed with 
certain rights, and duties which were determined by legal codes and exercised equally 
toward every citizen.
Heater states five distinctive events or strains o f thought which increased the 
concern on citizenship from the eighteenth century onwards as: a) the radical movement 
in England strengthening the tradition o f political freedom and paving the way for 
modernization in the parliamentaiy form o f government; b) the Industrial revolution and 
increasing political consciousness among the working class; c) the French Revolution
William Rogers Bmbaker, "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in 
France and Germany; A Comparative Historical Analysis" International Sociology^ 5:4 
(1990), 380.
Tomas Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1990); Ayşe Kadioglu, "Citizenship, Immigration and Racism in a Unified Germany with 
Special Reference to the Turkish Guestworkers" Journal o f Economics and 
Administrative Studies, 6:2 (1992), 200; Bryan S. Turner, "Postmodern
Culture/Modem Citizens" in The Condition o f Citizenship, ed. Bart van Steenbergen 
(London, California, New Delhi; Sage Publications, 1994), 155-6.
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and its premises mentioned above; d) the socialist doctrines and movements, though 
having an ambivalent effect, on the one hand organizing the working class in parties and 
unions, on the other hand viewing the state-citizen relation as contrary to the proletariat 
mentality; and e) the German idealist philosophers, namely Kant and Hegel, mentioning 
the primacy o f the state and the ethical basis o f  duty, which have provided new sets o f 
arguments on the relations between individual and state.
The Western development o f  citizenship also has deep roots in the evolution 
towards modernity. Badie mentions the evolution from community feeling to individual 
rationality by quoting Tonnies’ theory o f transition form Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellschaft}* The emergence o f individualism in the Western countries experiencing 
Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and capitalism transformed the people to 
individuals “characterized by the absolute value attributed to him in his singularity and 
by the degree o f  independence conceded to him vis-à-vis the group which he belongs 
and the institutions to which he is answerable.”^^  Thus, modernity brought about 
individuals stripped o ff from community ties and as being regarded equal members o f  
the nation state having the initiative to demand rights from the state. That strain o f
Gianfranco Poggi, The Development o f M odem State, (London; Hutchinson 
University Press, 1978), 97.
”  Heater, Citizenship, 63.
Bertrand Badie, "Community, Individualism, and Culture” in Individualism: 
Theories and Methods, eds. Pierre Bimbaum and Jean Leca, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 95-96.
Jean Leca, ‘Individualism and Citizenship”, in Individualism: Theories and 
Methods, 141.
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thought is crucial for understanding the different developments in the West and the 
Turkish case, which is the focus o f this study.
2.2 Nationalism  and N ation-building
2.2.1 Nationalism and citizenship
As modem citizenship is defined as membership o f a nation-state, it is cmcial to
mention briefly the relationship between citizenship and nationalism and the theories on
nationalism. Heater suggests that after the French Revolution and “the Declaration o f
the Rights o f Man and the Citizen, which asserted that ‘The principle o f all sovereignty
rests essentially on the nation,’ citizenship, patriotism, and nationhood were melded into
a powerful and emotionally charged political force.” *^’ Thus Heater adds:
The body o f citizenry, identified as the nation, was endowed with sovereignty 
in both its external and internal guises. Nationally defined citizens formed a 
whole, undivided and integrated state differentiated from all others, the 
consummation o f the post-medieval nation-state and the Westphalian state- 
system.^’
This statement is cmcial for understanding the constmction o f Turkish citizenship that 
went hand in hand with the process o f  nation building. The Turkish republic was 
founded on the premise that sovereignty rested on the people. During this process o f  
nation building both citizenship and nationalism “mutually profited as political ideas and 
practices by their being harnessed together for the political shaping o f the modem
20 Derek Heater, What is Citizenship?, (USA: Polity Press, 1999), 97.
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era.”^  Therefore, this chapter A\all first briefly mention the theories o f nationalism, and 
then will focus on the studies on citizenship, which would be beneficial for the concerns 
o f this thesis.
2.2.2 Theories o f nationalism
. It is accepted by many scholars that nationalism is a by-product o f the French 
Revolution,^ emerging at a certain point in time. There are however, different 
approaches towards nationalism, either viewing it as a construct, as an “imagined 
community” arising out o f the rise o f print capitalism,^ '* or as an evolution in modem  
capitalist history.^ * Habermas argues that nationalism is “a modem phenomenon o f 
cultural integration.”^^  He adds that:
This type o f national consciousness is formed in social movements and emerges 
fi^ om modernization processes at a time when people are at once both mobilized 
and isolated as individuals. Nationalism is a form o f collective consciousness
21 Ibid.
Ibid.
^ See for instance Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780.
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1991).
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London, New York: Verso,
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1983); Hans Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism, (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1958), ed.
“  Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” in The Condition O f 
Citizenship, 22.
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which both presupposes a reflexive appropriation o f cultural traditions that has 
been filtered by historiography and spreads only via the channels o f mass 
communication. Both elements lend nationalism the artificial traits o f something 
that is to a certain extent a construct 27
In line with Habermas’ argument the theories o f nationalism are mainly divided 
into two lines. That is nationalism is analyzed under two main dichotomies, either as 
“ethnic” or as “civic” nationalisms, or “Western” and “Eastern” nationalisms. Before 
going into the details o f these definitions o f different types o f nationalisms, one should 
bear in mind that, as Nieguth argues,
specific nationalisms have in common a core doctrine; that state and nation be 
identical. The process to achieve this goal can start from an existing nation that 
endeavors to create its own state through state-building, or it can start from an 
already existing state which engages in nation-building. The construction and 
distribution o f national membership is very much dependent among other 
factors, on the direction o f this process.^®
“Ethnic” nationalism, as its name connotes, emphasizes the primacy o f ethnicity 
or the inherited cultural identity.^ The ethnic nations are “perceived as social groups 
that exist prior to and independently fi'om particular states.” ®^ The ethnic nations are 
considered as “primordial social entities” and they are the “basis for creating states.” *^ 
On the other hand, in “civic” nationalism nation is defined as “ a community o f  people 
who inhabit a common territory and are citizens o f the same state -  with identical
27 Ibid.
Tim Nieguth, “Beyond dichotomy: concepts o f  the nation and the distribution 
oîmçiTcA>trs\â}p '^' Nations and Nationalism, 5 (2), 1999, 157.
^  Bernard Yack, ‘T he Myth o f the Civic Nation,” Critical Review, 10 (2), 
Spring 1996, 194.
30 Nieguth, “Beyond dichotomy,” 158.
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political, legal and social rights and obligations.”^^  It is a “freely chosen and purely 
political identity o f the participants.”^^  It is believed that in “civic” nationalism people 
get together by a rational choice o f forming a state in which all o f them would be equal 
as citizens o f the state, and would hold a common identity with this citizenship ties, 
without any consideration for common ethnicity or race.^ '^  Therefore, it is argued that in 
“civic” nationalism, citizenship ties are important.
Quite parallel to “ethnic”- “civic” distinctions there is an other distinction for 
viewing nationalism mainly developed by Kohn as “Western” and “Eastern” 
nationalisms. Kohn argues that in the West, nationalism grew out o f a long historical 
evolution that dates back to the Renaissance and Reformation, and its rise was a 
“predominantly political occurrence, preceded by the formation o f the future national 
state.”^^ He argues that, “eastern” nationalism, on the other hand, emerged late 
“generally at a more backward stage o f social and political development: the frontiers o f  
an existing state and o f a rising nationality rarely coincided.”^^  The “western”
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Yack, “The Myth o f the Civic Nation,” 194. 
Ibid., 195.
Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism, 329. It is evident that Kohn prefers “western” 
nationalism against “eastern” nationalism, and we can find value-laden tones in his 
article. This, however, is quite widespread among students o f nationalism. See Anthony 
D. Smith, “Nationalism and Historians,” in Anthony D. Smith (ed.). Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1992), 58-80, for a critique o f Hans 
Kohn’s study.
36 Ibid.
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nationalism was “an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles o f 
the present without much sentimental regard for the past,” whereas, in the “eastern” 
nationalism “an ideal fatherland was created out o f the myths o f the past and the dreams 
o f the future, devoid o f any immediate connection with the present, and expected to 
become sometime a political reality.” ’^ Finally, Kohn argues that “western” nationalism 
was “based upon a nationality that was the product o f  social and political factors,” but 
“eastern” nationalism was based on traditional ties o f  kinship and status.^* These 
“western” or “civic” and “eastern” or “ethnic” divisions o f nationalisms are evident in 
the processes o f nation-building.
As it is argued, in the “western” type formation o f the nation-state and nation­
building coincided, whereas in the “eastern” type the nation-state could be formed long 
after the rise o f the nationalist sentiments. The differences in the processes o f nation 
building gave way to two different types o f states, the definitions o f which are beneficial 
for this study; Staatnation and Kultumation. While Staatnation is a pure political 
arrangement, universalist, state-centered and assimilationist; Kultumation connotes a 
common heritage o f language, tradition, religion and worldview.^^ These two
Ibid., 330.
38 Ibid., 331.
Max J. Skidmore, Ideologies, Politics in Action (Forth Worth: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 270; Brubaker, ’’Introduction” in Immigration and the 
Politics o f Citizenship in Europe and North America, ed., 89-92; Habermas, “Struggles 
for recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” in Multiculturalism: Examining 
the Politics o f Recognition ed. by Amy Guttman (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 
1994) 2nd.edition. For a comprehensive analysis o f the different routes towards 
modernity see Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord 
and Peasant in the Making o f M odem World, (Boston; Beacon Press, 1966).
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conceptions and the evolutions for the formation o f those two different types o f  states 
have, as Turner suggests, different consequences for citizenship conceptualizations.'*^
Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that those dichotomous 
definitions o f nationalism only reflect the ideal-types. Usually, what we come across is 
the merge o f the two definitions. Especially in the Turkish case, there is both 
resemblance to the “Western” and “Eastern” types, or rather we can say that there are 
shifts from one to the other.'** Also, the critique o f Kymlicka on these “ethnic” “civic” 
definitions is worth mentioning here for the purpose o f this study. In his book review, 
Kymlicka argues that cultural nationalism was regarded by most o f the scholars as the 
component o f “ethnic” nationalism, and that the cultural aspect o f “civic” nationalism 
was ignored.'*  ^He suggests that integration with a civic nation and naturalization require 
language o f the state and familiarity with the common culture.'*  ^In addition, by referring 
to Tamir he notes that “ the state cannot avoid expressing a cultural identity when it 
adopts official languages and public holidays.”^
'*** Bryan Turner, “Outline o f a Theory o f Citizenship”, Dimensions o f Radical 
Democracy, Chantal Mouffe (ed.), (London, New York: Verso, 1992), 56. Those 
different types o f nationalisms and citizenship practices will be elaborated in the next 
section.
'** See Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘The Paradox o f Turkish Nationalism and the 
Construction o f Official Identity”, M iddle Eastern Studies 3 2 ,2  (1996), 177-193.
137.
131.
42
43
Will Kymlicka, “Misunderstanding Nationalism,” Dissent, Winter 1995, 130-
Here Kymlicka gives the example o f integration to the American nation. Ibid.,
'*'* Yael Tamir Liberal Nationalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993) cited in ibid., 135.
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At this point, I will briefly touch upon cultural nationalism. According to 
Hutchinson, in cultural nationalism,
the core o f a nation is its unique and differentiated civilization, which is the 
outgrowth o f the strivings o f countless generations settled in unique homelands, 
each one o f which has added its contribution to the common heritage. Nations 
are then not just political units, but creative personalities continually evolving in 
time, and it is to history that its members must return to discover the triumphs 
and tragedies that have formed them and the lessons they may draw for the
future.“*^
The usage o f the Language and History Thesis in Turkey reflects that attempt. For the
process o f nation-building in Turkey one can find the “moral innovators” who
By education rather than by machine politics, aspire to redirect the traditionalist 
and modernist groups away from mutual conflict and instead unite them in the 
task o f creating an integrated distinctive and sovereign community, capable o f  
competing in the modem world. They innovate by introducing a new ideology o f  
the nation in which the accepted meanings o f “tradition” and “modem” are 
transformed. The “modem” (or as it is frequently designated, the “West”) is 
particularized to adherents as a local manifestation o f a universal drive for 
progress to be found in all peoples.“*^
The process o f nation-building and the constmction o f citizenship in the early 
Republican period, which will be elaborated in Chapter IV reflects these moral 
innovations. Especially the case o f Halkevleri (The People’s Houses) is quite parallel to 
Hutchinson’s argument that
They are above all, educational movements, and they seek to rebind the different 
constituents to a presumed common essence, forming decentralized clusters o f 
historical and language societies, dramatic groups, publishing centers, 
agricultural centers and political parties in order to do so.^ ^
John Hutchinson, “Moral Innovators and the Politics o f Regeneration: the 
Distinctive Role o f Cultural Nationalists in Nation-Building,” Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, 103.
46
47
Ibid., 108. 
Ibid., 105.
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Even though Turkey cannot be classified as a third world with respect to its 
strong state tradition and the non-existence o f a colonial past, for the purpose o f this 
study we may benefit from Norbu’s study. Culture and the Politics o f Third World 
Nationalism. Norbu states that “the structure o f nationalism consists o f two equally 
powerful components; traditional data (such as race, language, literature, tradition, 
territoriality), and egalitarian ideology (such as freedom, equality and fi^atemity).” *^ 
Norbu notes that traditional data has been the prevalent component o f  the early third 
world nationalism, and that egalitarian ideology was predominant in western 
nationalism. He adds;
The essence o f contemporary Third World nationalism is a fusion o f modem and 
traditional components, which typically manifest as;
a) societal consciousness about national identity that provides the necessary 
dynamics o f national unity;
b) an all-encompassing value-system to guide and motivate political action;
c) a pan-ethnic movement to generate social power that is utilized to achieve 
national unity and independence;
d) a foreign policy centered upon the concept o f national interest.'*^
In the Turkish experience o f nation-building and constmction o f the citizen, we can see 
the implementation o f those elements. I will try to elaborate on this issue in Chapter IV 
while analyzing the early Republican period.
'** Dawa Norbu, Culture and the Politics o f Third World Nationalism, (London, 
New York; Routledge, 1992), 1.
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2.3 Historical Approach
The historical approach that is used in this study connotes the studies on 
citizenship, which focus specifically on the historical contexts for the evolution o f  
citizenship. The historical or historical-comparative approach is mainly represented by 
Marshall and Brubaker, and the two studies will provide a framework for understanding 
the Turkish citizenship.
Marshall’s analysis is one o f the most cited studies on citizenship. Marshall 
defines citizenship as a “status bestowed on those who are members o f the 
c o m m u n i t y A n d  those who have this status are equal with respect to the rights and 
duties bestowed upon them. Van Steenbergen suggests that with this definition Marshall 
has moved from a strict political definition o f citizenship (state) to a broader and 
sociological definition (citizen-society).^' By taking England as his area o f interest 
Marshall refers to citizenship comprising o f three elements, civil, political and social, 
each signifying subsequent historical epochs. The civil element is the one that emerged 
in the eighteenth century and concerns the rights crucial for individual freedom, -i.e., 
liberty o f the person, freedom o f speech, thought and faith, the right to own property 
and to conclude valid contracts, and the right o f access to justice. According to 
Marshall, the nineteenth century was characterized by the prevalence o f the political
Ibid., 1-2
50 Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, 92.
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element, the right to participate in the exercise o f political power either as the elected or 
elector. Lastly, the twentieth century was perceived as the cradle for the social element, 
which means to ensure that all shared the benefits o f society. While giving an historical 
account o f the rise o f citizenship, Marshall studies the developments in capitalist 
history. More specifically, focusing on the British context, he regards the development 
o f the rights mentioned above as an outcome o f the rising demands o f the working class, 
and attempts on the part o f the ruling class to meet those demands. According to  
Barbalet, together with the development o f capitalism as a social system and the 
clarification and distinction in the class structure, Marshall shows that there occurs a 
shift in modem citizenship from "being a system o f rights arising out o f and supporting 
the market relations towards being a system o f rights within an antagonistic relationship 
between the market and the class system.
Even though Marshall’s analysis is usually regarded as ‘welfare version,’^^  a 
system based on rights,^  ^ Janowitz argues that his sole emphasis was not on rights but
Bart van Steenbergen “The Condition o f Citizenship. An Introduction,” The 
Condition o f Citizenship, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi; Sage Publications, 
1994), 2.
Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, 78.
J.M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality 
(Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1988).
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Turner, “Contemporary problems in the Theory o f Citizenship”; Marshall, 
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elector. Lastly, the twentieth century was perceived as the cradle for the social element, 
which means to ensure that all shared the benefits o f society. While giving an historical 
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history.”  More specifically, focusing on the British context, he regards the development 
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and attempts on the part o f the ruling class to meet those demands. According to 
Barbalet, together with the development o f capitalism as a social system and the 
clarification and distinction in the class structure, Marshall shows that there occurs a 
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system based on rights,^  ^ Janowitz argues that his sole emphasis was not on rights but
Bart van Steenbergen “The Condition o f Citizenship. An Introduction,” The 
Condition o f Citizenship, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi; Sage Publications, 
1994), 2.
Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, 78.
J.M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality 
(Minneapolis; University o f Minnesota Press, 1988).
”  Ibid.
Turner, “Contemporary problems in the Theory o f Citizenship”; Marshall, 
Class, Citizenship and Social Development.
30
that ‘the corresponding duties cannot be ignored.’”  Those duties are based on a sense 
o f responsibility towards the welfare o f the community. Janowitz lists the obligations o f 
citizens according to Marshall as ‘tax payment, education, military service, and the 
promotion o f the welfare o f the community,’ *^ which are however the crucial duties 
attributed to citizens in every system.
Marshall’s analysis is crucial in the sense that, first o f all, he relates the 
development o f citizenship and rights to the evolution in history, namely the capitalist 
development in England. Second is the shift in the definition o f citizenship, a more 
sociological definition. Thirdly, the analysis o f the evolution o f these ci\dl, political and 
social elements and rights attached to them are the remnants o f the liberal version o f  
citizenship as will be discussed below.
Marshall’s analysis still provides the background o f many debates on citizenship. 
A recent study o f Işın and W ood, develops on Marshall’s analysis, but adds a new 
element, that is id en tity .T h ey  define citizenship;
Not only as a set o f legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess
by virtue o f membership in a state, but also as the practices through which
David Burchell, “The Attributes o f Citizens; virtue, manners, and the activity 
o f citizenship”. Economy And Society 24, 4 (November 1995); Habermas, “Citizenship 
and National Identity,” 30.
Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development', Morris Janowitz, 
“Observations on the Sociology o f Citizenship: Obligations and Rights” Social Forces 
59, 1 (1980); Barbalet, Citizenship, 82. However, Barbalet argues that Janowitz 
overstates Marshall’s points on duty. See Barbalet, Citizenship.
58 Janowitz, “Observations’
Engin F. Işın and Patricia K. Wood, Citizenship and Identity, (London, 
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999).
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individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or 
maintain existing rights.^ ®
While analyzing what they term as environmental or feminist citizenships they argue 
that;
To understand citizenship rights in terms o f the right to an identity (the right to 
have rights) as opposed to the passive right o f status, involves, first, a 
reconception o f the meaning o f citizenship, and, second, a reconception o f the 
means o f allocating citizenship rights and the polities from which such rights 
draw legitimacy, from polis to cosmopolis.^*
I will not go into the details o f their arguments, but as it is a new study developing on 
Marshall and as it adds a new element o f identity to Marshall’s study it is worth 
mentioning here. As identity has become a widely debated issue in Turkey, as well as in 
the world, this study may provide us a key for a new approach towards citizenship.
While Marshall’s focus was England from nineteenth century onwards and the 
development o f capitalist system, another historical comparative analysis, that o f 
Brubaker, takes France and Germany and the process o f nation building in those 
countries which provides us two distinct paths for citizenship. Theories o f nationalism 
or nation building also take France and Germany as two distinct cases and as reference 
points for understanding the evolution o f nationalism, and attribute different, sometimes 
normative, characteristics to them, as analyzed in the previous section.^^ Brubaker goes
60
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See for instance Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, Las Vegas, 
London; University o f Nevada Press, 1991). Chattergee quoting Plamenatz (“Two 
Types o f Nationalism” in Nationalism: the Nature and Evolution o f an Idea, ed. by 
Eugene Kamenka(London: Edward Arnold, 1976), pp. 23-26) mentions the ‘Western’ 
and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms . Partha Chattergee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial
further and analyzes the different conceptualizations o f citizenship together with the 
evolution o f nationhood in those two countries. However, before elaborating on the 
French and German conceptions o f citizenship, Brubaker’s definition o f citizenship and 
his model need to be mentioned. In his analysis Brubaker starts with the modem state, 
which he expresses as the “nation state” especiaUy after the French Revolution, as 
“more than a territorial organization, as an organization o f membership or an 
association o f citizens.”^^  Bmbaker claims that in every modem state citizenship 
functions as “both an instmment and object o f closure”, it is inclusive internally but 
exclusive externally.^ The state finds legitimacy by aspiring for the welfare o f its 
citizenry. Bmbaker defines citizenship as membership o f the nation-state. Bmbaker 
draws his argument from the contention that each nation-state attempts to have a certain 
population as its own which can be identified as something more than individuals in 
order that a cohesive and homogeneous nation can be constmcted. By regarding the 
nation-state both as an idea and ideal, Bmbaker delineates six membership norms for the 
ideal-typical model. According to this model, membership should be egalitarian, that 
is, there should be a status o f full membership and no other. Secondly, it should be 
sacred, that is, citizens should make sacrifices or sacred acts for the state. Thirdly, 
membership should be nation-membership·, that is, the political community should
World (Minneapolis; University o f Minnesota Press, Zed Books, 1986), p.l.  See also 
‘The Agenda for Nationalism”, Popular Movements, Political Organization, 
Democracy and the State, ed. by Preben Kaarsholm (Roshilde, International 
Development Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4 ,1992), p.74.
Bmbaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state”; Citizenship and 
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overlap with the cultural community o f shared language and character, which is 
acquired either by birth or through assimilation. Fourthly, membership should be 
democratic, that is, members should participate in the ruling process. Fifthly, 
membership should be unique, people should belong to only one state. Finally, 
membership should be socially consequential, that is, it should be expressed in a 
community o f well-being.^^
Brubaker bases the expansive conception o f citizenship in the French context, 
which he depicts as stemming from the principle o f ju s soli on the contention that 
nationhood in the French vocabulary was state-centered and assimilationist. 
Distinguishing the German case as Pb/A:-centered and differentialist, he finds the 
identifying features o f German citizenship to be based on blood. Taken into 
consideration with the theories o f nationalism it is accepted that, as the emergence o f 
national feeling and the formation o f the nation state coincided in France, with regard to 
the institution o f citizenship the egalitarian, democratic, nationalist and statist aspects 
were closely integrated.^ ® Brubaker views the French Revolution in four different terms 
all coinciding with certain evolutions in the understanding o f citizenship. When it is 
taken as a bourgeois revolution, the corresponding aspect is equality before the law, 
common rights and obligations. With regards to being a democratic revolution, 
citizenship is viewed as 2i general status, contrary to urban citizenship with certain rights
Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 21. 
Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State”, 380-81.
66 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 39-49.
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and privileges, endowed with equal political rights and political participation. As a 
national revolution both nation state and nationalism came to the fore, and the nation 
state is composed o f legally equal individuals. Finally, as a bureaucratic revolution, the 
citizen engages in a direct relation with the state; a total divergence from the structures 
o f the ancien regime.^’
Germany, on the other hand, had experienced a longer nation building process. 
The national feeling and formation o f a nation state did not coincide in Germany. 
Nationalism emerged long before national unification, which brought about a much 
different understanding o f nationalism and citizenship. German nationalism was a kind 
o f reaction to the French Revolution, and the Enlightenment, in short it was anti- 
western. It was based on an ethnic and cultural understanding and on Romantic 
premises.^* In this respect, Brubaker notes that by drawing upon a specific ethno­
cultural dimension, Germany failed to integrate the egalitarian, democratic, nationalist 
and statist aspects o f citizenship, which had been realized in France. Such a remark 
leads him to conclude that evolution o f citizenship in Germany displayed a diversified 
path among formal state membership, participatory citizenship and ethno-cultural nation 
membership.®^
Even though naturalization policies are not the concern o f this study, it is worth 
to mention them briefly as those differences are reflected in the naturalization process
67 Ibid.
Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘T he Paradox o f Turkish Nationalism and the Construction o f  
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and the attitude towards immigrants in France and Germany. As France has a territorial 
understanding o f citizenship, anyone bom in the territory can acquire citizenship rights 
easily. In Germany, on the other hand, only those with Germanic origins can acquire 
those rights as the state has an ethnic and cultural understanding.™
Before focusing on the philosophical approach toward citizenship, a study, 
which combines the historical evolution and philosophical characteristics, is worth 
mentioning. By focusing on the European context. Turner suggests that four different 
forms o f citizenship might be depicted. These four different forms o f citizenship are 
based on two axes, whether citizenship developed from above or below (active/passive) 
and to what extent it is developed in a public or private sphere. By applying those axes 
to the European context. Turner shows that the French case is a revolutionary context, 
where citizenship developed from below within a public sphere whereas American 
liberalism is a liberal pluralism that developed from below but in a private sphere. On 
the other hand, England is viewed as a passive democracy where citizenship developed 
from above and in a public sphere, and finally Germany is viewed as a plebiscitary 
authoritarianism where citizenship was instituted from above and in private sphere, his
table is as follows; 71
Brubaker, ‘Introduction,” 1-27; Citizenship and Nationhood in France and
Germany.
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Citizenship
Above Below
Revolutionary
contexts
Liberal pluralism
Passive democracy
Plebiscitary
authoritarianism
Public Space
Private Space
Turner makes another distinction as radical and formal citizenship, which highlights the 
active/passive and public/private distinction mentioned above. Radical citizenship is the 
outcome o f the developments o f the nineteenth century in Europe, that o f class 
struggles, wars, migration, and the emergence o f new egalitarian ideologies, which 
paved the way for revolutionary-democratic states. Formal citizenship, on the other 
hand, by emphasizing who qualifies to be a citizen, is a criterion formed and initiated by 
governments with the aim o f exclusion and control o f the masses.^ Turner concludes 
that different historical circumstances “give rise to radically different forms o f 
citizenship participation.”’  ^ Those historical analyses provide us a background 
information for the evolution o f modem citizenship. But there is also another approach, 
which stems from the philosophical characteristics and distinctions in the understanding 
o f citizenship.
”  Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism  cited in Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, 
The Politics o f Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore (London and New York; 
Routledge, 1995), 25-26.
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2.4 Philosophical Approach
The philosophical approach stems from different strains o f thought in world 
history. This section will try to highlight the dichotomous characterization o f citizenship 
as a reflection o f those strains o f thought. One strain o f thought is related with 
modernity, namely the liberal thought based on natural law and Locke.^ '* This thought 
has a rather individualistic and instrumentalist understanding, and citizenship is viewed 
as a legal status where there is a distant relation between the state and individual based 
on the acquisition o f benefits and rights from the state.’  ^ Other strain o f thought comes 
from Aristotle and there is a community based and ethical understanding where 
responsibilities toward the state and community have the utmost importance for 
citizenship.
There are also some similar definitions o f citizenship. For instance, Kymlicka 
and Norman’s distinction o f two concepts o f citizenship as "citizenship-as-legal-status" 
and "citizenship-as-desirable-activity" are worth mentioning. "Citizenship-as-legal- 
status" refers to frill membership in a particular community, whereas "citizenship-as- 
desirable-activity" refers to the extent and quality o f citizenship depending on one's 
participation in the community.’  ^ Thus, Stewart argues that this tension on the
73 Turner, “Contemporary Problems in the Theory o f Citizenship”, p.9.
’'* Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity”.
Robert E. Goldwin, “Citizenship and Civility” in Civility and Citizenship in 
Liberal Democratic Societies, ed. by Edward C. Banfield, (New York: Paragon House, 
1992), 43.
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discussions o f citizenship arises out o f two different conceptions o f citizenship.’  ^ He 
distinguishes between state citizenship, referring to a formal legal status o f a nation 
state, and democratic citizenship, as shared membership o f a political community, a 
general distinction shared by almost all students o f citizenship.’*
2.4.1 Liberal-democratic understanding
The “liberal” or “liberal-democratic” understanding o f citizenship is based on the 
basic premises o f liberalism. The individual is regarded as a sovereign and autonomous 
being, and it is the individual, not the community that “comes first.”’  ^ In this 
understanding citizenship is regarded as "status," arising out o f a contract. This is a 
contract held both between the individual and the state and among the individuals.
The liberal understanding gives utmost importance to rights. According to 
Oldfield, “rights inhere in individuals, because individuals are both logically and morally 
prior to society and the state.”*® Therefore, this social contract between the individual
Kymlicka and Norman, "Return o f the Citizen," 353-355.
”  Angus Stewart, “Two Conceptions o f Citizenship”, British Journal o f 
Sociology 46, 1 (March 1995), 63-78.
’* Ibid.; Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 
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and the Nation State. 
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and the state is based on the state’s role as safeguarding the rights o f the sovereign and 
autonomous individuals. On the other hand, the individual citizens do not feel any 
responsibility towards other citizens other than to respect other individuals' rights. 
Goldwin noted that in the Lockean sense, which provides the basis for liberal 
understanding, “what is natural for us is not to act as citizens but to act as individuals, 
with our own personal concerns and interests ... without attention to the good o f the 
others.”*^  Heater argues that in the liberal understanding, “there is no sense that the 
state has any organic existence, bonding the citizens to it and to each other.”*^
The liberal understanding is “an essentially ‘private’ conception” which grants 
the individual the freedom to choose the degree o f their participation in public life. As 
Heater argues:
The acquisition o f citizenly status does not necessitate abandonment o f the 
pursuit o f self-interest. Public and private spheres are kept distinct, and citizens 
are under no obligation to participate in the public arena if they have no 
inclination to do so. Nor have citizens any defined responsibilities vis-à-vis their 
fellow citizens... If the liberal citizen is expected to feel only a limited obligation 
to the state pari passu the state is expected to impinge on the citizen’s life only 
in a feeble way.
In other words, in the liberal understanding the primary focus is on the rights o f the 
citizen rather than the duties. The duties, obligations or responsibilities o f the citizen 
towards the community are quite limited.
Adrian Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?,” Political Quarterly, 
61: 2(1990), 178
81 Goldwin, “Rights, Citizenship, and Civility,” 45. 
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We can suggest that according to liberal understanding the citizen is active. 
He/she has the ability to claim more rights or benefits from the state, and he/she does 
not have to perform specific activities in order to achieve those rights. Besides, if we 
trace the development o f the liberal-democratic understanding o f citizenship in the 
modem world history, those rights were achieved after long stmggles o f the people 
against the state, in other words it was a development from below.
There is a close relationship between the liberal understanding o f citizenship and 
capitalism. Heater lists three similarities between capitalism and citizenship, as 
compared to feudalism. Those are;
1) Pre-capitalist society was based on personal subservience. In contrast, the 
free exercise o f individual initiative is the very essence o f capitalism. 
Similarly, citizenship grew by the extraction o f rights for the individual.
2) Feudal stmcture was hierarchical; capitalism in contrast requires social 
fluidity. The concept o f citizenship took this alteration to the logical 
conclusion equality o f status.
3) Ancien regime society was provincially fragmented. Internal customs 
barriers, even provincially distinct measurements o f weights and capacity, 
were anathema to the capitalist’s essential requirement o f free and open 
access to markets. The integration and solidification o f the nation-state, so 
essential for the capitalist, made way for citizenship as national identity.*^
However, it should be noted that all those transformations were not related merely to
capitalism itself, but as Barbalet suggests “the way in which capitalist development is
likely to remove from the social stmcture class forces which would otherwise inhibit the
progress o f modem citizenship.”*^
Ibid.,6-7. 
Ibid., 8.
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As mentioned earlier in tliis chapter, Marshall’s analysis (even though I classify it 
under historical approach) can also be regarded as an analysis o f the rise o f the liberal 
understanding o f citizenship. By focusing on the evolution o f rights during the capitalist 
history o f the Great Britain, Marshall’s analysis is an account for rights-based liberal 
understanding. Also, it is an account o f the struggle and achievements o f the active 
citizens for the extension o f rights to the wider society.
2.4.2 Civic-republican understanding
The civic-republican understanding is the other main understanding in the 
dichotomy mentioned above. “Republic” according to Heater stands for “a 
constitutional system with some form o f sharing out o f power to prevent concentrated 
arbitrary and autocratic government,” and “civic” means “the involvement o f the 
citizenry in public affairs to the mutual benefit o f the individual and the community.”*^  
This understanding has its roots in the ancient Greek political philosophy.*^ It is mainly 
inspired from Aristotle who defined the citizens as those “who share in the civic life o f 
ruling and being ruled in turn.” By relying on the Greek city-states as the basis for the 
theory, this undertjfanding emphasizes the importance o f civic virtue and common good. 
Thus, Oldfield defiped civic-republicanism as:
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First o f all citizenship is not a status, but a practice or an activity, which is 
underpinned by an attitude o f mind. It is by acting, by public service o f fairly 
specific kinds, that individuals demonstrate that they are citizens.**
Contrary to the liberal understanding that places the individual at the core, the
civic republican understanding emphasizes the community. Individuals are not perceived
as being prior to society. They do not have any sovereignty, as it has been in the liberal-
democratic understanding. Their existence depends on the social context. “Only if  the
community is sustained in being that the practice o f citizenship is ensured continuity in
time, and the identity o f individuals as citizens is preserved.”*^  On the other hand, the
civic republican conception regards citizenship as "practice." The emphasis is on "duty"
rather than "right." There are socially defined goals with duties, as in the case o f being a
citizen. As distinct from the liberal democratic understanding o f contract, social bonds
in civic republicanism are based on the communal sharing o f life. An individual becomes
a citizen when he/she performs the duties o f citizenship.^
The civic-republican understanding is represented by some philosophers
throughout modem history. Machiavelli emphasized the importance o f civic virtue
(virtu). According to his thought:
The good citizen, effectively educated in the precepts o f virtii, must lead an 
active life, whether civilian or military. In civilian life the citizen must take a 
positive interest in public affairs, and above all, refrain from according to priority 
o f a private life o f wealth, luxury, and ease over a commitment to the general 
public good.
* Oldfield, “Citizenship; An Unnatural Practice?, 181.
*^Ibid.
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Military service provides the discipline necessary to convert the naturally wicked 
man into a virtuous, patriotic citizen
On the other hand, Rousseau introduced General Will as a solution for the 
question o f “How can men subject themselves to government, which is necessary for 
security, while, at the same time, retaining their freedom, which is their moral right?”*^  
General will is critical for the civic-republican understanding. The community is at the 
core, and the citizens comprise an organic whole. Rousseau explained this as: “Each one 
o f us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction 
o f the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part o f 
the whole.”^^
Habermas describes the civic-republican understanding as a communitarian and
ethical understanding. He notes that in civic-republican understanding citizenship is:
conceived in analogy to the model o f achieved membership in a self-determining 
ethical community. The citizens are integrated into the political community like 
parts o f a whole; that is in such a manner that they can only form their personal 
and social identity in this horizon o f shared traditions and intersubjectively 
recognized institutions. ... Citizenship can only be realized as a joint practice o f 
self-determination.’'*
As can be seen from those definitions, both liberal-democratic and civic- 
republican understandings o f citizenship are crucial for understanding the citizenship 
practices o f a state. I will return to those definitions throughout this study.
’ * Heater, What is Citizenship? 49. 
Ibid., 50.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (ed.) M. Cranston, 
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2.5 Definition of obligations
As can be traced form these studies mentioned above, citizenship theoiy carries 
in itself a dichotomy o f emphasis on rights and emphasis on duties. Even if  the ideal 
seems to be a balance between the two, it is hard to point a state where this balance was 
achieved. Usually, rights-based account o f citizenship is adopted in the West. For the 
case o f non-western countries. Hill and Kwen Fee’s study on Singapore is significant.^ ^ 
They suggest that in the process o f nation building Singapore adopted a notion o f  
citizenship inclined to emphasize duties more. The following chapters will trace this 
dichotomy in the construction o f citizenship in Turkey.
Education and especially civic education had been regarded crucial. The Greek 
civic education was based on the development o f individual and judicial skills, rhetoric 
and judgment. Furthermore, indoctrination o f the youth for obedience to laws and 
submission to government and encouragement for military service to defend the state 
were emphasized.^^ Virtue and community feeling were the key elements o f Greek 
citizenship, and education had been used for the transmission o f those values to the 
youth.
By drawing on Hobbes’ argument that “man is made fit for society not by 
nature, but by education” ’^ and emphasizing the influence o f Christianity on modem
Hill and Kwen Fee, The Politics o f Nation Building and Citizenship in 
Singapore.
96 Heater, Citizenship, pp. 6-7.
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‘passive’ citizen, Burchell argues that the (Christian) citizen has been formed by two 
parallel p r o c e s s e s O n e  is the external discipline imposed through formal education 
and the social discipline o f polizei or police,^ and the self-discipline gained through a 
new kind o f civil conduct.
As the modem nation states and modem citizenship began to develop, education 
acquired much more importance. First o f all, together with the development o f 
capitalism and division o f labor the need for qualified and educated work force 
increased. This paved the way for elementary education to be compulsory. With the 
emergence o f nation states, cohesion o f the population and the inculcation o f the feeling 
and consciousness o f national identity were achieved vrith the spread o f education.*®® It 
is within this context that many states included civic education courses in their 
curriculums.*®*
Bernard Gert (ed.) Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen (De Homine and De 
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Depending on the kind o f regime and types o f education under these regimes 
education might be considered either “to produce good citizens who hears the voice o f 
‘the State’ within him” ®^^ or “a subject o f contestation determined by the struggle within 
the state apparatuses and the civil society and decisively dependent on the public.”*“^  
However, as Heater argues, citizenship education usually refers to ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ simply as political rights such as voting and duties such as tax and 
military service, but civic rights such as equality before law, or freedom o f speech are 
undermined.*®'* Nevertheless, civic education stands as a crucial and integrative element 
for the acquisition o f a feeling o f citizenship in every state.
Militaiy service has been one o f the determining' elements for citizenship 
throughout history, in Greek polis, Romans, and then in medieval cities. The citizen- 
soldiers bore arms when their city was in need o f defense. Turner cites Weber’s The 
City where Weber points to the origins o f citizenship to be found in the formation o f an 
infantry and the development o f the urban militia.*®  ^ Civic virtue according to 
Macchiavelli was dependent on an armed citizenry. Therefore, modern nation states
Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago 
Press, 1983); and Carol Vincent “Education for the Community” British Journal o f 
Educational Studies 31, 4 (December 1993), 366-380; Eric B. Goldwin, National 
Service, Citizenship and Political Education, (Albany: State University o f New York 
Press, 1992). For the case o f Turkey see Füsun Üstel.
*®^ Gentile’s words from Education in the 20th. Century World, 251 quoted in 
Heater, Citizenship, 214 for totalitarian regimes.
*®^ Englund, “The Public and the Text”,2.
*®'* Heater, Citizenship,260.
*®^ Turner, ’’Contemporary Problems in the Theory o f Citizenship”, 4.
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exercise military service and conscription in various degrees. Starting from the French 
Revolution conscription was used as an integrative force for the nation. Those who had 
completed military service had a higher citizenship status. Besides, after the French 
Revolution through militaiy service, the idea o f nationalism had been strengthened, and 
during their service men acquired a feeling o f “us” and “others”.
Janowitz makes a significant point with regard to the relation between military 
service, citizenship and political democracy. He suggests that the citizen army formed 
by conscription may be a device for political control o f the military professionals. 
That argument, however, is based on the western experience and may be easily refuted 
in the non-western cases.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I tried to have a selective literature review o f the theories on 
citizenship. The aim was to sketch out a mapping o f citizenship, with its historical 
background, different traditions o f thought and with its basic elements. Modem  
citizenship seems to be an institution emerged in the West under certain historical 
circumstances. However, contrary to the argument o f some scholars, like Nisbet or 
Kohn, I argue that citizenship is not a unique institution o f the West. In this thesis, I will 
try to show that the citizenization process was and is being experienced in Turkey as
Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies”, 
Armed Forces and Society (2) 2, Febmary 1976.
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well. The theoretical approaches that were analyzed throughout this chapter will be 
utilized for the Turkish case. The nation-building process and nationalism in Turkey 
have always been debated by referring either to the “Western” or French model, or to 
the “Eastern” or German model. As one o f the citizenship theories I discussed in this 
chapter draws parallels with different types o f nation-building and citizenship practices, 
I will use this approach to trace the adoption o f those models for citizenship. The other 
historical approach developed by Marshall and his elements o f citizenship, namely civil, 
political, and social elements, will be searched for in the history o f the Turkish Republic. 
The liberal-democratic and civic-republican understandings will be traced. As most o f  
the scholars o f Turkish politics argue,*®* civic-republican citizenship has been prevalent 
in the republican history. This study will try to show the adoption o f civic-republican 
understanding and the shifts towards the liberal-democratic understanding in certain 
periods o f time through utilizing legal documents, and the social and political history o f 
Turkey. The following chapters intend to trace the issue in the republican history, to 
document the issue and to reach a definition or meaning o f citizenship with respect to 
Turkey.
107 Ibid. p. 227.
*®* See for instance. Füsun Üstel, “Cumhuriyetken bu yana Yurttaş Profili,” [The 
Profile o f the Citizen since the Republic] Yeni Yüzyıl, 24 April 1996; Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 
Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınlan, 1999); E. Fuat 
Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunu: Anayasal 
Vatandaşlık ve Demokratik Açılım Olasılığı” [Turkish Modernization and the Problem 
o f National Identity: Constitutional Citizenship and Possibility o f a Democratic 
Solution], 75 Yılda Tebba’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru [From Subject to Citizen in 75 years] 
(ed.) Artun Ünsal,(İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayınlan, 1998), 169-180.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE OTTOMAN EXPERIENCE
This chapter tries to highlight the development o f the notion o f “citizenship” in 
the Ottoman Empire in order to provide a background for Republican Turkey, which is 
the primary focus o f this study. In this respect, the aim o f this chapter is to analyze the 
path the Ottoman Empire took in the search for an “Ottoman” citizenship, which would 
be helpful for a better understanding o f Republican Turkey.
The notion o f citizenship was not familiar in the Ottoman Empire until the 
nineteenth century. It was this period when together with modernization attempts the 
question o f “Ottoman” citizenship which would surpass the various identities and 
cleavages present within the Empire and grasp all the so-called Ottoman subjects 
emerged. Therefore, in this chapter, I will analyze the issue o f  “Ottoman” citizenship, 
how and why the notion emerged, and what the basic traits o f the “Ottoman” 
citizenship were. In doing so, the modernization attempts and the social and political
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developments, especially starting from the eighteenth century until the collapse o f  the 
Empire will be analyzed.
3.1 Overview of the Social Structure
Ottoman social, economic and political structure before the eighteenth century 
was divided into two classes. The first one was called as the askeri, which literally 
means military, but used for the ruling class that is, the “officers o f the court and the 
army, civil servants and the ulema, the corps o f the learned.”* The second group was 
the reaya, composed o f the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects o f the Empire. They were 
the peasants, and artisans and traders.^ The ruling group was not engaged in any 
productive activities, and therefore they did not pay any taxes. Reaya was the group 
which was engaged in production and who paid taxes. The ruling elite did not have any 
ties with the rest o f the society.
The land system was based on granting land to local notables in exchange for 
military service, that is the Umar system. However this land system was arranged in a 
way that when the Umar holder died or failed to exercise his duties the land was taken
* Halil İnalcık, “The Nature o f Traditional Society. Turkey,” in Political 
Modernization in Japan and Turkey, eds. Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 44; and Niyazi Herkes, The 
Development o f Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 10. 
Also Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, (New  
Rochelle, New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973), 65-69; Satnford Shaw, History 
o f the Ottoman Empire and M odem Turkey, V ol.l (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), Empire o f the Gazis: The Rise and Decline o f the Ottoman Empire.
2 TIbid.
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away fiom the family. Tımar system was organized in a way that did not permit the 
emergence or strengthening o f local aristocracy.^ Timor holders had to serve for the 
military when they were needed. The other regular army was composed o f the 
Janisarries and Kapıkulu who were children taken away from Christian families and 
were assimilated into the army. The existence o f the Umar system, which was a barrier 
for the existence o f an aristocracy, led to a different development in the Ottoman 
Empire from the Western states. In the West, aristocracy had played significant roles in 
modernization; they became influential actors for democracy.'* In addition the »dstence 
o f an aristocracy had provided a limitation on the ruler’s authority. In the Ottoman 
case, however, this lack o f aristocracy gave way to a strong state tradition.^
3.1.1 M illet system
In order to understand the nation formation in the Ottoman Empire, Karpat 
argues that one has to study the millet system.^ The Empire, especially after the 
conquest o f Constantinople was composed o f different ethnic and religious
 ^ Emre Kongar, İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı, 
(İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985), 5* ed.
1985).
See Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy 
See Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, (Walkington: The Eothen Press,
 ^ Kemal Karpat, “M illets and Nationality; The Roots o f the Incongruity o f  
Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, Christicms and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire: The Functioning o f a Plural Society, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard
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communities. The state never made any attempt to assimilate the people, nor forced 
them to convert to Islam. Instead, starting from Mehmed IPs reign, a system that was 
rather unique to the Ottoman Empire was put into practice.^ This was the M illet 
system, which was based on the differentiation o f people on religious grounds.
M illet system was derived partly from Islamic law, according to which people 
from other religions were left free within their internal affairs; had their own judicial 
systems; and their material and spiritual life, honor and property were under the 
guarantee o f the state. Moreover, they were not recruited into the military. In return for 
this they had to pay a certain tax, cizye^ According to this system every community, 
particularly the Christians and Jews, selected their own leader who would conduct its 
internal affairs and who would be in touch with the state. Ortaylı argues that, the 
system led to closed and compartmentalized groups and, diminished the possibility o f  
“a common Ottoman culture in written culture, science and thought.”  ^ The main 
characteristic o f  this system was differentiating people not according to their ethnic 
origins but according to religion and not trying to merge people into one, but accepting 
it as it was. Rodrigue and Reynolds suggest that it was “a recognition o f difference”. *
Lewis, v .l The Central Lands, (New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 
1982).
 ^Aron Rodrigue,. “Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire: Interview 
Stanford Humanities Review, 5,1 (1995).
* Cevdet Küçük, “Osmanli’da “M illet Sistemi ve Tanzimat”, "[Millet Sysytem  
in the Ottomans and Tanzimat\ Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 
[Encyclopedia o f Turkey from the Tanzimat to the Republic] Vol. 4, 1007.
’ ilber Ortaylı, “Osmanli İmparatorluğunda M illet”, [Millet in the Ottoman 
Empire] Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia o f  Turkey 
from the Tanzimat to the Republic], Vol. 4, 996-1001.
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the difference which was ascribed and not articulated on the basis o f rights.^ ® 
Therefore, the millet system was not a system o f equality; each millet had a separate 
function and status.*^ Thus, the millet system functioned in quite a different manner 
from citizenship. While citizenship functions as an “equalizing and universalizing” 
institution, the millet system’s main function was the differentiation o f the population 
on the basis o f religious differences. Thus, due to the implementation o f the millet 
system, the Ottoman Empire could not bring about a common identity for its subjects. 
It is argued by many scholars that this difference and the system itself paved the way 
for the emergence and rise o f nationalistic feelings among the millets quite before the 
Turks in the nineteenth century.
3.1.2 Ottoman Philosophy o f State Regulation
These implementations and structures mentioned above reflect the Ottoman 
philosophy o f regulating the state. There was an understanding o f traditionalism, based 
on the Ancient Law. The society was segregated into groups, which had different 
statuses and roles. The aim behind this was to prevent deviations and to keep everyone 
in its traditional place, in other words, to maintain order. Berkes argues that as no idea 
o f individual freedom existed in the medieval system o f state, there was no notion o f  
natural rights or o f citizen sh ip .E very group functioned as one organ o f the body; thus
10
11
Rodrigue, “Difference,” 82. 
Secularism, 11-12.
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equality was out o f the question. The values o f those functions and the positions people 
held were always based on the will and order o f God.
Consequently, the Ottoman social system was based on a certain type o f order 
that had to be kept as it was.‘  ^ Kongar quotes İnalcık as “the aim o f the state was to 
prevent the society’s traditional organization from changing.” '^* That system prevented 
the formation o f social classes as experienced in Europe and modernization attempts in 
the Ottoman Empire followed a rather different as well as a difficult path.
3.2 Modernization Attempts
Modernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire started during the eighteenth 
century.*^ Mahmud II’s reign is crucial for understanding the roots o f  the Ottoman 
modernization. When Mahmud II ascended the throne the country was in turmoil. The 
local notables were getting stronger and were almost rebelling against the dynasty.
‘^Ibid., 13.
Berkes lists five ruling principles for the Ottoman Empire. The first is 
traditionalism, which suggested that every individual should remain as God willed. 
Second, each group should be protected from the influences that would disturb the 
order. Third, each group or individual should remain where it was according to the 
tradition. Fourth, the military and the ruling group should have no roots in the society 
and should pay allegiance only to the ruler. Fifth, to maintain a balance among the 
various status groups, which was called nizam, the preservation o f order was necessary. 
See, Berkes, Secularism^ 11-13.
14 Kongar, İmparatorluktan Günümüze, 58.
There are different views on the starting period o f Ottoman modernization. 
Some view  Sened-i İttifak (1808) as the starting point while others regard Tanzimat as 
the beginning.
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Therefore in 1808 Sened-i İttifak “the first public law” in the Turkish history was 
proclaimed.*^ According to İnalcık, Sened-i İttifak is the reflection o f the local 
notables’, that is ayari's, aspirations for the control o f state power, and in this sense it 
was a traditional document.*^ Even though Sened-i İttifak is regarded by some as the 
first constitutional development in Ottoman history it can be regarded as an agreement 
between the local notables and the State for safeguarding their powers, benefits and 
security. Apart from those features, it was a starting point, which would later lead to 
Tanzimat and the Constitution o f 1876.
While viewing the changes in the Ottoman Empire as a kind o f change fi'om the 
medieval religious order to a more secular one, Berkes notes the significance o f 
Mahmud II’s reign, as the period during which the “idea o f an Ottoman state” with the 
people, as the basis o f its sovereignty; and the Sultan, Mahmud II, as the enlightener o f  
the people emerged.*® Those were not merely the desires o f a ruler, but the traditional 
structure o f the Empire; especially the age old army o f the Empire was in deterioration 
and could not keep up with the technological development in the West. Those were the 
attempts for restoring the strength o f the Empire. Therefore, modernization and 
westernization started from the military.
Mahmud II firstly crashed down the Janissaries and began to form a new army. 
As the old system o f Janissaries was abolished there was a requirement for a new 
system, therefore conscription was to be the solution. Reform and modernization o f the 
army, which was the original aim, did not stay within the boundaries o f military issues.
*^  Halil İnalcık, “Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu”, Belleten, 
October 1964,28 (112), 603.
17 Ibid.
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It spread form the military to schools, to medical schools, and especially significant for 
the period o f Mahmud II to the centralization o f government, and a new form o f  
taxation. The first census in Ottoman history was held in 1830.^ ^ In other words a new 
kind o f surveillance was introduced^“ which could be regarded as an attempt o f 
transition from viewing the people as a mass to, in a sense, transform that mass into the 
citizens o f the Empire. Besides, a significant development occurred in 1831 for the 
inculcation o f the Ottoman people, the first Ottoman newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi 
began to be published, with the purpose o f raising the consciousness o f  the people. 
This purpose would continue throughout the Republican history as well, raising o f a 
secular and rational generation was seen as a crucial element in the survival o f the 
state.^  ^ Later, the ruling elite would emphasize on the issuing o f regular newspaper
18 Berkes, Secularism, 92.
This census was applied only for men, and the ethnic characteristics based on 
religigous differences as well as job statuses were also investigated. The total 
population o f men was 3,753,642. See, Nuri Akbayar, “Tanzimat’tan sonra Osmanli 
Devleti Nüfiısu,” [The Population o f the Ottoman State after the Tanzimat] 
Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia o f Turkey from 
Tanzimat to the Republic], Vol. 5, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1985), 1239.
For details o f surveillance, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth o f the Prison, (New York: Random House, 1979); and Stewart R. Clegg, 
Frameworks o f Power, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), 
153-159, 167-178.
Ortaylı argues that, population records were significant formations in the 19**' 
century, reflecting the increasing relations between the state and its subjects. See, Über 
Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century o f the Empire], 
(Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1995), 3"* ed., 31.
Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 59, quoted in Metin Heper, ‘Türkiye’de 
Unutulan Halk ve Birey” [The Forgotten People and The Individual in Turkey] in 75 
Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru [From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years] ed. Artun 
Ünsal, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayınları, 1998), 44.
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both “as a tool to strengthen the ties between the subjects and the state, as well as to 
declare and express its ideology and activities to its subjects and the other countries.”^^  
Even though those developments roughly seem to resemble the developments in 
the West on the surface, a rising middle class, who would voice their demands and 
carry out these developments was lacking in the Ottoman experience. As can be traced 
throughout the following years as w ell, those attempts and developments were initiated 
by the ruler as a reaction to, and often as against the West.
3.2.1 Tanzimat Period
The developments initiated during Mahmud II’s reign continued and gained 
impetus after his death. In 1839 Giilhane Hatt-i Hümayunu was proclaimed by Mustafa 
Reşit Paşa. It was an attempt to reform and modernize the state attempt to hold the 
Empire together under a certain “Ottoman” identity. In 1826 Greeks had rebelled 
against the Empire and later in 1830 they formed their own state, in other words the 
country started to experience nationalistic movements within its territories together 
with increasing military defeats. It is a widely accepted view that Tanzimat Charter was 
declared partly because o f pressure fi’om the West.^ '*
The Hatt-i Hümayun brought certain changes to the regulation o f state affairs. 
First o f all, the charter brought limitations to the Sultan’s powers. However, that 
limitation did not pave the way for popular sovereignty, even though it was “the
23 Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 39; 173-175.
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abolition o f the medieval doctrine o f  sovereignty.”^^  It was rather an attempt to 
safeguard the bureaucracy against the Sultan. From that time on the bureaucracy started 
to gain a control the affairs o f the State increasingly. The charter had granted equal 
rights o f liberty, property and equality before the law for everyone within the Empire 
for the first time in Ottoman history. It aimed at introducing a new “Ottoman” 
identity that would surpass the religious cleavages, that is the millet system and would 
grasp within itself all the subjects o f the Empire regardless o f their religious or ethnic 
identities. It was an attempt to abolish the millet structures and to construct a new 
identity for all the subjects o f the empire that would hold them together. Tanzimat was 
the beginning o f a search for a common “identity” for the subjects o f the Empire and 
this search would continue until the end o f the Ottoman period. There were three main 
areas o f reform; those were guarantees o f life, liberty and property, just and public 
trials with certain regulations on the side o f law; a new and regular taxation system; 
and a regular system o f military conscription.^^ We can suggest that, referring to 
Marshall, by the proclamation o f the Tanzimat Charter civil rights were for the first 
time introduced to the Ottoman society. The contents and proposals o f the Edict were, 
according to Davison, the reflections o f the French and American Revolutions, and
See Berkes, Secularism, 139-141; Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 
34; Davison, Reform in The Ottoman Empire, 234-270.
Berkes, Secularism, 146.
Ibid., Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876,26
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 39.
27 fİnalcık, “Sened-i İttifak,” 612.
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provided the basis for more change in the future, that is The Reform Edict and The 
Constitution o f 1876.^^
3.2.2 The Reform Edict
In 1856 another edict was issued by the Ottoman government, which can be 
regarded as a complementary o f the Tanzimat. The Reform Edict was the continuation 
and furthering o f the reforms introduced by the Tanzimat. In line with the idea o f  
Ottomanism the Reform Edict aimed at furthering the equality between the Muslims 
and non-Muslims brought about by the Tanzimat. The Reform Edict o f 1856 laid more 
emphasis on the equality o f the Ottoman subjects. In line with this emphasis the 
testimony o f the Christians were allowed in some judicial matters, the tax paid by the 
non-Muslims in place o f military service was abolished and as mentioned previously 
military conscription started to be implemented for everyone in the Empire regardless 
o f religion.^^ In 1843 the term o f military service was determined to be five years, and 
another seven years in the reserves. All o f those developments; that is equality in 
“matters o f military service, administration o f justice, taxation, admission to civil and 
military schools, public employment, and social respect” *^* were reflections o f the idea
Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 39. 
Ibid., 55.
Ibid.
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o f Ottomanism. In this respect one can see the shift from the Ancient Law to more 
secular laws.^ *
As Davison argues, the content o f the Reform Edict introduced a new concept 
o f patriotism or “compatriotism” as the bond that would hold the Ottoman subjects 
together. The crucial development o f the Reform Edict for this study is the introduction 
o f the term vatandaş (citizen) for the first time.“  It was during that period that the term 
“vatan” which was previously used for the place o f birth acquired a new meaning, the 
fatherland.^ ^ Those were the attempts to shift from the millet system into a more 
secular and equal identity for every subject o f the Empire. Behind those attempts was 
the pressure from western powers and the desires to save the Empire from collapse. 
Another development related with the notion o f Ottoman citizenship was the issuing o f  
passports starting from 1844. Those passports were the oflFspring o f the population 
records, nüfus tezkeresi or nüfus cüzdanı, and mürur tezkeresi (identity documents) 
used for domestic travels.^ '* Those papers were issued on the basis o f population 
censuses and for acquiring records o f the subjects o f the Empire. The aim was to make 
the people realize their responsibilities towards the state, like paying taxes and military 
service, by being the citizens o f the Empire, in other words nüfus tezkeresi was “a
Ibid ., Berkes, Secularism, 152.
Bianchi, Khaththy Humaioun quoted in Davison, p.56 note 15.
See Bernard Lewis, “Watan” in The Impact o f Western Nationalisms, eds. 
Jehuda Reinharz and George L. M osse, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1992), 169-179.
See note 18 in Kemal Karpat, “M illets and Nationality,” 169 cited from 
Kemal Karpat, an Inquiry into the Social Foundations o f Nationalism in the Ottoman 
State, (Princeton, 1973), 75 if.
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proof o f citizenship.”^^  Karpat mentions the usage o f the notion o f “tabaqyi saltanatı 
seniyye’’ or Subjects o f His High Majesty in the 1839 Edict and after 1856, as an 
attempt to “reconcile the Ottoman concept o f nationality stemming from the millet 
experience with the European idea o f citizenship.”^^  Finally on January 23, 1869 the 
first legal regulation regarding Ottoman citizenship, Tabiiyet-i Osmaniyye’ye dair 
Nizamname was amended. However, both “tabaayi saltanatı seniyye” and the 
citizenship law used to notion o f tebaa meaning “subject” instead o f “citizen”, 
Uluocak points to the usage o f vatandaşlık (citizenship) and tabiiyet (nationality- 
deriving from tebaa) synonymously.
The reason behind the declaration o f this law was to control and stop the non- 
Muslim subjects o f the Empire from acquiring the nationality o f Western states and 
using this citizenship in the territories o f the Ottoman Empire to benefit from the 
capitulations. The Citizenship Law was the first o f its kind in the Ottoman Empire and 
was prepared according to the European laws. It was composed o f nine articles stating 
the ways o f acquiring Ottoman citizenship.
The citizenship law was based on descent, that is, every individual bom o f  
Ottoman parents, or from an Ottoman father, was regarded an Ottoman citizen. 
Besides, territorial understanding could also be implemented in a limited manner for 
those bom in the territory o f the Empire within three years after they reach maturity. In
35
36
Ibid.
Kemal Karpat, “M illets and Nationality,”163.
Nihal Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Karşılaştırmalı Uygulamalı 
[Turkish Citizenship Law: Comparative, implementations], (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi,
1989), 3"*· ed., 16.
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addition, foreigners could also acquire Ottoman citizenship by the decision o f the legal
Q
authorities.
3.2.3 The 1876 Constitution
The proclamation o f the Reform Edict could not succeed in solving the 
problems o f the Empire. Besides, both the nationalistic movements and the pressure 
coming from the Western powers were intensified. During that period an intellectual 
movement o f opposition emerged from the bureaucratic elite o f the Bab-i. Âli. 
Intellectuals working in the translation bureau o f the Bah-iAli who were well educated 
got together and formed an association for advocating the transition to constitutional 
monarchy. They were known as the Young Ottomans. The members o f this group had 
various and sometimes; diverse views to save the Empire. Their thought ranged from 
“constitutionalist liberalism to modem Islamism, even to the seeds o f Turkism and 
socialism”^^  and they were influential both in the proclamation o f the Constitution and 
later in the emergence o f the Young Turk movement. The Young Ottoman movement 
was a movement o f the intellectuals opposing and criticizing the mler by using the
-JO  ·  · ·  ·
Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku [Citizenship Law], (Istanbul: Filiz 
Kitabevi, 1993), 8* ed., 44-45; Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, 20-21.
İlber Ortaylı, “Bir Aydın Grubu: Yeni Osmanlılar,”[An Intellectual Group. 
The New Ottomans] Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, [Encyclopedia 
o f Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic], Vol.6, 1702-1703.
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press in order to create a public opinion for the first time in Ottoman history/*® 
According to Berkes, the Young Ottomans were criticizing
a) the economic plight o f the masses o f Muslims and the financial condition o f 
the Empire;
b) the increasing dependence o f Turkey upon the rivalries o f the great powers 
and the increasing interference o f those powers in the internal affairs o f 
Turkey which intensified the bitterness between the Muslim and Christian 
subjects o f the Empire;
c) the irresponsible policies o f the government and the financial follies o f the 
ruler/**
It was Namık Kemal, the significant member o f the young Ottomans who started using 
vatan as connoting the fatherland. There was a deep patriotism rising among this 
group, and thus they proposed Ottomanism, a common identity for all the members o f 
the Empire, together with constitutional monarchy as the remedy for the problems o f 
the Empire. Even though they spoke o f the equality o f  the members o f the Empire they 
were strongly influenced by Islamic thought.
The significance o f the Young Ottomans lies in their being the first opposition 
movement o f the intellectuals, their usage o f the press for voicing their views and their 
belief in Ottomanism to save the Empire. In addition they were influential in the 
promulgation o f the constitution o f 1876.
On the background o f the promulgation o f the 1876 constitution there were the 
domestic problems, the dissolution o f the Empire, and the pressure o f the great powers. 
It was both an attempt to hold the Empire together and to stop the great powers’ 
interference in the domestic affairs o f the Ottoman Empire. It was a reflection o f the
^  Şerif Mardin, Yeni Osmanli Düşüncesinin Doğuşu [The Genesis o f  the 
Young Ottoman Thought] (Istanbul; İletişim Yayınlan, 1996); Davison, Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, 111.
'** Berkes, Secularism, 206.
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bureaucracy’s getting the upper hand in state affairs. Under these conditions. Midhat 
Paşa prepared the proposal o f the constitution. It was mainly formed around the idea o f 
Ottomanism, which would hold the subjects o f the Empire, Muslim and non-Muslim 
together, and it would “insure that the needed reforms and progress o f all the peoples 
o f the Empire are achieved.”^^  Tanör suggests that by taking Ottomanism and a 
common fatherland as the premise, the 1876 constitution was realistic.'*^ The 
constitutional regime o f 1876 brought about changes on three grounds; transition to 
secular, fixed, and objective rules in state affairs; attempt for a modem separation o f  
powers; recognition o f individual rights and formation o f a legislative assembly.“*^  Thus 
the Constitution placed a lot o f emphasis on the rights o f the individuals. Those were; 
equality before the law, individual liberty, freedom o f press “within the limits o f law,” 
the right o f petition, right to education, right to acquire jobs in public offices, security 
o f property, taxation according to law, and freedom from arbitrary punishment and 
torture.'*  ^But there was also an article on the Constitution stating that the Sultan could 
shelve the Constitution and the parliament any time he regarded as appropriate and 
necessary. Tanör views the constitution o f 1876 as a ferman, by underlining the fact 
that the Sultan was the head o f the executive and the members o f one o f the chambers
42 Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire
Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (OTAĞ) [Ottoman 
Turkish Constitutional Developments], (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınlan, 1998), ed.
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44 H. N. Kübalı, Türk Esas Teşkilat Hukuku, p.77 cited in Tanör, OTAĞ
Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri “Senedi 
İttifaktan Günümüze” [Turkish Constitutional Texts: Since Senedi İttifak until Today], 
(Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınlan, 1985), 32-33; A. Şeref Gözübüyül^ 
Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları [Turkish Constitutions], (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi 
Yayınları, 19958, 6; Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 387.
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were directly appointed by the Sultan/** Consequently, it is hard to suggest that by the 
Constitution o f 1876 sovereignty moved from the Sultan to the public, or executive to 
the Assembly. Berkes notes that “the ruler was not bound by the constitution, the 
constitution was bound by his w ill.”^^
Under these circumstances, the first parliament opened in March 1877. It was a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious parliament where non-Muslims were over the one 
third o f the total number. However, those non-Muslim members took the seat in the 
parliament not as representatives o f their religious groups but as individual members, 
as a result o f the reflection o f the state’s policy o f demolishing the millet structures, 
and the idea o f Ottomanism. The executive M eclis-i Vükela (Council o f Ministers) was 
directly appointed by the Sultan. The parliament was composed o f two chambers 
Heyet-i Ayan and Heyet-i Mebusan. Heyet-i Mebusan was formed through elections. 
According to the constitution, for each 50,000 men there would be one representative. 
The elections were two tiered. Only males and those who possessed considerable 
wealth and tax-payers could vote. Thus it was not a system based on general vote, 
which suggests that the right to vote was not viewed as a significant component o f the 
Ottoman citizenship.
The first constitutional period lasted for a short time. Sultan Abdiilhamid II 
postponed the meetings o f the parliament; the reason was the war with the Russians. 
This postponement lasted for thirty years. It was a period o f absolutism and censorship. 
However, under this atmosphere there also rose a new understanding o f education. 
Many new schools were opened, among which the military and medical schools are
46 Tanör, OTAG, 132.
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significant. With the understanding to acquire not only the western technology but also 
the culture, those schools had a curriculum composed o f contemporary ways o f 
thinking. Therefore, the students o f those schools were exposed to positivism, 
materialism and to a certain extent nationalism. There was unrest among those people 
because o f Abdiilhamid’s absolutism, and the solution seemed to restore the 
constitutional monarchy. Being influenced by the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks 
emerged at that time. At first, like the Young Ottomans they believed in the 
“brotherhood o f all the Ottomans” and like their predecessors their worldview was a 
mixture o f rationalism, secularism, Islamic and traditionalist thought.'^ * Consequently, 
with the cooperation o f the Muslims and non-Muslims oaJuly 23, 1908 the second 
constitutional period in the Ottoman history started. The prevailing ideology was 
Ottomanism and according to Tandr “it was the first and the last joint movement o f  
Muslims and non-Muslims for a democratic and liberal consensus ground.”^^  
Sovereignty started to move from the Sultan to the public, and a move from the 
medieval conduct o f state to a national and secular ideology. However, the second 
constitutional period faced the collapse o f this ideology and the rise o f nationalistic 
movements among both non-Muslim ethnic groups and Muslim groups, like Albanians 
and Arabs.
47 Berkes, Secularism, 246.
Tanör, OTAG; Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri (1895-1908) [The 
Political Ideas o f the Young Turks], (Istanbul; İletişim Yayınlan, 1996), 5* ed.
Tanör, OTAG, also see Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi [The Revolution o f 
1908], (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1995); suggesting that the transition to second 
constitutional period was a result o f a widespread national revolution.
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After the return to constitutional monarchy there occurred a division in the 
Young Turk movement, as liberals gathered around Prince Sabahattin, and the 
Committee o f Union and Progress. As a consequence o f the dispersion going on within 
the empire and the failure o f Ottomanism, nationalistic sentiments began to emerge 
among the Turks. During this period, three significant strains o f thought emerged with 
the aim o f saving the Empire fi^ om collapse. These were Westernism, Islamism, and 
Turkism.
3.2.4 Westernism, Islamism and Turkism
Between 1908 and 1918 there were three prominent schools o f  thought, namely; 
Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism, which were;the varieties o f an attempt to find a 
new foundation for the political existence and cultural reconstruction o f the Turks, 
whose peril was perceived to have extended their traditional existence. Those schools 
o f thought emerged after the failure o f Ottomanism, which was regarded as a solution 
for the collapse o f the Empire that would hold the subjects o f the Empire under a 
certain “Ottoman” identity, as mentioned previously in this chapter.
The W estemists suggested that total westernization that would cover all the 
aspects life would be the solution for the problems o f the Empire. They believed that 
“casting aside the old system o f values in order to develop a new morality based upon 
the Western system o f values” was the major issue. It was argued that social and
50 Berkes, Secularism, 337.
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moral life would be westernized as well. “Without adopting the cultural and intellectual 
foundations o f the West, neither social reform nor Westernization could occur. 
However, they were so obsessed with total Westernization that they failed to find a 
solution that would take the Turkish or Islamic features into consideration.
Islamists, on the other hand, argued that the core o f the problem was that the 
Şeriat was not applied properly. The solution for the problems o f the Ottoman Empire 
was the return to the Islamic law. Even though they accepted the superiority o f the 
West technologically, they thought that the West’s superiority relied on their secular 
mentality.
Turkism emerged later than those two schools o f thought mentioned above. The 
Turkists benefited from both the Westemist and Islamist thoughts and reached a 
synthesis that would make them successful. Turkism emerged not only as a political 
element, but even before, as a way o f thinking in philosophy, literature and language. 
Many intellectuals o f the period wrote on Turkism. Among them there were two 
different lines o f thought. Berkes argues that one was a “critical, rationalistic, radical 
approach with marked (utopian) socialist tendencies” while the other was “a romantic, 
idealist, and nationalist tendency.” '^* Turkism developed from this second line. Ziya 
Gökalp is regarded as the founder o f Turkism. He suggested that the basis o f  
nationality was the common culture as:
Ibid., 338.
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The nation is not a community defined either by race, nor tribe, nor geography 
or politics, nor will. The nation is a community that has common features o f  
language, religion, morality and aesthetics, in other words it is a community 
composed o f individuals who had the same education.
Gokalp viewed Islam as a barrier to the rise o f nationalism with “its tendency to
superimpose itself as a civilization at the expense o f the national cultures.”^^  The
Turkists believed that modernization and westernization would be achieved only when
nationalism is comprehended by the people. In addition, they argued that only the
technical developments o f the West should be borrowed while keeping national culture
and traits. Turkism succeeded as a prominent school o f thought among those three. The
Committee o f Union and Progress that took power adopted a Turkist worldview.
The shift from Ottomanism to Turkism, in a sense reflects the response to the
changing dynamics. When it was found out that the all-encompassing Ottoman identity
would not work in a collapsing Empire, then there occurred a turn towards
Turkishness. This turn reflects the emphasis on the survival o f the state. At first it was
thought that a common Ottoman identity would hold the Empire together, but after the
separation o f the ethnic groups from the Empire, then the survival o f  the state was
found in the emphasis on Turkism. One o f the most prominent figures o f Turkism,
Yusuf Ak^ura advocated the implementation o f Turkism instead o f Ottomanism in
1904.”
We can suggest that the seeds o f the Kemalist revolution can be found in this 
period. Kazancigil argues that, Kemalism was built on the reform movements that date
55 Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, eds. Mahir Ünlü and Yusuf Çotuksöken,
(İstanbul; İnkılap Kitabevi, 1997), 5*** ed., 18. 
Berkes, Secularism, 352.
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back to the Tanzimat period.^ * As the members o f the Committee o f Union and 
Progress and the cadres o f the Kemalist revolution had a similar educational 
background, Kazancigil notes that the reforms made during the early Republican 
period were among the plans o f the Young Turks.^  ^ Even though there are diverse 
views on the influence o f Ziya Gdkalp on the republican understanding o f 
nationalism,^ *  ^ the Kemalist regime also viewed culture as the main determinant o f 
nationalism. Here, we can suggest that there was not a rupture but a continuum with the 
Ottoman Empire, especially when Turkism is taken into consideration. Arai argues that 
the nationalism o f the Young Turks paved the way for republican nationalism “with its 
efforts for the raising o f national consciousness and honor o f Turkishness among the 
Ottoman Turks who have lost those features long time ago.” ‘^Furthermore, the search 
for a common identity for the people o f the state was a major issue in both the late 
Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period. We can also suggest that the 
Kemalist regime built on the experiences o f  the Ottoman Empire on this issue and tried
to eliminate the problems the Ottoman Empire previously faced.62
Masami Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk M illiyetçiliği [Turkish Nationalism  
during the Young Turks Period], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1994), 20.
Ali Kazancigil, “The Ottoman-Turkish state and Kemalism,” in Atatürk: 
Founder o f a M odem Turkey, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun, (London: C. 
Hurst, 1981), 37-55.
Ibid., 49-50.
^  For instance, Kazancigil notes that Kemalist nationalism diverged from the 
definition o f Gokalp on the grounds o f being territorial.
Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi, 146.
Ayşe Kadıoğlu delineates the difference between the Ottoman Empire and 
the Turkish Republic as regards to modernization as “progress for order” in the
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3.3 Concluding Remarks: An Overview of Ottoman Citizenship
The emergence o f the notion o f citizenship in the Ottoman Empire dates back to 
the Tanzimat. There was an attempt to build up a common identity for all the subjects 
o f the Empire, who held different religious and ethnic identities. This attempt went 
hand in hand with modernization, both were part o f the need to reform in order to 
prevent the Empire from collapsing.
It is hard to classify the developments with regard to citizenship in the Ottoman 
Empire. On the one hand, it was an attempt to demolish the community structures and 
replace them with a new kind o f relationship between the state and people. Even 
though the developments in the Ottoman Empire might be viewed as a transition from 
a medieval conduct o f the state towards a more secular and modem one, it is difficult to 
suggest that the Ottoman citizenship was based on the recognition o f the people as 
“individuals” in their relations with the state, in other words it is not a “transition from 
status to c o n t r a c t . I t  was rather part o f the desire to crash down the privileges o f the 
millet structures and keep the Empire together, in other words to save the country. The 
citizenship law does not delineate the position o f the citizen vis-à-vis the state; the 
rights and duties are not mentioned. The 1876 constitution seems liberal; most o f the
Ottoman case, and “order for progress” in the republic. See, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 
Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınlan, 1999), 24-29.
Bryan S. Turner, “Contemporary Problems in the Theory o f Citizenship” in 
Citizenship and Social Theory, ed. Bryan S. Turner, (London, Newbury Park, New  
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 5.
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articles related to the subjects o f  the Empire are about the rights o f individuals. 
However, something seems to be missing in all those. First o f all, the notion o f  
citizenship is a modem phenomenon and is used with reference to the nation-states. In 
the Ottoman case, however, quite contrarily the emergence o f the issue o f Ottoman 
citizenship stems from the reaction to nationalistic movements and nation-state 
formations. It is an attempt to hold the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual 
population o f the Empire together under a new identity that would surpass the other 
identities and serve the survival o f the state.
Ottoman notion o f citizenship placed emphasis on two axes, one was the legal 
definition o f who the Ottonian citizen was, and second was the desire o f incorporating 
the people into the Empire under a new identity, which would be different and above 
the identities people had. Thus, the emphasis was on the legal status and identity 
aspects o f citizenship. Those were all for practical reasons and were imposed from 
above. It was not achieved by the people as a result o f the demands coming from lower 
classes, as it was in the English case, nor a process linked with the formation o f a 
nation-state, as it was in the French and German cases. It is not much possible to trace 
the liberal or republican characteristics o f Ottoman citizenship. Although, the 
individual rights were safeguarded by the laws mentioned throughout this chapter, we 
cannot suggest that the individual was given the highest priority. On the other hand, I 
did not come across any statements about the primacy o f the obligations towards the 
state, or an emphasis on community. Therefore, citizenship in the Ottoman Empire had 
been limited to a legal definition that tried to introduce a common identity which was 
thought to be beneficial for the survival o f the state.
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However, as the goals o f those reform movements could not be achieved, and 
on the contrary the Empire faced many nationalistic movements and separations from 
the Empire, there occurred a transition from Ottomanism to Turkism, the only element 
left in the hands o f the Empire. After the failure o f creating a common Ottoman 
identity and the collapse o f the Empire after First World War, the young Turkish 
Republic would face almost the same problems o f creating a nation and the citizens as 
members o f this nation more seriously. The next chapter will try to highlight the early 
republican experience o f the construction o f Turkish citizenship.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD: THE NEW CITIZEN
The introduction o f the notion o f citizenship dates back to the late periods o f 
the Ottoman Empire, namely to the Reform Edict o f 1856. However, the attempts 
for constructing an Ottoman identity started before. The Tanzimat Charter that was 
mentioned in the previous chapter attempted for the equality between the Muslim 
and non-Muslim subjects o f the Empire. Later, together with the Reform Edict and 
Citizenship Law o f 1868, an official definition o f the Ottoman citizenship was 
made. The notion o f citizenship in the Ottoman Empire was articulated as part o f  
the attempt to save the Empire from collapse and unite the multi-religious and 
ethnic population under a common “Ottoman citizenship”. The articulated 
citizenship notion tried to surpass the millet structure that had compartmentalized 
the society by introducing an identity above all ethnic and religious divisions. 
However, as noted in the previous chapter this did not succeed due to the rise o f  
nationalistic movements among the non-Muslim and non-Turkish subjects o f the 
Empire. After the collapse o f  the Empire and the War o f National Independence the
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Turkish Republic emerged with brand new ideas for the society, and started with 
the premise that “sovereignty rested on the people.”*
The major development on the part o f the sovereignty o f the people was the 
formation o f the first Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920.^ It was a period 
o f national struggle against the Western powers that were invading the Ottoman 
Empire after the defeat in First World War. The sultanate surrendered and the 
people gathered together under the leadership o f Mustafa Kemal for the liberation 
o f the country from those western powers. That liberation movement was, in a way 
stripping itself from the Sultan’s reign and the Grand National Assembly gathered 
to take charge o f executive, legislative and judicial powers. Even though it was not 
voiced at that time explicitly it was a movement towards a republic. A new 
constitution was promulgated basing itself on the “sovereignty o f the people”. 
According to Tanor, the constitution o f 1921 was perhaps the only constitution that 
was prepared through democratic means as compared to the other constitutions.^ 
The deputies discussed every single issue. The constitution defined the “Turkish 
people” as those ‘The masses who were living within the boundaries o f the 
armistice, regardless o f their ethnic origin that got together on the basis o f  political
* Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980) (OTAĞ) 
[Ottoman-Turkish Constitutional Developments], (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınlan, 
1998), 2"*· ed., 227.
 ^This process started with Mustafa Kemal’s arrival in Samsun. He resigned 
fi-om his position in the Ottoman military and started to work for the struggle 
against the Allied Powers. In order to attract the support o f the people and to 
prepare the strategy few congresses were held in Anatolia (23 July 1919 Erzurum, 4 
September 1919 Sivas). Those were the first steps taken in the path to the formation 
o f the Grand National Assembly. See, Bernard Lewis, Emergence o f Modern 
Turkey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
Tanör, OTAG, 250.
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unity and independence.”  ^ In other words, the ‘Turkish people” was defined by a 
unity o f political and geographical basis. ^  However, this was the period o f struggle 
for independence, and the definition should have to be inclusive. Even though the 
formation o f the Parliament was a fundamental break from the Sultanate, at that 
time the intentions for the proclamation o f the republic was not explicit, therefore 
this constitution had to appeal to all the people living within the boundaries o f the 
National Oath.
After the victory in the War o f Independence and the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty signed with the Allied Powers, The Republic was proclaimed in October 29, 
1923. The first and major task was the formation o f a nation state. Regarding the 
Ottoman dynasty and regulation o f state as the real cause for collapse, the new 
Republic aimed a complete renewal. Therefore, the Republic went through 
widespread reforms in every aspect o f life. This was a real break from the Ottoman 
heritage and it was also designed for the formation o f the Turkish nation. It was 
believed that the survival o f the new republic was dependent on the adoption o f 
nationalism and secularism, and the construction o f a Turkish citizenship that 
would be parallel to both nationalism and secularism. Therefore, as Mardin states, 
“Mustafa Kemal took upon a hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed 
life in it.”^
This chapter tries to delineate the process o f the construction o f Turkish 
citizenship in the early republican period. Citizenship was designed as one o f the
 ^Ibid., 249.
 ^Ibid.
 ^Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” \n Atatürk: Founder o f 
a M odem State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 
196.
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crucial components for nation building. Mustafa Kemal, the founder o f the republic 
perceived citizenship as the very core o f the legitimacy o f the Republic.^ Both the 
emergence o f the notion o f citizenship and the changes that notion went through 
during the early republican period will be analyzed. The study will benefit from the 
parliamentary debates, legal arrangements o f the period in concern, and from the 
writings o f the prominent ideologues o f the period.
4.1 Nation-building in Turkey
Nation-states and nationalism are modem phenomena, they emerged right 
after the French Revolution and nation-states became prevalent figures in the 
international context, rather than the Empires that covered a multi-ethnic 
geography. Most o f the scholars studying nationalism agree that nation is a 
constmct.*  Nation building process carries a cmcial role in this constmction. The 
inculcation o f the feeling o f belonging to a nation is either carried out through the 
usage o f printed material or through educational institutions.^
Most o f the scholars dealing with nationalism classify it as either “Western” 
or “Eastern” nationalisms as mentioned in Chapter n . Western type o f nationalism 
is the one where both the birth o f national feelings and the formation o f the nation
 ^ A. Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları [Civic 
Information and the Manuscripts o f M. Kemal Atatürk], (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kummu Yayınlan, 1988) 2”**. Ed.
* Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 
(London, New York; Verso, 1991).
 ^Benedict Anderson, ibid.
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State coincided, the most prominent example o f which is the French case. On the 
Eastern type, however, nationalism as a sentiment emerged long before the 
formation o f the nation state, the example is Germany. Those different types o f  
nation formations lead to different types o f citizenship theories, as either the 
adoption o f territorial understanding like that o f the French case, or the adoption o f 
blood principle as in the German case.^ ^ There is also a different path adopted by 
the third world countries, which imitated the developments o f  the Western countries 
and the nation formation was carried out by the intelligentsia. On this case there is a 
problem o f the limits o f imitation. While benefiting from the technological and 
ideological developments o f the West, there was an attempt to preserve the 
authentic culture o f the country. * *
On the issue o f nationalism Turkey does not fit either o f them fiilly. As 
mentioned above, eastern type nationalism emerged long before the nation state, 
and there was a desire for that nation state. In the Turkish case it was “a state 
searching for its nation rather than a nation searching for its state.”^^ The state was 
found and there was the need to construct the nation, and the reforms o f the 
republic aimed at that construction.
William Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany, (London, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1992).
“ On this approach see Partha Chatteijee, Nationalist Thought and the 
Colonial World (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, Zed Books, 1986), 
and “The Agenda for Nationalism”, Popular Movements, Political Organization, 
Democracy and the State, ed. by Preben Kaarsholm (Roshilde, International 
Development Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1992). Also see, Elie Kedourie, 
Nationalism, (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
Ayşe Kadioglu, “Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk M illiyetçiliğinin 
Açmazları” [The State Searching for its Nation: The Impasse o f Turkish 
Nationalism], Türkiye Günlüğü, 33 (March-April 1995), 91-101.
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Norbu’s analysis that is mentioned in the second chapter provides us the key
notions for understanding the nation building process in Turkey. Both the
traditional data*  ^ and the egalitarian ideology were combined in order to achieve a
modern society yet respectful o f  its own values. All those notions were utilized by
the Republican elite for the formation o f the nation and the inculcation o f the idea
o f belonging to a nation in the hearts o f the people. Thus, a societal consciousness
about national identity and an all-encompassing value system was aimed. In
addition, as Brubaker noted each nation state claimed a certain population as its
own, and desired this population to be something more than an aggregate o f
individuals, and aimed at having a cohesive and homogeneous nation.^ '* For this
aim citizenship was both instrumental and necessary. Reinhard Bendix argues that
In the nation-state each citizen stands in a direct relation to the sovereign 
authority o f  the country in contrast with the medieval polity in which that 
direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men o f the realm. Therefore, a 
core element o f nation building is the codification o f the rights and duties o f  
all adults who are classified as citizens.
Here the traditional data does not refer to the heritage o f the Ottoman 
Empire. It is used in a sense to connote the features that would make up the Turkish 
nation. Among those are language, territoriality, and Turkish culture. The Republic 
utilized and sometimes invented those features for the formation o f the Turkish 
nation.
William Rogers Brubaker, ‘Introduction”, in Immigration and the Politics 
o f Citizenship in Europe and North America, ed. by William Rogers Brubaker, 
(Lanham, New York, London; The German Marshall Fund o f the US University 
Press o f America, Inc., 1989),
Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies o f Our 
Changing Social Order, (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1964), 74.
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The people o f  the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must show 
and prove that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their 
family life and their way o f living. In a word, the truly civilized people o f  
Turkey ... must prove in fact that they are civilized and advanced persons 
also in their outward aspect.'*
Those were the main steps taken for the creation o f a nation that was composed o f 
“civilized” citizens who were educated in modem methods, and whose modernity 
was reflected in their appearance. In addition, the Gregorian calendar and twenty- 
four hour clock was adopted. On 4 October 1926 the Swiss Code was adopted as 
the Turkish Civil Law. The previously used Arabic alphabet was changed to Latin 
alphabet on 3 November 1928, and the public usage o f Arabic alphabet was 
prohibited.'^ These were the major steps taken to demolish the ties with the 
Ottoman past and for the formation o f a new nation.
4.1.2 The 1924 Constitution
The 1921 Constitution was amended, and 1924 Constitution was put into 
use. Article 88 o f the Constitution stated that “ the people o f  Turkey regardless o f 
their religion and race are Turkish in terms o f citizenship.” '^* Yıldız points to the 
novelty in the law about mentioning Turkishness,^' and stresses the debates over
'* Ibid., 268-269.
Lewis, Emergence o f M odem Turkey, 278.
A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları [Explanatory Turkish 
Constitutions], (Ankara; Turhan Kitabevi Yayınlan, 1995), 76.
Ahmet Yıldız, Search fo r an Ethno-Secular Delimitation o f Turkish 
National Identity in the Kemalist Era (1924-1938) with Particular Reference to the 
Ethnicist Conception o f Kemalist Nationalism, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bilkent 
University, 1998, 302-303. Here Yıldız quotes the statement o f reasons for article
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who will be defined as Turk.^  ^ After long debates, as Tanbr notes, the Constitution 
stressed that Turldshness was defined in terms o f  geographical and political 
parameters rather than racial parameters, despite the existence o f racial and 
religious differences.^^ During the same period Mustafa Kemal stated that ‘The 
people o f Turkey who promulgated the Turkish Republic are called as the Turkish 
Nation.” In other words “the core o f nationality is not race, but political loyalty.” '^* I 
also suggest that in that early phase o f the period in concern, there was an 
inclination towards the French or the western type o f nationalism based on territory.
The 1924 constitution was a liberal constitution with regard to individual 
rights. The basic rights and freedoms were enlisted in the 5“* section, Turklerin 
hukuku ammesi (the Public rights o f the Turks). Those were, shortly, security o f  
life, liberty, honor, and property; freedom o f conscience; freedom o f press and 
communication; freedom for forming associations.^^ It is noted by both Gozubuyiik
88 as; “Since the Ottoman Empire had been obliterated and perished, the members 
o f the nation could no longer be called “Ottoman.” National self-honor caimot 
accept belonging to a dynasty. Our state is a national state, not an international or 
supra-national one. The state can recognize no nation other than the Turk. It is not 
proper to consider racial differences as an obstacle to nationality since there are 
peoples o f different origins in the country who possess equal rights. Likewise, since 
the freedom o f conscience is certified, religion has not been considered as a 
hindrance to nationality as well. Turkish nation too, like all the new nationalities, 
could embody people o f different races. But it is the community o f  the Turks 
{Türklük camiası) that has the capability o f  bringing together all the races.” See, 
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 2"^  period, meeting 2, vol. 7, 9.3.1340 (1924), 216.
Yıldız notes the different views on who would be called a Turk and the 
objections on naming the minorities as Turk. For instance, Hamdullah Suphi and 
Ahmet Hamdi suggested the term Turk to be used only to connote nationality rather 
than citizenship, and pointed to the danger in calling the minorities as Turk. See, 
Yıldız, ibid., 303, note 106.
23 Tanör, OTAG, 309.
i. Turan, Cumhuriyet Tarihimiz, Istanbul: Çağlayan Ktb., 1969, 73 cited 
in ibid., 310.
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and Tanor that the 1924 Constitution was inspired by the French Revolution. Tandr 
argues that the constitution had a liberal and individualistic approach; and that the 
limits o f the liberties were not drawn by the benefits o f the state, public or the 
society, as had been the case in the following constitutions.^ *^ However, Gdzubuyuk, 
on the other hand, argues that the constitution merely enlisted the basic rights and 
liberties with short definitions, but that there was not a regulation that safeguarded 
those rights and liberties, and that the regulation and boundaries o f those rights 
were left to the executive. The 1924 Constitution is one o f the examples o f the 
differences and contradictions between the discourse o f the legal documents and 
actual practices. The Law on Settlement, The Tax on Property and other 
implementations that will be elaborated below are examples for this.
4.2 The Citizenship Law
As mentioned above, citizenship had been a crucial element o f the nation 
building process and the Republic. However, the first citizenship law o f the 
Republic had not occupied the agenda o f the Parliament much. The proposal 
prepared by then the Istanbul deputy Tevfik Kamil Bey was read in the Parliament 
on May 22, 1928, and 1312 numbered and May 23, 1928 dated Turkish Citizenship 
Law was decided to be enacted by January 1, 1929.^* No debates or questions were
Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasaları, 71-76.
Tanör, OTAĞ, 308.
Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasaları, 54.
T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, 3"* period, 1^  meeting, session 80, vol. IV
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raised at the meeting about Turkish citizenship. All the articles were read and voted 
without any objections.^^
The law adopted both descent and territory principles. According to Article 
1 “the children bom from Turkish father or mother either in Turkey or in a foreign 
country are considered as Turkish citizens.” ®^ Also, according to article 2/c ‘Those 
children bom from Turkish father or mother out o f wedlock in Turkey or in a 
foreign country, are regarded Turkish citizens.” Those articles reflect the principle 
o f jus sanguinis by granting citizenship to the children o f the Turkish citizens even 
if  they were abroad, or borii out o f wedlock. The articles following those mentioned 
above were designed for the exercise o f ju s soli principle. Nomer argues that those 
articles were designed in a complementary manner.^ * Article 2/a and 2/b stated that 
those children bom in Turkey and whose parents are unknown and those children 
who were bom in Turkey and one or both o f the parents are stateless are considered 
as Turkish citizens. According to Article 3, “those children who were bom from 
foreign parents in Turkey, and who are settled in Turkey can admit Turkish 
citizenship within three years after they reach maturity.” Besides, “the children o f  
foreigners who were bom in Turkey after January 1, 1929, are Turkish. They can 
admit their parents’ citizenship within six months after they reach maturity 
according to the Turkish laws. If they do so, they w ill be subject to article 9.”
See ibid.
Article 1, Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu [Turkish Citizenship Law], Tabiiyet 
Kılavuzu [The Guide for Nationality], (Istanbul; Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939) p. 6; 
Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku, [Citizenship Law] (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 
1989), 8*^  ed., 45.
Ergin Nomer, ibid.
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The Law o f 1928 also permitted admittance o f a foreign country’s 
citizenship by the permission o f the Turkish State. Those people had to leave 
Turkey within a year and sell the properties they have in Turkey, otherwise the 
government would liquidate their properties.^^ However, if  they apply for 
readmitting they would get Turkish citizenship without residence requirement and 
their children will have the right to apply for Turkish citizenship and get it by the 
decision o f the Council o f Ministers.^ "* During the early Republican period there 
was not an issue o f dual citizenship as it was after the 1980s. But still it can be 
sensed that this article was designed in a way that would permit people to hold dual 
citizenship, as there was an opportunity for readmission. However, the liquidation 
o f properties, which means that those people would not be permitted to engage in 
the economic life, leaves a question mark.
The first Citizenship Law o f the Republic provided merely a definition o f 
the Turkish citizen. Probably it was enacted, as part o f the nation building process 
and it is evident from the parliamentary meeting records that it was not regarded as 
a crucial issue by its legal definition. However, the inculcation o f a citizenship 
identity among the people was another dimension, and w ill be elaborated 
throughout this study. Atatiirk’s views on citizenship that was reflected in the 
course book “Civic Information” and the views o f prominent ideologues o f the 
period that tried to define the Turkish citizenship will be utilized. This book is 
crucial in order to understand what kind o f citizen the regime aspired. The
Article 9 states that “those Turks who admit another countiy’s citizenship 
without permission or join the military o f a foreign country might be expelled from 
Turkish citizenship by the decision o f the Council o f Ministers.”
33
34
Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu, Article 8.
Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu, Article 14.
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implementations, like that o f Halkevleri (People’s Houses) that was significant for 
education o f the masses as citizens will be analyzed. There is also another 
dimension related with the Turkishness, or the Turkish identity and the situation o f 
the minorities in this process. This will be dealt with in the final section.
4.3 The Construction of Citizenship
During the early Republican period, the creation o f a new Turk or Turkish 
citizen who had to be, first o f all, “civilized” and “’patriotic”^^  was the most 
significant civilizing mission o f the Kemalist reformist elite. The Kemalist attempt 
at transforming subjects into citizens came into being with the rising concern o f the 
political authority for describing who were Turks and who were not, or who the 
Turks were going to be.^  ^ In that ruling, the modernizing elite tried to establish a 
strong link between citizenship and nationality or national identity. This was 
regarded in most cases, as an inevitable aspect for the exercise o f citizenship, and, 
according to their cultural objectives, for defining the profiles o f civilized  and 
patriotic citizens o f the Republic. It is in this respect that they appeared to take into 
consideration the idea that creating a shared sense o f national culture and identity 
was a fundamental precondition o f forming and strengthening citizenship. That was 
the main task o f the Kemalist nation-building project that required, in defining the 
national and cultural identity o f citizens, the total elimination o f Ottoman and
Füsun Üstel, “Cumhuriyetten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili”[The Profile o f the 
Citizen since the Republic], Yeni Yüzyıl, April 24, 1995.
Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘T he Paradox o f Turkish Nationalism and the 
Construction o f Official Middle Eastern Studies, 32/2, (1996), 177.
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Islamic heritage, which was considered responsible for the backwardness o f the 
sta+e and society. By striving to eliminate the hegemony o f traditional institutions 
and values over the state structure and society, the Republican elite aimed at 
building a “completely secular state” ’^ and a secular socio-cultural structure. That is 
why the Turkish reform movement stimulated by the nationalist ideology o f the 
Kemalist modernizing state was a sort o f cultural revolution or, in the words o f 
Mardin, a “revolution o f values.” *^ Thanks to its preexistence as a strong, 
centralized state^  ^ that helped to facilitate the process o f  cultural and linguistic 
integration, the Republican state projected a particular form o f a vision o f socio­
cultural life, a good life which each Turkish citizen should adopt. This new life 
would represent a common good and national interest,'*® but not a particular and 
individualistic one that was dangerous for national unity.
In forging a new identity, the Turkish state used its powers and agencies to 
accomplish its social and cultural engineering. It strove to eliminate all previously 
designated symbols, attitudes and manners, replacing them with its own new myths 
and symbols. Atatürk defined the “new” Turk thus: ‘Sve must be civilized men 
from every point o f view; our ideas, our reasoning w ill be civilized fi-om head to
Metin Heper, ‘The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in 
Comparative Perspective,” British Journal o f Middle East Studies^ 1991: 13,47.
Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Transformation,” 
International Journal ¿/M iddle Eastern Studies 2 (1971), 209.
See, Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, (Walkington: The Eothen 
Press, 1985).
'*® For a discussion and the views o f Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (Minister o f 
Justice in the İnönü government in the late 1920s) on the relationship between 
common good and life style, see Mustafa Baydar, Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz 
[Atatürk and Our Revolutions], (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 
1973), 208- 210.
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toe”^^  For him, the nation to which new Turics belonged was composed o f citizens 
tied together by common language, culture and collective consciousness and ideals, 
being a political and social entity. This definition contains no reference to religion - 
Islam- or tradition. In short, the Kemalists had sought to establish a common 
cultural content, in large measure newly formulated and o f course secular, to be 
used in forging the new Turkish citizens’ identity, and for manifesting their position 
as members o f both the state and the organic whole (the nation).
The conceptualization o f citizenship, as it was argued, came hand in hand 
with constructing a unique, unchangeable and historic Turkish identity that would 
be made possible only by newly fabricating and imposing a new monolithic culture, 
while ignoring ethnic and sub-cultural identities. That led to the designation o f  
traditional/Islamic and local cultural symbols to the periphery o f the public sphere, 
and even to the dictation and regulation o f everyday life o f the new Turks. The 
Republican civilizing elite, therefore, tried their best to “penetrate into the life style, 
manners, behavior and daily customs o f the people, and to change the self­
conception o f Turks.”^^  Each Turkish citizen, equipped with well-defined modes o f 
behavior, had to be faithful to the his/her own state that, as a representative o f  
collective personality o f the nation and citizens, preached the advantages and 
goodness o f being a Turk, a Turkish citizen. In other words, the Republican concept 
o f citizenship was perceived as not only equipping its citizens with the rights and 
responsibilities o f the public sphere, but as forming a totally new man by preaching 
even the rearrangement o f private life, or the very life-style o f  the people.
Cited in Yılmaz Altuğ, “Atatürk and Building o f a Modem State,’ 
Turkish Review Quarterly Digest 5, 12 (1991), 34.
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Apart from developing institutions for the inculcation o f an idea o f Turkish 
citizen that will be elaborated below, the first achievement o f the republic about 
citizenship was the development o f courses on citizenship. Civic education started 
with the course Mcdumat-i Vataniyye (Information About Motherland) that was 
included in the curriculums in 1924. Later in 1927, it was replaced by Yurt Bilgisi 
(Information about Motherland).'*^ Afet İnan, who was an adopted daughter o f 
Mustafa Kemal, was commissioned to write the schoolbook Vatandaş için Medeni 
Bilgiler (Civic Information for the Citizen) for this course with Mustafa Kemal’s 
own contributions.'*^ This book is crucial for understanding how Turkish citizenship 
was perceived by Mustafa Kemal and the state. The book was designed with an 
enlightening mission.'*^ It was mainly formed during Mustafa Kemal’s discussions
4.3.1 Citizenship and Civic Information
'*^  Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case 
o f Turkey,” Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. by Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1995), 21.
43 Üstel, “Yuttaş Profili.’
'*'* Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler [Civic Information for the Citizen] was 
first published in 1930 as a course book for secondary schools. Afet İnan made a 
presentation on “Atatürk’s thoughts on the rights and duties o f the citizen” in the 
conference series held by Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish History Society] on the 25*** 
anniversary o f Atatürk’s death. As the presentation took attention Afet İnan decided 
to re-edit the book. She published Medeni Bilgiler ve Atatürk’ün El Yazıları in 
1969, by adding Atatürk’s own notes to the original book. See, Atatürk’ün Yazdığı 
Yurttaşlık Bilgileri, [Citizenship Information Atatürk Wrote] ed. by Nuran Tezcan, 
(İstanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık A .Ş., Cumhuriyet Gazetesi 
Armağanı, 1997), 9.
'*^ This is evident also in the books o f the prominent ideologues o f the 
period. For instance Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Saffet Engin and Recep Peker aimed at 
providing the readers with the history o f philosophy, political systems and thought. 
Between the lines they preach the Turkish State and the Revolution, and state the
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with the state elites, members o f the military, lawyers and intellectuals.'*^ Starting 
from the preface, it was mentioned repeatedly that “Atatürk wanted every right to 
be complemented by a duty.”'*^  Afet İnan adds that, while the citizen had certain 
obligations towards the family, society, and the state as a member o f the nation, 
“the nation had some obligations towards the whole humanity in respect to being a 
family o f the civilized humanity.” *^ Thus, according to Atatürk the most civilized 
feature o f the Turkish citizen was forming the nation as a whole within the civilized  
realm, as a group o f persons endowed with rights and duties, free and equal and 
conscious o f their responsibilities.
The mentality behind the collection o f that kind o f a book was noted by 
Atatürk him self as “the information that teaches the citizen the present duties and 
rights in their conduct o f affairs among themselves or between them and the state, 
and generally the information on the organization o f the state are collected under 
the name Civic Information.”'*^  In the section “What is Civic Information about?” 
firstly the duties o f the state towards the citizens are enlisted as:
a) to provide and to promote security and justice within the country, and to 
preserve all kinds o f liberties o f the citizens,
b) to recruit foreign politics and relations with other countries positively, 
and to safeguard the security o f the country by keeping the defense
differences and virtues o f the Turkish nation compared to others. See, Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali [The Revolution o f Atatürk], (İstanbul; Kaynak Yayınlan, 
1995) 3"* ed.; Recep Peker, înkılab Dersleri Notları [Notes o f the Lectures o f the 
Revolution], (Ankara; Ulus Basımevi, 1936); Saffet Engin, Kemalizm tnkılabmm  
Prensipleri [The Principles o f the Revolution o f Kemalism], (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Matbaası, 1938).
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forces ready and if  necessary to preserve the rights o f the nation by 
arms,
c) construction o f roads and railroads,
d) education,
e) social service,
f) economic issues like agriculture, commerce and crafts.^ ®
Later, the duties o f  the citizen are mentioned shortly, and voting was stressed as the 
most important duty and the most holy right o f the citizen. Democracy is regarded 
as intellectual, individualistic and egalitarian. In line with this definition the 
boundaries o f the state’s duties towards the citizen are drawn by:
Securing the political freedom o f the citizen.
Assuring the improvement o f the citizen on intellectual areas such as the
areas o f science, social, arts and ethics.
Assuring the citizen’s right to participate in the national sovereignty in the
recognized ways.
And assuring that every citizen has the same political rights.^’
Here, it should be noted that throughout the book only the duties and obligations o f 
the citizens are covered and stressed, however, the rights are undermined. 
Citizenship was defined within the parameters o f the community. Thus, the 
definition o f citizenship was “civic republican.”^^  Liberalism was given short shrift 
by the prominent ideologues o f the period.^^ Recep Peker stated that liberalism was 
based on the premise o f fi'eedom and inviolability. But he criticized that 
inviolability was only viewed from the citizen’s aspect. He noted that the state 
should also be inviolable and the citizens have the obligation to take into 
consideration not only the inviolability o f  other citizens but also the nation’s and
Ibid., 15-16; Atatürk’ün Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri, 47-48.
Ibid., 45.
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, civic republican type o f 
citizenship relies on the importance o f the duties and obligations compared to the 
rights. The community is important and the citizen achieves his/her citizen identity 
as being part o f the community.
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the state’s inviolability. Otherwise, anarchy would occur and the nation and the 
state “which are above everything” w ill be violated.^“* It is evident that in his view, 
the state was given the highest priority. It is accepted that the individual liberties 
and freedoms are drawn within the benefits o f the state and the citizens are regarded 
as responsible towards the state. Afet İnan notes that “for ensuring public order and 
defense o f the country, the state needs healthy, vigorous citizens with high 
understanding, national sentiment and love for the countiy.”^^  This is a typical civic 
republican definition that places the civic virtue at the core o f citizenship.
In accordance with this Afet İnan states the duties and obligations o f the 
citizen as follows:
The citizen pays taxes. The citizen is entitled with obeying the rules 
designed for public order. The citizen has certain obligations to exercise 
during their activities in commerce and economics towards other citizens 
and the state. Finally they have obligations towards the nation and 
humanity. Their most important duty is to participate in the elections.
Moreover, military service is one o f the crucial duties o f the citizen. The military
was regarded as an educational institute where “the minds o f the sons o f the country
are enlightened.”^^  The role o f the military in constructing the nation and feeling o f
being a citizen was expressed as;
In the military the citizens learn equality and develop their ideas o f  courage 
and initiative. In this institute they feel deeply that they are the sons o f this 
fatherland. The necessity that every citizen should be beneficial and serving 
the nation and the country is felt most in the military. There the citizens
^eeVtksx,inkilab Dersleri, 59-60, 71-73. 
Ibid., 72.
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leam that the only guard for the nation to be valuable, powerful and with
high civilization is the military.^*
The book also covered major themes related with citizenship such as, the state, 
republic, and detailed information on taxation, constitution, and the regulation o f  
the Parliament, local governments, law, and economics. As mentioned previously, 
the book aims at serving as an enlightening guide in the conduct o f affairs between 
the state and its citizens.
In addition, the suffrage rights for women and women as citizens are 
discussed at length. Afet İnan tells in her memoirs that during the practice o f the 
course Yurt Bilgisi (Information about Fatherland) one o f the students objected to 
the selection o f one o f the schoolgirls as a major on the grounds that women did not 
have the right to participate in the elections. She told the then Minister o f Interior 
Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, that she felt extremely sorry as a Turkish woman for not 
having the right to participate in the elections. She did not want to be a teacher 
without those rights. Later she started to study other countries where women were 
granted suffrage rights.^ ^ Later, on April 3, 1930 women were granted the right to 
participate in the local elections, and on 1934 they were granted full participation in 
general elections as well. Afet İnan based her arguments about women’s suffrage 
rights on the grounds that women were participating in the public life, working in 
factories, shops. She cites the examples o f other countries and notes that “women 
can only teach their children about freedom when they get political training.”^  
Granting equal rights to women were an essential part o f the modernization project. 
The newly establishes states regard the reforms on women’s rights as part o f the
Ibid.
59 Ibid., 4-5.
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attempt to take a seat at the international system.^* Kemalist modernization 
endowed the Turkish women with the role o f being the symbol o f  the degree o f  
modernity. The total break with the past and the character o f the new regime were 
reflected in this role. Women’s participation in the public life was encouraged. The 
reason for the subordination o f women was found in Islam, and the ancient Turkish 
history provided a reference point for the equality o f women and men.
In a study about the courses on citizenship throughout the Republican 
history. Üstel points to two goals o f the courses, namely civilization and 
patriotism.^^ With respect to civilization, there was an emphasis on behaving 
according to the preferred codes o f conduct. Üstel later depicts the militant 
characteristics o f Turkish citizenship. Firstly, patriotism was defined as including 
the cultural and ethnic understanding, in addition to a loyalty based on territory. 
Secondly, as mentioned throughout this thesis as well, the duties and obligations o f 
the citizen were emphasized, in other words, republican understanding o f  
citizenship was implemented. Thirdly, the motive o f threat and enemies was 
utilized.
Üstel makes reference to the “common good” and “good life” in the 
formation o f the citizen. Those references reflect the merging o f the public and 
private spheres, on the one hand through the regulation o f the life o f the citizens
60 Ibid., 89.
Nilüfer Çağatay and Yasemin N. Soysal, “Uluslaşma Süreci ve Feminizm 
Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Düşünceler,” in 1980'ler Türkiye’sinde Kadın Bakış 
Açısından Kadınlar, ed. by Şirin Tekeli, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1993), 2"*^  ed., 
328.
62 t 'iÜstel, “Yuttaş Profili.
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even in private life, and on the other hand by defining the social role o f  the citizen 
within the parameters o f common good.^ ^
Thus, Üstel concludes with the definition o f official citizenship as “an 
understanding o f citizenship that does not differentiate between the public and 
private sphere, militant with respect to its reflexes. Also, social ties among the 
individuals strengthened by a cultural and ethnic sense o f belonging are based on 
the share o f a certain life style and common good.”^
4.3.2 Some views on citizenship
There are some significant intellectuals o f the early Republican period, who
tried to contribute to nation building and to develop a sense o f  belonging among the
people. Many scholars benefit from their books and articles while studying the early
republican national identity.^^ One o f them. Saffet Engin, in his book Kemalizm
İnkılabının Prensipleri defines the Republic as:
A social group gathers in order to reach a general and collective aim and 
makes a division o f labor in order to reach this aim. They are all obliged to 
fulfill these duties under a natural leader. Such a nation is belonging to the
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See, for instance Tanil Bora, ‘İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli 
Kimliği,”[Turkish National Identity in the Construction Period] Toplum ve Bilim, 
71 Winter 1996. Tami Bora used Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler o f Afet İnan, 
Atatürk İhtilali o f Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, tnkılab Dersleri Notları o f Recep Peker, 
and Kemalizm İnkılabmm Prensipleri o f Saffet Engin. Also see. Yıldız, Search for  
an Ethno-secular delimitation o f Turkish National Identity. Ahmet Yıldız utilized 
the works o f almost the same people, however while excluding Saffet Engin, he 
benefited fi'om Vasfi Raşid Seviğ. This study refers to mainly Afet İnan, Saffet 
Engin, and Recep Peker.
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highest level o f human evolution and the perfect section o f the civilization. 
Because, here high ideals apprehended by everybody, is prevalent.^
Engin, by being influenced from August Comte^  ^ states that Turkey had reached
the positivist stage after passing through the stages o f theology and metaphysics. He
suggests that “we are Turks and Europeans, as a matter o f fact, not to be European
is not living in this century, or being dead morally.” *^
Later he starts to define the Turk; his definitions emphasize the community
in the formation o f the Turkish identity. He stresses that “every Turk can realize his
own character only in the bosom o f this national conscience.”^^  Besides, while
noting that each Turk has the ability to make good judgments by his own rationale,
later he suggests that “in the community Turk, consciously, likes to think as the
other individuals think and act the same way, and is social.” According to Engin
the national era for the Turks started with the increase o f collective conscience.
“Collective conscience and national conscious is the social power that is composed
o f the total o f the appropriateness o f the citizens’ thought, feeling, and activity.” ’^
Thus, the citizens should have similarities on
66 Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri,
Auguste Comte, (1798-1857), is the founding father o f sociology. He 
argued that the evolution o f knowledge is governed by three stages. The first is the 
theological stage, where theology was the main source o f explanation, the second is 
the metaphysical stage, when the essence o f the phenomenon was to be discovered 
through the process o f reason, and finally the third stage, the positivist age. “Here 
mind abandons its search for essences and absolutes and contents itself with the 
discovery o f relationships between phenomena, that is with the construction o f 
sciences. See, René Hubert, “Comte, Auguste,” Encyclopedia o f the Social 
Sciences, vol. 4, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931, 151-152.
Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri, 23.
Ibid., 87.
70 Ibid.
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1) capacity to show same reactions to same effects
2) should be aware that same reactions are common in various individuals
3) to think on this resembling reactions and to act.^
Engin defines citizenship in a collectivity and community; besides the citizens are 
conscious o f their activities and reactions to certain events, and act in line with the 
community, which leaves no room for individual ideas and thoughts.
Engin’s thoughts reflect the mentality o f the early republican era, which 
one the one hand tries to enlighten the people and motivate them for 
modernization, by stating that “the aim o f Kemalism is to rise the humanity by 
ensuring the highest manifestation o f the reality o f universal progress within the 
national structure”^  and on the other hand tries to build up a new identity. 
Citizenship is used synonymously for Turkishness or simultaneously the term Turk 
is used for the citizen. This citizen (Turk) is defined within the parameters o f the 
Turkish nation and has certain obligations and duties towards the state and the 
nation.
As mentioned previously, citizenship in the early republican period was 
conceived within the process o f nation building and the national revolution. Even 
though it did not occupy the agenda as an issue, we can come across some articles 
o f the intellectuals o f the period on citizenship. On the discussion about the area o f 
thought in Turkey, M. Şekip Tunç '^*, Mümtaz Turhan^  ^ and Münir Serim stressed
Ibid., 110.
Ibid.
Ibid., 193.
Mustafa Şekip Tunç (1889-1958), Turkish psychologist and intellectual. 
Worked in Istanbul University. He chose Bergsonism as a philosophical ground for 
the salvation o f the nation. He believed in the individual and the virtue o f the 
individual as the core o f the civilizations. His books include İnsan Ruhu üzerinde
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the role o f the citizen for the development in the area o f thought. Tunç while 
stating that the national thought should mature more, stresses that certain 
requirements for this maturity should be acknowledged, one o f which is fiill 
perception o f citizenship.^^ He stressed the need for the unity o f the country and the 
equal sensitivity o f each citizen. “When the citizen reaches the national maturity 
and discerns that everything belonging to the country is related with him, and 
preserves this relation as a right, then we could achieve the devotion to the national 
thought and to the whole national life.”^  Serim and Turhan agreed with him that 
every issue depends on the information about and consciousness o f  the country, 
and that each citizen should be aware that he has to show equal responsibility and 
care, and power for to country above everything.^*
In another article it is stressed that there is a need for dealing with the 
issues o f patriotism and citizenship. ‘The duties and roles o f the youth and the 
Turkish citizens in their confrontation with the Turkish society and the state will 
form around the content o f those views”. Zeki Mesut stressed that there is a need
Gezintiler (1943), Psikolojiye Giriş (1949). See Türk Ansiklopedisi, vol. 32, 
(Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963), 498.
Mümtaz Turhan (1908-1969) regarded the issue o f education within the 
problem o f cultural change, and relied on cultural anthropology in his studies. 
Hilmi Ziya Ülken suggests that he might be included in the trend o f Social Science. 
His books include Kültür Değişmeleri (1951), Maarifimizin Ana Davaları (1954), 
Garplılaşmanın Neresindeyiz (1961). See, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye’de Çağdaş 
Düşünce Tarihi, (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınlan, 1998), 5*^  Ed., 458-460.
^^ “Fikir Hayatında Vahdet,” Kültür Haftası, 10, March 18 1936, 181, 
reprinted in Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı [Intellectual Life in Atatürk’s Period], 
(Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınlan, 1992) eds. Mehmet Kaplan, İnci Enginün, 
Zeynep Kerman, Necati Birinci, Abdullah Uçman, 164-167.
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for creating a new mentality and a new spirit within the country and there is need 
for a new type o f citizen on the path to civilization and progress. This new citizen 
would and should be a patriot in all his individual and social roles. ‘Thus, in new 
Turkey, the concepts patriotism and citizenship would have the same meaning.”**’ 
Similarly, Nermi points that revolution is not merely a change in the state system, 
but is “the formation o f a new mentality, or more explicitly a new man, which is 
the major aim.”*’
In most o f the articles concerned, there is an emphasis on the general w ill
and common interest. Engin, for instance, mentions the general will. General w ill,
social intelligence and spiritual authority should be prevalent in everybody
regardless o f class and groups. Besides, by giving the ancient Turkish civilizations
as the example, he suggests that the freedom o f the citizens had been a core issue,
however, this freedom was defined within the boundaries o f the general w ill, which
manifested itself in the state authority that could represent the conscience o f  the
nation.*^ On the other hand, Mesut emphasizes the common interest as follows;
For the regeneration and progress o f the Turkish society, all citizens should 
work in solidarity and be directed towards the same aim and target. The 
measure o f the acts o f a real citizen is the common interest. The patriotism 
o f a citizen, who organizes and regulates his social role as serving the 
common w ill, is solid, and therefore more productive... Now our major aim 
is to found a general harmony that would facilitate the realization o f  
common desires and targets.*^
Zeki Mesut, “Vatanperverlik ve Vatandaşlık,” [Patriotism and 
Citizenship], Hayat, 1 (7) 13 January 1927, pp. 134-135, reprinted ‘m Atatürk Devri
Fikir Hayatı, 473.
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8, 1928, 24 reprinted m Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı, 487.
82
83
r^vgxTi, Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri, 189, 274.
Mesut, “Vatanperverlik ve Vatandaşlık,” 477.
100
In addition, one remark points to the desire to have civilized citizens by noting that 
“ a person, who pushes his fellow citizens while getting on a streetcar, is not a 
citizen flilly.”^
With regard to social responsibility o f the citizen, it was argued that in the 
modern society man was freed from isolation and became “the unity o f  effect and 
activity.” Man that was defined as, “the unity o f effect and activity,” is the man 
who feels his social responsibilities thoroughly. According to Nermi, the revolution 
required that kind o f responsibility from its citizens, and every person should think 
on this social responsibility that makes him an independent citizen.*^ Those duties 
and responsibilities are for shaping the future. Similar to other intellectuals 
mentioned above, Nermi points to collectivity and community. He suggests that 
everyone should ask him self “What are we?” rather than “Who am I?” and 
disregards the individualistic understanding as if  it was something outdated. 
Thus, the responsibilities and duties o f the citizens are defined within the 
community, or as Nermi said, “behind every social duty is the lively voice o f the 
community.”®*
As it is portrayed in the studies quoted above, the desired citizen o f the early 
republican period was someone aware o f the duties assigned to him on the path 
towards civilization. This desired citizen was portrayed within the community to 
which he had responsibilities, and through which he could achieve his identity as
Ibid., 478.
Nermi, “Ya§ar’a Mektuplar,” 488. 
Ibid., 489.
Ibid.
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citizen. Afet İnan stated that each right should correspond to a duty, however rights 
in the liberal sense are disregarded. Citizenship was a status defined within the 
objectives o f the nation state and as different from the Western practices it was 
rather designed as a tool for achieving these objectives. The most significant 
example for the formation o f this “citizen” is the formation o f the People’s Houses 
where the people were educated for becoming full-fledged “citizens o f  the 
Republic.”
4.3.3 The People’s Houses
The project o f nation building and the construction o f the citizen was 
reflected in the formation o f the Halkevi (People’s Houses). The People’s Houses 
were founded on February 19, 1932 in fourteen cities. Later in 1940, with the aim 
o f spreading the People’s Houses to smaller regions like villages. Halkodaları 
(People’s Rooms) were to be formed. The previously functioning Turkish Hearts 
were closed for the reason that they had completed their aim o f providing Turkish 
national sentiment and consciousness.*^ People’s Houses replaced them as a new 
institution “to transform the Anatolian society, the Turkish people into a strong and 
modern Turkish nation. For this reason the People’s Houses were founded.” “^ The
88 Ibid.
The Turkish Hearts were founded in 1912 and functioned until 1931 and 
were replaced by the People’s Houses. They aimed at the promotion o f Turkish 
nationalism, and worked not only at the cultural level, but also influenced the 
political activities as well. See, Füsun Üstel, İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk 
M illiyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları ( 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 3 Nationalism since the Empire to 
the Nation-State; The Turkish Hearts], Istanbul; İletişim Yayınlan, 1997.
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significance o f the People’s Houses for this study is that, they were the major 
institutions where the desired citizen o f the Turkish Republic would be raised or 
educated.
The social role o f the people’s Houses was defined as “to continue Kemalist 
revolutions until the sovereignty o f  the people is realized thoroughly, to educate and 
improve the people in order to elevate them to a level sufficient for the exercise o f 
this sovereignty.” *^ The project o f the People’s Houses was regarded as the success 
o f the Kemalist regime by the General Directorate o f the People’s Houses for “the 
education o f the people, cultural development and the formation o f national 
integrity and consciousness.” In other words the People’s Houses were one o f the 
most significant projects o f the Kemalist regime for the construction o f a new type 
o f citizen o f the modem nation state. Atatürk declared his views on the need for the 
People’s Houses as.
The nation should organize as a mass o f people that is conscious, 
understanding and devoted to an ideal. It is not sufficient to have the 
strongest lecturing means or the most educated armies o f teachers. We w ill 
not undermine the regulation o f a national people’s work in order to educate 
the people, and for the amassment o f the people.’^
^  Kadri Kaplan, “Halkevleri’nin Doğuş Bilinci ve Tarihsel Görevi” [The 
Birth o f the People’s Houses and their Historical Tasks], in Atatürk ve Halkevleri: 
Atatürkçü Düşünce Üzerine Denemeler [Atatürk and the People’s Houses: Essays 
on Atatürkist Thought], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kummu Basımevi, 1974), 52.
Anil Çeçen, “Halkevlerinin Toplumsal Görevi” [The Social Tasks o f the 
People’s Houses], in Atatürk ve Halkevleri, 190.
^  Halkevleri Genel Başkanlığı ve Atatürk Enstitüsü Başkanlığı [General 
Head o f the People’s Houses and Head o f The Atatürk Institute], “Sunuş” [Preface] 
\n Atatürk ve Halkevleri, 5.
Beşir Göğüş,“HaIkevleri ve Halk Eğitimi”[People’s Houses and the 
education o f the People] in Atatürk ve Halkevleri, 176, cited from Halkevleri
Dergisi, 1,1966.
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Similarly, in the speech Recep Peker made in the opening o f the People’s Houses 
mentioned that there was a need for additional education after or together with 
schools for the training o f the people in order to form the nation. Thus, the aim o f 
the Republican Peoples party was “to organize the nation as a mass o f people who 
were conscious, and who understood and loved each other and were tied to an 
ideal.” '^·
In the opening speeches the community was emphasized again. It was stated
that everyone should spare some o f his time for the improvement o f the community
and believe by heart for the necessity o f this. “Otherwise the best-educated citizen
will stay as a single citizen.”^^  In the People’s Houses the educated citizens would
contribute to the education o f the other citizens. Thus, Peker argued, the nation w ill
solidify and turn into a community as a granite mass.^ In the first anniversary o f
the formation o f the People’s Houses a revue named Birlik (Unity) was performed,
which propagated “community” against “one” and “all” against
People’s Houses were formed and utilized as an institution where
citizenship consciousness among the people would be elevated. In the first
anniversary, İsmet İnönü reminded their expectations from the citizens as follows:
We will consider the duties o f the citizens to be exercised by good will and 
sacrifice. We address to the citizens above everything that, if  they became 
old enough to join the military and were invited, they should do their 
military service; if  obligation for taxation is bestowed upon them, then they
“Recep Bey’in (Peker) Nutku”, [The Speech o f Recep Peker] in Atatürk 
ve Halkevleri, 11.
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Ibid., 13. 
Ibid., 15
“Halkevlerinin Birinci Yıldönümü,” [The First Anniversary o f the 
People’s Houses] in Atatürk ve Halkevleri^ 40. However, no further information 
could be gathered on this revue. The collection o f the plays and revues held in the 
People’s Houses did not include Birlik.
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should consider paying their taxes as an honor. The basis o f our policies and 
our success is the declaration o f the duties explicitly.^*
Atatürk inspired the members o f the People’s Houses to study language,
research about folklore, gather information about villages, gather a collection o f
customs and traditions, research history and archeology, revive folkloric dances,
deal with folklore poets, travel, hold conferences, write, improve the ability for
public speech, play sports, and attract people to the People’s Houses.^ In order to
carry out all those duties The People’s Houses had mainly nine branches. Those
were: 1. Language and literature, 2. Fine Arts, 3. Performance and theatre, 4.
Sports, 5. Social assistance, 6. Courses for the people and training, 7. Library and
publication, 8. Village, 9. History and museums. Among them the branches o f
language and literature, and history and museums are significant. In the speech he
made on the opening ceremony o f the People’s Houses, Reşit Galip Bey declared
that:
Within the cultural elements that compound the national character and that 
shapes and strengthens the national spirit, language, literature and history 
are the most important ones.
The branches o f language and literature, and history will aim at gathering all 
the people around the country studying on those areas. Under today’s 
circumstances where every work has just started, it is especially crucial for 
those studying language, literature and history, to work in collaboration. The 
organization o f this collaboration and the collaboration itself are necessary 
for the rise o f national language, national literature and national history on a
well-founded basis 100
Thus, the activities o f the language and literature branch were to increase the 
general knowledge o f the people; to prepare conferences, speeches, and ceremonies
“İsmet Paşa Hazretlerinin Nutku,”[The Speech o f İsmet Paşa] in Atatürk 
ve Halkevleri, 45
^  Enver Behnan Şapolyo, “Atatürk ve Halkevleri,” [Atatürk and the 
People’s Houses] in Atatürk ve Halkevleri, 68-69.
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that would initiate the principles o f the party to take root, and help increase the 
feeling o f citizenship obligations; in addition to working on language and 
literature.’”* The history branch, on the other hand, was founded for research on 
history, folklore, and ethnography.
The project o f the People’s Houses can be viewed as a significant part o f the 
populism o f six principles o f the Republican Peoples Party. Those principles were 
founded on the congress o f the RPP in 1931. The journal o f the People’s Houses 
Ülkü was issued with the aim o f teaching the people the six arrows o f the RPP, and 
providing those six arrows a theoretical framework.’”^  The six arrows o f the RPP 
were founded in the 1931 Congress o f  the party and can be regarded as the core o f  
Kemalism. Those are defined as “the essential characteristics o f the republican 
Peoples Party,” and are a) republicanism, b) nationalism, c) populism, d) etatism, e) 
secularism, f) revolutionarism.’”^
“Reşit Galip Bey’in Nutku,”[The Speech o f Reşit Galip Bey] Hakimiyeti 
Milliye, February, 20 1932 reprinted in Atatürk ve Halkevleri, 19.
Uluğ İğdemir, ‘Halkevleri ve Halkodalan” [People’s Houses and 
People’s Rooms], 'm Atatürk ve Halkevleri., 122.
Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak: Muasır Bir Medeniyet İçin Seferberlik Bilgileri, 
1923-1950 [To Create a Citizen: Information o f Mobilization for a Modem 
Civilization], Exhibition Catalogue, ed. by Zafer Toprak, (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi 
Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 1998), 53.
Those characteristics are explained as:
a) The Party is convinced that the Republic is the form o f government which 
represents and realizes most safely the ideal o f national sovereignty. With its 
unshakable conviction, the Party defends, with all its means, the Republic 
against all danger.
b) The Party considers it essential to preserve the special character and the entirely 
independent identity o f the Turkish social community in the sense explained in 
Article 2 (The nation is the political unit composed o f citizens bound together 
with the bonds o f language, culture, and ideal). The Party follows, in the 
meantime, a way parallel to and in harmony with all the modem nations in the 
way o f progress and development, and in the international contacts and 
relations.
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The significance o f the formation o f the People’s Houses should be 
evaluated with the formation o f two other institutions at the same year, namely Türk 
DU Kurumu [Turkish Linguistic Society], and Türk Tarih Kurumu [Society for the 
Study o f Turkish History], Those two institutions were designed for founding the 
grounds for national identity and for initiating social and cultural transformation. In 
1931 the Society for the Study o f Turkish History was founded with the aim o f 
“promoting interest and research in the national history o f the Turks as distinct
e)
c) The source o f Will and Sovereignty is the Nation. The Party considers it as an 
important principle that this Will and Sovereignty be used to regulate the proper 
fulfillment o f the mutual duties o f the citizen to the State and o f the State to the 
citizen.
We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the Law, 
and who recognize no privileges for any individual, family, class, or 
community, to be o f the people and for the people (populist).
d) Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one o f our 
main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and 
vital interests o f the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in 
order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as 
possible.
The Party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and methods in 
the administration o f the State prepared and applied in conformity with the 
needs o f the world and on the basis o f the fundamentals and methods provided 
for modem civilization by Science and Technique.
As the conception o f religion is a matter o f conscience, the Party considers it to 
be one o f the chief factors o f the success o f our nation in contemporary 
progress, to separate ideas o f religion from politics, and from the affairs o f  the 
world and o f the State.
The Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles bora o f  
revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these 
principles which have since been elaborated.
“Program o f the People’s Party o f the Republic,” (Official Translation) in Donald 
Everett Webster, The Turkey o f Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish 
Transformation, (New York: AMS Press, 1973), 307-309. Originally this is the 
program o f 1935, but the content is almost the same. I have checked and shortened 
this program in accordance with the program cited in Taha Parla, Türkiye’de 
Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı 
O k’u [The Official Sources o f Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist Single Party 
Ideology and the Six Arrows o f the RPP] Vol. 3 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 
1995), 36-37.
f)
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from merely Ottoman history.”*®^ The major aim o f the society was to search for 
the history o f the Turks in the pre-Islamic period. With this aim several congresses 
were held, the first o f which took place in July 1932 in Ankara. The aim was “to 
spread the history thesis to masses and to develop new history books.” ®^^ The 
history thesis mainly aimed at the creation o f  a new history. In doing so. Central 
Asia, that was believed to be the original homeland o f the Turks was revisited. In 
addition, the main argument was that civilization emerged and spread over the 
world from the Turks in the Central Asia.*°^ This history thesis had concluded that 
all the civilizations in the world originated from Turkish civilization. Engin argued 
that “it was understood that all the great civilizations o f Crete, Aegean and Greeks 
were in fact a common Turkish civilization. The world described by Homer in his 
epics was Turk.
In parallel with the foundation o f the Society for the Study o f Turkish 
History, in July 1932 the Turkish Linguistic Society was founded. The aim was “to 
bring out the genuine beauty and richness o f the Turkish language and to elevate it 
to the high rank it deserves among world languages.” The Sun-Language Thesis
Uriel Heyd, Language Reform in Modern turkey. Oriental Notes and 
Studies No. 5, (Jerusalem: Hadassah Apprentice School o f Printing, 1954), 25.
Büşra Ersanli Behar, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de “Resmi Tarih” 
Tezi’nin Oluşumu (1929-1937 [Power and History: The Development o f the 
“Official History” Thesis in Turkey], (Istanbul: Afa Yayınlan, 1996), 2”** ed., 119. 
For the official history thesis see the whole book.
Ibid., 120. Here Mahmut Esat Bozkurt argues that the Turks had long 
before Europe cultivated land, raised cattle, and used mines.
Saffet Engin, ‘Türk Tarihi ve İnkılabı” [Turkish History and 
Revolution], in Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri
Heyd, Language Reform, 25. Also see, “Güneş-Dil Teorisinin Ana 
Hatları ve Verimleri” [The Main Points o f the Sun-Language Thesis and Its
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was developed during this period, which suggested that as “Central Asia was the 
cradle o f human civilization, Turkish was the mother o f all languages.”*”^  To 
further the research done on Turkish language and the Sun-Language thesis several 
congresses were held, like on history, starting from September 1932. But those 
societies and theories were developed and utilized in order to facilitate the break 
with the Ottoman past, and the development o f a new Turkish nation. Through the 
usage o f “scientific” knowledge, it was tried to be proved that the Turks were the 
prominent actors in world history. The People’s Houses grew, and functioned 
parallel to those institutions.
The aim o f the People’s Houses was, as mentioned above, to create a “new  
man” civilized from head to toe. This new man should be a distinguished person 
with his taste o f m u sic,*p h ysica l structure, hygiene, and manners. This is also 
quite parallel to the statement that “the individual only becomes a citizen and 
subject o f right through and thanks to the institution; the citizens obligations to it 
are logically anterior to his or her rights.”***
The project o f the People’s Houses is one o f the significant examples o f 
what Michel Foucault calls as disciplinary power and bio-power. Disciplinary 
power, has the major function o f “ ‘training’, rather than selecting and levying; or
Products], Türk Dili, 16, April 1936, 30-32, reprinted \n Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı, 
V o l.2 ,92-95.
109 Ibid., 33.
**” See, Orhan Tekelioglu, “The Rise o f a Spontaneous Synthesis: The 
Historical Background o f Turkish Popular Music,” A/ziMe Eastern Studies, 32 (2) 
April 1996.
*** Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: an introduction,” in The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Govemmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, 
and Peter Miller, (London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore. Harvester, 
Wheatsheaf, 1991, 32.
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trmning in order to levy and select all the more.””  ^In addition, Foucault argues that 
“discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is a specific technique o f power that regards 
individuals both as objects and as instruments o f its exercise.”"  ^ In line with 
Hobbes’ statement that “man is made fit for society not by nature, but by 
discipline,”” '* “the citizen is quintessentially a creation o f techniques o f social 
discipline, and derives his or her citizenly capacities as a product o f the activity o f 
government.”*”  David Burchell argues that this is the key feature o f passive 
citizen. The creation o f a new type o f citizen, the new man, and the ongoing 
emphasis on community, reflects Foucault’s views on modem governmental 
rationality; where he points to the tendency o f “a form o f political sovereignty, 
which would be a government o f all and o f each, and whose concern would be at 
once to ‘totalize’ and to ‘individualize’.”**^
Bio-power is related to the biological interest in individuals by the 
administrative power, and might be regarded as the origin o f  the modem state. **^  
The emergence o f censuses and the increasing concern on health and hygiene o f the 
subjects is part o f bio-power. The importance o f hygiene and public health was 
expressed by İsmet İnönü as:
**^  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, ( New  
York: Vintage Books, 1979), 170.
113 Ibid.
**'* Gert Bernard (ed ), Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen (De Homine and 
De Cive), (London: Harvester, 1978), 10 cited in David Burchell, ‘The Attributes 
o f Citizens: Virtue, Manners and the Activity o f Citizenship,” Economy and 
Society, 24 (4) November 1995, 541.
**^  Ibid., 543.
**^  Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: an introduction,” 3.
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The basis o f our Social life is the preservation and solidarity o f the family. 
In our social structure, a strong family life, free from all kinds o f anti­
democratic and servile mentality, is the thing, which will occupy our 
attention. We have resolved to seek and to pursue continuously the 
procuring o f all means for the protection and usefulness o f the children in 
the family. Thus we consider the nurture o f the children to be the main 
wealth and support o f the country. The conviction that the prosperity and 
happiness o f the country is possible only through service, and that wealth 
can only be secured through economy above everything else in the family 
and in society, shall be foremost among the activities o f the party. The 
struggle against the high cost o f living shall be pursued unceasingly and 
properly.
The following are the aims o f our Party:
To work for the improvement o f the sanitary conditions o f  the country along 
scientific lines;
To fight continually against social diseases;
To enlighten the people persistently and uninterruptedly in order that they 
may come to respect the laws o f hygiene and health;
To open scientific institutions;
To make hygienic and social laws for the realization o f our program o f  
public health; and
To provide the means for the care and protection o f those who are 
temporarily or permanently disabled.'**
The increasing concern o f the state over the body o f it is subjects were reflected on 
the importance given to the measures for the rise o f population and struggle with 
the diseases like, tuberculosis, syphilis, and malaria. Those were included in the 
programme o f the Republican Peoples Party, in addition to the concern on physical 
education, which was supposed to be simultaneous with the revolutionary 
education. In line with the party programme, a law on education was enacted which 
will be evaluated below.
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1985).
See Michel Foucault, History o f Sexuality, (New York: Vintage Books,
"* The Address o f Ismet Pasha on Education,” Vakit, November 14, 1927, 
reprinted and translated in Lutfy Levonian, The Turkish Press: Selections from the 
Turkish Press Showing Events and Opinions 1925-1932, (Athens: School o f 
Religion, 1932).
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As mentioned above, the physical education o f the citizens was regarded as 
an essential part o f the education o f the citizens. Article 7 o f the National Education 
section o f the RPP party programme o f 1931 stated that: Our Party gives 
importance to all the sports groups formed by the Turkish citizens from the point o f  
keeping the nation powerful and resolute, and regards the protection and 
continuation o f those groups as its duty.^ *^
In the following party programme o f 1935, more detail was given on the 
views on sports and physical education. After stressing that continuity in physical 
education, sports activities and revolutionary education will be taken into 
consideration, it was stated that every person will be obliged to deal with physical 
education. Parla argues that this article was a prescription o f the forthcoming law 
on physical education, and sought for sportsman soldiers o f the revolution.
The law o f physical education was enacted on June 29, 1938. According to 
Article 1 o f the law, it was stated that physical education is composed o f all kinds 
o f gymnastics, sports and games that facilitates the development o f the citizens’ 
capabilities in accordance with the national and revolutionary objectives. 
Therefore, playing sports was defined as an obligation until the age o f 45, 
especially for the youth (Article 4). According to Article 13, in villages, towns.
4.3.4 The Icnv ofpJ^sical education
Parla, Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi, 73.
‘^°Ibid., 77 
Ibid.
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, “Spor teşkilatı hakkında kanun layihası ve 
Muvakkat encümen mazbatası” [Proposal o f law on sport organization ] Vol. 26,
Sequence no. 332,4 .
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cities, and separate districts except schools and military garrisons, which inhabit 
more than fifty citizens o f the age o f obligation for sports; clubs, in places with less 
than fifty citizens, sports groups would be formed. Besides, the companies, 
factories and institutions employing more than five hundred workers were obliged 
to build sports halls and swimming pools.
The reasons for sports organization were stated in the proposed law by 
giving the Western countries as examples. The Western countries gave premium 
importance to sports and physical education, because they have considered the 
education o f the citizens as well shaped and with normal quality, to be the most 
important element o f the defense o f the country and for economic development. 
Therefore, creation o f a highly qualified Turkish youth in all aspects was a major 
aim. The proposal was introduced by the then Minister o f Interior, Şükrü Kaya, 
stating that physical education is a critical component o f national education, and 
aims at raising people as beneficial persons for the nation and humanity. The reason 
behind the enactment o f a law on physical education was expressed by the Minister 
o f Interior Şükrü Kaya as:
Every regime seeks an appropriate type o f citizen and finds it. We know the 
citizen o f the absolutist regime. The man o f the regime o f Atatürk, the 
Kemalist revolution is well shaped, clever, brave, dignified, merry and 
serious, and defends his rights and ideas in every circumstance. We are 
seeking this. The aim o f this physical education is intellectual, moral and 
ethical training. This is the type our regime entails...Being well behaved, 
polite, dignified and serious are the Turks’ most obvious features in 
confrontation with the world.
As can be depicted, the law o f physical education is a reflection o f the increasing 
concern o f the state over the body o f the individuals. In that sense, it is the 
utilization o f bio-power.
Ibid., 1.
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The infusion o f the private and public sphere, which had been the case 
during the process o f the construction o f citizenship, can also be seen in this law. 
Şükrü Kaya, in the end o f his introductory speech stated that “we would like to see 
our citizens serious and dignified, in their public life, as well as in their private 
life.” ’^^
4.4 The “Other” Face of the Citizenship Construction: The Turkification 
Process
What is evaluated so far is the abstract definition o f Turkish citizenship. It is 
mostly related with the legal status aspect o f Turkish citizenship. However, there is 
another aspect related to Turkish identity, and the actual practices that in a sense 
deviate from that abstract definition mentioned above. This section will dwell upon 
the situation o f the minorities, and the policies implemented with the aim o f 
homogenizing the nation. The nation was defined as a political and social gioup 
with unity in language, culture, and ideal. This was an inclusive definition in the 
first instance. However, the degree o f inclusion varied by the difference o f religion 
in actual practice.
While people with different ethnic and cultural origins were to be called 
Turks, the notion o f citizenship was not defined simply in ethnic terms. That is, 
Turkish nationality was not regarded as the product o f biology or blood ties. The 
new and artificially constructed or ‘manufactured’ Turkish culture was, therefore, 
open to non-Turkish Muslim groups, who were accepted as members o f the nation
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 26, 29 June 1938,487.
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and state so long as they were willing to culturally and linguistically integrate or 
assimilate into the Turkish culture. This is the logic o f cultural assimilation, it was 
not ethnic or racist. The migration o f Muslim groups (Bosnians, Albanians, 
Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the Caucasus were accepted, and those 
groups were easily naturalized; however, migration o f the Gagavuz Turks, a small 
Turkish group with a Christian origin, was hardly accepted.^ ^^ In a similar way, 
non-Muslim groups (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) were called Turk only in respect 
to citizenship, but not to nationality; in terms o f defining nationality they were seen 
as outsiders whether or not o f Turkish origin, for they were not Muslim. This 
shows that in determining the nature o f Turkish nationality, in an implicit manner, 
religion appeared as a significant element together with ethnicity.
Herein lies the paradox o f the official definition o f Turkish identity and 
citizenship. While seeming to reject their Ottoman and Islamic heritage, the new 
regime (Republic) still continued to respect the common historical heritage with 
those non-Turkish groups mentioned above. Those groups were placed within the 
Muslim millet in the Ottoman Empire, and, it might be argued, there is a reflection 
o f that millet system in the Turkish Republic in its recognition o f the groups that 
previously were parts o f the Muslim millet as Turks. In a similar way, the non-
125 Ibid.
Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanh’dan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği” 
[Turkish Identity from the Ottomans to the Republic], in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve 
Kimlik [Republic, Democracy, and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul; Bağlam 
Yayınlan, 1997), 81.
Bernard Lewis said, “One may speak o f Christian Arabs, but a Christian 
Turk is an absurdity and a contradiction in terms. Even after thirty years o f the 
secular Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but 
never a Turk.” ‘Turkey: Westernisation,” in Unity and Variety in Muslim 
Civilization, ed. by G. E. von Grunebaum (Chicago; Univ. o f Chicago Press, 1955), 
326.
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Muslim groups remaining in Turkey were regarded as Turkish citizens as a 
continuation o f their community status in the Ottoman Empire. But there were 
debates on the status o f the non-Muslim communities and the problem o f their 
citizenship during the 1920s. The debate was around equality and the assimilation 
o f the non-Muslim population. On the other hand, it was exclusionary in the sense 
that the outsiders with non-Muslim origins were hardly accepted as citizens. Those 
issues w ill be elaborated below, by taking certain periods and events as a reference 
point. The process o f Turkification will be analyzed, here policies on Turkification 
means, by quoting Aktar;
It is the process during which the Turkish ethnic identity began to be 
dominant in almost every level o f social life, such as from the language 
spoken in the streets to the history taught at schools; from trade to the state 
regime in employing personnel; from special law to the settlement o f the 
people in specific regions.
A French journalist who stayed in Turkey during the war o f national independence,
later wrote on the situation o f the citizens in Turkey, in his book:
There still exist in the country two categories o f citizens with unequal rights, 
the Muslims and the non-Muslims.
This discrimination made between the citizens o f the same state, is not, 
however, dictated by the difference o f religion. Its causes are, on the one 
hand, o f a moral nature; on the other hand, o f an economic nature. Let us 
examine first the former set o f causes. The Muslim Turks, who alone fought 
for the independence o f the country, remain still very much under the 
influence o f the tragic struggle, which took place in Anatolia. No more have 
they forgotten the attitude taken at that time by various sections o f the non- 
Muslim communities. Certain betrayals rendered them suspicious. And in 
this state o f mind they no longer consider the oral manifestations o f civic 
loyalty on the part o f the minorities as being o f indisputable sincerity. They 
wish proofs more tangible showing that the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews 
have become heart and soul true citizens o f Turkey.
Ayhan Aktar, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yillannda Uygulanan ‘Türkleştirme” 
Politikaları” [The Policies o f Turkification implemented during the first years o f the 
Republic] Tarih ve Toplum, 156 December 1996, 324.
Paul Gentizon, Mustapha Kemal, ou I ’Orient en marche, (Paris: Bossard, 
1929) cited in Henry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social 
and Religious Development (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), 82.
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In fact, the situation o f the minorities had been a critical issue since the Ottoman 
Empire. The foreign powers tried to intervene in the domestic affairs o f the Empire 
in matters related with the situation o f the non-Muslim groups, in other words, the 
millets. The underlying reason behind both the Tamimat Charter and the Reform 
Edict was to free the Empire from that interference by granting equal status to the 
non-Muslims. However, these attempts failed, and the population exchange with 
Greece became an issue after the Balkan War in 1914.*^° Ak^am argues that 
Turkification had occupied the core o f the governmental policies after the Balkan 
War, and detailed plans were made for the eradication o f the non-Turkish masses
• 131from strategic areas.
After the Balkan Wars and during and after the War o f Independence 
around 1 million Greeks left Anatolia and moved to Greece. The agreement on 
population exchange was signed in January 30, 1923 in Lausanne after long 
debates. According to this agreement, non-Muslim Turkish citizens living in the 
Turkish territories would be exchanged with the Muslim Greek citizens living in 
Greek territories starting from May 1923, and none o f them could return to the
See, Ayhan Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin 
Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama; Türk-Yunan NüfUs Mübadelesi 1923-1924” 
[A Phase in the Homogenization o f the Population and the Turkification o f the 
Economy: Turkish-Greek Population Exchange], in Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme 
Politikaları [Tax on Property and the Policies o f Turkification] (Istanbul; İletişim  
Yayınları, 2000), 26.
See, Taner Akçam, Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu [Turkish 
National Identity and the Armenian Problem] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995) 
4* ed., 124. Here Taner Akçam argues that the issue o f the Armenians (so-called 
Armenian holocaust) can also be analyzed within this framework o f Turkification 
process.
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places they lived without the permission o f the respective governments.*^^ This 
agreement excluded the Greeks inhabiting in Istanbul, and the Muslims inhabiting 
in Western Thrace. According to some statistics, a total o f 1,200,000 Anatolian 
Greeks left Turkey, while 400,000 Rumelian Muslims arrived. The law 
prescribed that the properties left by the migrants would be distributed to their 
counterparts in respective countries. However, as Aktar mentioned, the migration o f  
the Greeks had started long ago, and the properties and houses they left had already 
been plundered by either the homeless Anatolian people or in some places by the 
people close to Ankara government. Thus, the settlement o f the migrants in both 
countries became a problem.
The population exchange was part o f the process o f the homogenization o f  
the populations o f both Turkey and Greece. As mentioned above, Muslims were 
regarded closer to the Turkish culture than the non-Muslims. Moreover, because o f 
the attitude o f some o f the sections o f the minorities during the War o f 
Independence, there was an unrest and mistrust towards these groups. By the 
finalization o f the population exchange process, the non-Muslim population which 
had been one fifth o f the total Ottoman population before First World War, fell to 
one fortieth.*^ "*
The implications o f the population exchange are not only limited to the 
homogenization o f the nation. By having a Turkified population, firstly the 
intervention o f the Western powers to the domestic affairs in Turkey for the reason
Kemal Arı, Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925) [The 
Great Exchange. Forced Migration to Turkey] (Istanbul; Tarih Vakfi Yurt 
Yayınlan, 1995), 18.
133 Ayhan Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi,” 17.
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o f the minorities was eliminated. In addition, the population exchange has led to 
changes in economic structure. Aktar benefits from a special report prepared by the 
then American Ambassador, Raymond Hare, that was evaluating the population 
exchange and noting that “while Greece benefited from the population exchange 
economically, it had political losses. Turkey, on the other hand, has been beneficial 
politically, but had economical loss.”‘^^  The economic loss was firstly due to the 
migration o f the Greek merchants and craftsmen who had been prevalent in the 
market. Secondly, the resettlement o f the newcomers was not handled with plans 
or programs, which caused a fall in the agricultural production.*^* On the other 
hand, the population exchange led to the emergence o f a national bourgeoisie under 
these circumstances.*^^ This would be more significant during the period when Tax 
on Property was sued, which will be elaborated below, that led to further
Çağlar Keyder, Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar [State and Classes in 
Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1993) 3”* ed., 112.
*^  ^Aktar, “Nüfusun H om ojen leştirilm esi20,43.
*^  ^ Raymond Hare, “The Origin and Development o f the Greco-Turkish 
Exchange o f Populations Question,” 15 October 1930 dated and 767.68115/143 
numbered special report quoted in ibid.
*^  ^For instance, the production o f brick, glass, and pottery were done by the 
Greeks, and after their departure a major fall in the production was experienced. 
See, An, Büyük Mübadele, 175. On the other hand, foreign trade had almost 
stopped because o f the departure o f the Greek traders. See, Aktar, “Nüfusun 
Homojenleştirilmesi,” 50-51.
*^ * Ibid., 47. It is stated that the migrants were resettled in unfamiliar 
geographic and climate conditions, by ignoring the regions they came from. This in 
turn led to fall in agricultural production. However, Kemal An suggests that the 
newcomers have contributed to the development in some sectors, like new methods 
in raising crops, and tobacco production. See, An, Büyük Mübadele, 176-182.
*^  ^ Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi,” 49-55, Keyder, Türkiye’de 
Devlet ve Sınıflar, 114-118.
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According to the Lausanne Treaty signed on 24 July 1923, the non-Muslim 
population o f Turkey, namely Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were granted minority 
status. The articles o f the Treaty related with the minority status were between 37* 
and 45* articles. Those articles granted the minorities the freedoms o f worship, 
travel and migration, right to speak their own languages, and forming their own 
religious, educational and social service associations.^'“ According to article 42, the 
minorities had the right to regulate their own traditions and customs and their own 
laws in family and personal matters.
However, the Republic had the intention to grasp all o f its population under 
one law, namely the Civil Law. During the preparation o f this law in 1925, the 
minorities withdrew from their rights granted by Article 42, either willingly or 
unwillingly. But, this did not help to the betterment o f their situation, or to be 
accepted as full citizens o f the Turkish Republic.
elimination o f the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and strengthening o f  the Turkish
bourgeoisie instead.
Avner Levi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler [Jews in the Turkish 
Republic], (Istanbul; İletişim Yayınlan, 1996), 19.
See Ayhan Aktar, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllannda Uygulanan Türkleştirme 
Politikaları,” Tarih ve Toplum note 21.
See, ibid., 112-113; Levi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Yahudiler, 68-69; 
Rıfat N. Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni 
(1923-1945), [The Jews o f Turkey During the Republican Years: An Adventure o f 
Turkification], (İstanbul; İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 90-102.
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As mentioned previously, the major components o f a nation were defined as 
unity in language, culture and ideal. Therefore, many attempts were made on the 
development and spread o f Turkish. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, which 
would ease literacy among the masses. On the other hand, a language thesis was 
formulated, that was mentioned above. During this process, the population that had 
mother tongues other than Turkish experienced pressures for speaking Turkish, and 
the Turkification o f the names was regulated by a new law, namely the law o f 
Family Names.
4.4.1 The emphasis on Turkish language
4.4.1.1 “Citizen, speak Turkish!’
During the Turkification process, campaigns for making non-Muslim 
citizens speak Turkish were initiated several times. Speaking Turkish was regarded 
as an integral part o f being a nation, which was reflected in the motto o f “one 
language, one culture, and one ideal.” In 1931, in a speech he made on the 
programme o f RPP, the party general secretary, Recep Peker, stressed the 
importance on Turkish as:
We should express our views about the Christian and Jewish citizens as 
well. Our Party regards those citizens as Turkish on the condition that they 
participate in the unity o f language and ideal we have expressed 
previously.
143 Parla, Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi, 110.
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The first campaign was organized by the Student Union o f the Dar-iil
Fiinun Faculty o f Law, with the aim o f banning the usage o f languages other than
Turkish by the minorities in public places.*"*  ^ It was stated in a newspaper that
One o f the requirements o f citizenship is to know and speak Turkish, which 
is the official language o f Turkey. Those whom we admitted to citizenship 
should know that. They (Armenians, Greeks, and especially Jews) owe their 
ease, freedom and income, everything to the Turks whose language they do 
not want to speak.
Signs were hung to the public places, like ships, and people started to warn those 
speaking foreign languages. There even occurred some fights and quarrels among 
the people.*'*^
In response to this campaign, the Jews formed Turkish courses for their 
co m m u n ity ,a n d  the Turkish Hearts opened Turkish courses for the minorities. 
The first campaign for Turkish ended suddenly, but new campaigns were to be 
organized from time to time in the future.
4.4.1.2 The law on family names
The law on Family Names was adopted in 1934. The proposal noted that 
family names were used all around the world, and that the family name states the
144 Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni, 135.
145 M(im) Halid, ‘Türkçe Mecburiyeti” [Compulsory Turkish], Edime 
Postası, 22 March 1928 cited in ibid., 144.
146 See, ibid., 130-148.
147 The Jews had given priority to learning and speaking Turkish. They 
formed a commission for the spread o f the usage o f Turkish. Their principles were 
mainly to adopt Turkish as mother tongue, and to open courses for this. See, ibid, 
note 278, 133.
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nationality o f  the person. Muğla deputy Nuri Bey, who prepared the proposal 
mentioned the people who were trying to change their names in the courts with the 
names Turkified by Mustafa Kemal. He added that together with a new regulation 
and with the help o f science on the derivation o f new names, this problem would be 
solved.
According to this law, all names that remind ranks, post, tribe, foreign race 
or nationality, and names that are disgusting, funny or rude would be outlawed 
(Article 3). In addition, the new surnames should be in Turkish, thus the foreign 
tags such as “jaw, of, e f viç, iç, dis, pulos, aki, zâde, mahdumu, veled and bin were 
prohibited.
On the banning o f those names that remind foreign nationality like Çeçen
Ibrahim or Laz Mehmet, the Minister o f Interior, Şükrü Kaya, noted that their aim
was “to abolish the imaginary distinctiveness that does not exist at all.”*^ ° This is in
parallel with the definition o f a nation \n Medeni Bilgiler that stressed
Today there are citizens and nationalities within the Turkish nations 
political and social spheres to whom Kurdish, Circassian, Laz, or Bosnian 
identities were propagated. However, these wrong names that are the 
products o f the absolutist era, have not made any influence on the nation 
except distress other than a few tools o f the enemy and reactionary fools. 
Because, those members o f the nation also have the same past, history, 
morality, and law with the general Turkish community.
On the other hand, Refet Bey declared that he was against the abolishing o f
the foreign names. This would, according to Refet Bey, conceal the real tendencies
“Muğla Mebusu Nuri Beyin, nüfus kanununa müzeyyel 3/97 numaralı 
kanun teklifile soy adı hakkında 1/558 numaralı kanun layihası ve Dahiliye ve 
Adliye encümenleri mazbatası,” TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, Sequence no.203.
“Soyadı Nizamnamesi” Resmi Gazete, No: 2805, 2o December 1934. 
Articles 5, 7 and 8.
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, 21.6.1934, 246.
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o f some people. Instead, he suggested that those who want to assume foreign names 
should be allowed to do so, which would enable people to see those persons’ real 
id e n t it ie s .In  response to this, the Minister o f Interior, Şükrü Kaya, stressed the 
importance o f assimilation, as one o f the major duties o f a state. He suggested that 
the incongruities would be eliminated through schools and society, and the person 
would become “a Turk as much as I am and would serve to the country.”*^  ^ Thus, 
the law on Family Names would serve to assimilate the non-Turkish elements 
within the Turkish community.
4.4.2 The law on settlement
1934 had been a critical year for the minorities. The Thrace incidents and 
the enactment o f the 2510 numbered Law on Settlement almost went 
simultaneously. The Law on Settlement is significant for the issue o f citizenship as 
it is still used for admitting people to Turkish citizenship. Besides, as will be 
elaborated below, this law points to the transformation in the understanding o f  
citizenship from territorial understanding towards a more common culture and 
descent oriented one.
The Thrace incidents started with the publication o f an anti-Semitist journal 
called M illi İnkılâp [National Reform] in Istanbul. After that, the anti-Semitist 
movement increased in Turkey, especially in the Thrace region. Jews were attacked
Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, 23.
See the speech o f Refet Bey, Bursa deputy, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 
23, 21 June 1934, 248-249.
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and their shops were plundered especially in Çanakkale, and other parts o f Thrace. 
As a result o f those attacks Jews living in those regions had to flee to Istanbul.*^'' 
The rise o f those attacks against Jews is regarded as the results o f both the 
enactment o f the Law on Settlement, and the influence o f the rise o f anti-Semitism 
in Europe.*^^
The 2510 numbered Law on Settlement was enacted on June 14, 1934. 
According to the Minister o f Interior, Şükrü Kaya, thanks to this law, the country 
‘Svould transform into a country where a single language is spoken, and same 
thoughts and sentiment are shared by the people.”^^  ^ In the introductory speech, 
Kütahya deputy, Naşit Hakkı Bey, noted that this law was one o f the fundamental 
laws o f the revolution. In his long speech, Naşit Hakkı Bey mentioned the 
importance o f the unity in language, culture and ideal and added that this law would 
help the assimilation o f those who regard themselves as non-Turkish, or who had 
lost Turkish identity. By taking all the measures for the people to speak Turkish, 
and abolishing o f the tribal organizations, those who were from other cultures or
153 See the speech o f Şükrü Kaya, Minister o f Interior, ibid.
For the details o f  the Thrace events, see Ayhan Aktar, ‘Trakya Yahudi 
Olaylarını ‘Doğru’ Anlamak” [Understanding the Thrace Jewish Incidents 
Properly], Tarih ve Toplum, 155 (November 1996); Levi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde 
Yahudiler, 100-130; Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni, 243-264. Also see, Haluk 
Karabatak, “ 1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudilef” [Thrace Incidents and the Jews], 
Tarih ve Toplum, 146 (February 1996), 4-16; Oral Onur, ‘Trakya Olayları 
Hakkında”[About the Thrace Incidents], Tarih ve Toplum, 149 (May 1996), 3-4; 
and Avner Levi, “ Trakya Yahudileri Olayı. Alınamayan Ders,” [The Incident o f  
the Jews o f Thrace], Tarih ve Toplum, 151 (July 1996), 10-17.
*^^Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni, 243-246.
Speech o f Şükrü Kaya, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period 4, vol. 23, 14 June
1934, 141.
Speech o f Naşit Hakkı Bey, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period 4, vol. 23, 7 
June 1934, 67.
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who spoke other languages would be absorbed, and assimilated into the Turkish 
culture.
The first article o f the Law on Settlement stated that the dispersion and the 
settlement o f the population would be regulated according to the degree o f 
adherence to the Turkish culture. Thus, the Turkish territory was divided into three 
regions; the first region is the territory where the population with Turkish culture is 
desired to concentrate. The second region is the territoiy spared for the settlement 
o f those who were to be assimilated into the Turkish culture. The third region 
would be evacuated for health, political, military and security purposes, and it 
would be prohibited to settle in those places (Article 2).
Article 3 stated that those people fi’om Turkish descent or those close to 
Turkish culture who migrate with the desire to settle in Turkey are accepted by the 
decision o f the Ministry o f Interior and are called muhacir (émigré). Those émigrés 
and refugees would resettle in the places shown and would not be permitted to 
leave those places (Article 7). Besides, the émigrés would be helped in their 
resettlement and naturalization would be made easier for them (Article 6). On the 
other hand, those who do not adhere to Turkish culture, anarchists, spies, nomadic 
gypsies and those who were deported would not be admitted as émigrés (Article 4).
The nomadic gypsies o f Turkish nationality would be spread to villages o f 
Turkish culture, foreign nomadic gypsies and nomads who do not adhere to Turkish 
culture would be deported (Article 9). In addition, according to Article 10, 
leadership o f the nomadic tribes {aşiret reisliği) was abolished. Those two articles 
were designed especially for the dispersion o f the Kurdish tribes. Actually, Bali
158 Ibid., 70.
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noted that the law was designed in order to spread the Kurds after their 
rebellions.
Article 11 is significant for the situation o f the non-Turkish minorities. The 
spread and assimilation o f those people were safeguarded by this article. It stated 
that
a) It is prohibited for those whose mother tongue is other than Turkish to 
collectively form new villages, wards, worker or artisan groups or to 
restrict a village, ward, work or arts to the same race.
b) The Ministry o f Interior, upon the decision o f the Council o f Ministers 
have to take necessary measures for the cultural, military, political, 
social and disciplinary reasons about those, who do not have allegiance 
to Turkish culture or those who have allegiance to Turkish culture but 
speak another language. Provided that it is not done wholesale, moving 
to other places and dismissal from citizenship are included in these 
measures.
c) The number o f foreigners settled in towns and villages cannot exceed 
the ten-percent o f the whole population o f the municipality and those 
cannot from a separate ward.
In Article 12, 13, and 14, the people who were to be resettled in the 
determined regions are stated respectively. Thus, no tribe, nomad or those not 
alleged to Turkish culture could resettle in the first region. Only the émigrés and 
population o f the third region that are alleged to Turkish culture, and retired 
bureaucrats and officers o f Turkish descent and Turkish culture could settle in the 
first region. In the second region, nomads, refugees and émigrés, those moved from 
the first and third region would be settled. In this article it is stated that it is 
compulsory for those who are not o f Turkish race to be dispersed to villages, and to 
towns and cities on condition that they do not form separate wards or groups
*^^Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni, 246. See, Tank Ziya Ekinci, Vatandaşlık 
Açısından Kürt Sorunu ve Bir Çözüm Önerisi [Kurdish Problem from the point o f 
Citizenship and A Proposal for Solution], (Istanbul; Küyerel Yayınları, 1997), 161- 
162. And also Ahmet Yıldız, Search fo r an Ethno-Secular Delimitation o f Turkish 
National Identity, 413-420 for the situation o f the Kurds and the Law on Settlement.
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(Article 13/3). In addition, those resettled people could not move to other places 
even after ten years o f  their settlement (Article 29).
The Law on Settlement is a major development for the Turkification 
process. For the sake o f assimilation o f the non-Turkish elements major rights o f 
freedom o f movement were violated. Besides, pressure for speaking Turkish 
intensified. The non-Turkish population was spread over the country so as to be 
absorbed by the Turkish culture. The Law on Settlement was a perfect reflection o f 
the motto o f the Republic "one language, one culture, one ideal.”
The pressure over the non-Turkish groups for integration with the Turkish 
culture had intensified in the 1930s. There are some views that relate those 
developments to the rise o f Nazism and Fascism in Europe,*^ However, Parla 
argues that those were not related to the influence o f those ideologies but were the 
policies determined long before the reign o f Nazism and Fascism. But, during the 
Second World War, the policies recruited towards the minorities had some 
reflections o f anti-Semitism. The Tax on Property is a significant example.
4.4.3 Tax on Property
The Tax on Property was issued on 11 November 1942. The Turkish 
government was in an economic crisis because o f the increase o f defense expenses 
that increased with the beginning o f the Second World War in 1939. In addition, 
there were the problems o f the increase o f inflation, budget deficits, expansion o f
160
161
See, for instance, Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni, 243-244.
Parla, Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi, 22.
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the black-market and profiteering.’® The object o f the taxation was expressed by 
Şükrü Saraçoğlu as to decrease the money in use, and to provide for the needs o f 
the country. However, the underlying reason was the elimination o f the 
minorities from the economy, and the replacement o f the minority bourgeoisie by 
its Turkish counterparts.
According to this law, the taxpayers were categorized into four as Muslims, 
non-Muslims, foreigners, and converts (those who had converted to Islam). The 
taxes each category should pay were determined rather arbitrarily.’^^  The amount 
that should be paid by the non-Muslim taxpayers usually exceeded their wealth and 
were not proportional to the tax issued for the Muslim population. Those tax payers 
who could not pay the fixed amount were sent to working camps that were formed 
in Aşkale, Erzurum, and Sivrihisar. The Tax on Property was abolished in March 
1944 and the debts o f those who could not pay their taxes until that time were 
cancelled.
The Tax on Property was significant in two respects. Firstly, during the 
taxation process the statements made by the prominent politicians o f the period 
reflected that the non-Muslim population was seen as guests who were financially
’® Rıdvan Akar, Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları, 
[Passengers o f Aşkale: Tax on Property and Working Camps], (İstanbul: Belge 
Yayınlan, 1999), 52.
Mahmut Goloğlu, M illi Şef Dönemi (1939-1945) [The National Chief 
Period] (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınlan, 1974), cited in ibid., 52.
See, ibid., 197-205; Ayhan Aktar, “Varlık Vergisi Sırasında Gayri 
Menkul Satışlan ile Servet Transferi: İstanbul Tapu Kayıtlannın Analizi,” [Real 
Estate Sales and Transfer o f Wealth During Tax on Property] Toplumsal Tarih, 69 
(September 1999) reprinted in Aktar, Türkleştirme Politikaları, 215-243.
165 See ibid.
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benefiting from the “hospitality o f  Turkey.”*^ Besides, it was a violation o f certain 
rights and the inequality between the status o f the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens 
became apparent during this process. Secondly, because o f collapse o f the non- 
Muslim bourgeoisie due to the burden o f the Tax on Property, the bourgeoisie 
structure was transformed. The wealthy Muslim traders took over the business o f  
those people. This, in turn, led to the strengthening o f the Turkish bourgeoisie.
Tax on Property was one o f the most significant developments against the 
non-Muslim population during the early Republican era, and a final step taken in 
this period for the Turkification o f the population. In the following chapter, the 
situation o f the minorities will be elaborated with respect to their citizenship status.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter tried to highlight the construction o f Turkish citizenship. The 
legal aspect is analyzed by the utilization o f the Constitution and the Citizenship 
Law o f 1928. The legal definition was egalitarian, and tired to benefit from both ju s  
sanguinis and ju s soli. In the first instance, Turkish citizenship was close to the 
French model that was based on territory with the premise that “those who are 
affiliated to the Turkish State by citizenship are called as Turks.” However, later a 
shift can be depicted in both the attitudes towards the minorities, the emphasis on 
adoption o f Turkish culture, and the admittance o f those people who were regarded 
close to Turkish culture as émigrés and to citizenship. This shift is parallel with the 
German type o f citizenship based on descent and unity in culture.
166 Speech o f the Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 21 January
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The construction o f citizenship was mainly carried out by the courses given 
at schools, and for the elderly through the People’s Houses. The citizen defined was 
passive with certain duties and obligations towards the community and the state. 
The rights were achieved in return for the obligations fulfilled. The definition o f the 
citizen was centered around the common good and general will. The community 
was given high priority.
The second part o f the chapter is concerned with the identity aspect o f 
Turkish citizenship. It deals with the situation o f the minorities within this process. 
Through the analyzed policies and laws, it is seen that the legal and egalitarian 
definition o f citizenship was not implemented thoroughly. While the legal 
definition was inclusive, the policies implemented towards the minorities were 
exclusionary. The aims for Turkification surpassed the acculturation o f the notion 
o f citizenship, and Turkishness became the critical issue. In other words, integration 
with the Turkish culture became the determinant o f Turkish citizenship.
1943, cited in Akar, Aşkale Yolcuları, 96.
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CHAPTER V
THE ERA OF TRANSFORMATION: 1946-1980
So far this study has dealt with the construction o f Turkish citizenship in the 
early Republican period, and briefly analyzed the Ottoman case as a historical 
background. The early Republican era, which was analyzed in the previous chapter, 
is crucial in the sense that it was the period during which both the nation-building 
process and the construction o f citizenship was carried out. The citizen constructed 
in this period was a civic republican citizen, endowed with duties and obligations 
towards the state and community. The citizenship rights were granted in return for 
the duties fulfilled. The desired citizen should be devoted to the Kemalist principles 
defined by the six arrows o f the Republican Peoples Party. That is, the citizen 
should be republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secular, and revolutionary. Thus, 
the general will and common good were the main determinants for the citizen. This 
definition o f citizenship was tried to be inculcated through institutions like the 
Peoples Houses and education.
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The early republican period was a single party regime and the consolidation 
o f the Republic and its reforms were the major aim. Citizeni.ration was a major 
component within this process. If Marshall’s analysis and classification is taken 
into consideration, then the early Republican period can be referred to as the stage 
o f civil citizenship, where the legal rights and definition o f citizenship is carried 
out. As evaluated in the previous chapter, there had been shifts fi'om the French 
type o f inclusionary citizenship towards a kind o f exclusionary type, resembling the 
German type that put importance on Turkish culture and language. There was even 
an inclination towards an ethnicist nationalism that emphasized Turkishness. 
However, by the transition to multi party politics in Turkey, there occurred major 
transformations both in the society and at the state level.
This chapter will deal with the period starting from the transition to multi­
party politics in 1946 until the military takeover in 1980. This period will be 
covered under two phases, the first phase is the Democrat Party rule until the first 
military takeover in 1960, and the second phase is the period after this takeover 
during which a new constitution was amended and the most liberal type o f 
citizenship was exercised. Even though this period did not hold a mission o f the 
conceptualization o f Turkish citizenship, particularly in the first phase, its 
significance lies in the changing role o f the citizen with regard to political 
participation.
Between 1946 and 1980, major transformations occurred in the Turkish 
Republican history. In 1946, the countiy was mostly composed o f rural areas and 
the percentage o f rural population in the total Population was 75,1 %. However, 
within the 35 years after transition to multi-party regime, urbanization accelerated
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and the urban population rose to 43,9 % by 1980.* This had certain outcomes. The 
desired citizen o f the early republican period was the citizen living in urban areas, 
and until 1946 the rural people were usually undermined. During that period this 
desire o f urbanization was achieved to a certain extent, but the process o f 
urbanization brought about or created its own cultural patterns, which were quite 
distinct from the early republican dreams. In addition, per capita income increased, 
and by the construction o f roads even the distant parts o f the country were 
connected to each other.Moreover, the rates o f literacy, life expectancy, and other 
vital statistics increased.^ With regard to citizenship, the conceptualization o f  
citizenship was transformed towards a new one that emphasized political 
participation and to one that utilized religion as a component. On the other hand, 
migration o f the Turkish guest workers to Germany started during this period, 
which later caused problems about citizenship both in Turkey and Germany. The 
issue o f dual citizenship became one o f the major problems after the 1980s, and will 
be elaborated in the next chapter.
During the first phase, the people found a way to show their resentment 
against the single-party regime through the Democrat Party (DP). The people were 
politically mobilized by the DP, and for the first time in Republican history, 
political participation had acquired an important role. This phase should be 
evaluated in two periods as the opposition years o f the DP, during which the party 
tried to rely on popular support; and the DP rule, when major changes in the 
mentality and politics o f DP are observed.
* İstatistik Göstergeler. Statistical Indicators, 1923-1990. TC Başbakanlık, 
Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, n.d.
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In the second phase, on the other hand, by the promulgation o f a new 
constitution (1961 Constitution) after the military takeover o f May 27, 1960, a more 
liberal atmosphere that opened the room for more representation o f different 
worldviews and for more o f a liberal type o f citizenship was experienced. This 
chapter will dwell upon those changes with particular reference to their impacts on 
Turkish citizenship.
5.1 Transition to multi-party regime
The year 1945 was significant for world history; the Second World War 
ended with the failure o f Nazism and Fascism. The world was divided into two 
poles between United States and the Soviet Union, and the period o f the Cold War 
began. Turkey had to clarify its stance in this context and chose to be ally with the 
West. However, the new order predominated by the West was based on capitalism 
and democracy. Thus, Turkey had to adopt itself to those in order to be accepted 
by this new order.
Within this context in addition to the continuously rising unrest within the 
Turkish society the need for transition to democracy became obvious. Therefore in 
1946, the Republican Peoples Party, which was in power as a single party for more 
than 20 years, decided to make room for new parties in the political arena. In fact.
 ^ Reşat Kasaba, “Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1946-1961,” in Ellis 
Goldberg et al. (eds.). Rules and Rights in the Middle East, (Seattle and London: 
University o f Washington Press, 1993), 45.
 ^ İlkay Sunar, “Populism and Patronage: The Demokrat Party and Its 
Legacy in Turkey,” //Po/zV/co, anno LV (4), 745.
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the aim was to let the formation o f a moderate opposition like the previous 
experiences o f multi-party regime.
The previous attempts were made first on 1925 by the formation o f 
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party) in 17 November 
1924, and second in 12 August 1930 by the formation o f Serbest Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası (Free Republican Party). Both parties were established by the initiative o f 
Mustafa Kemal. His desire was to exercise a kind o f rational democracy where 
there would be an enlightened debate between the political parties over the long­
term interests o f the community.'* The desired system was a two-party system with 
a strong ruling party and a weak opposition. However, those two attempts had 
failed.
The Progressive Republican Party aimed at the preservation o f individual 
freedom and religion from the interference o f the government.^ However, a revolt 
has broken out in the east o f Turkey on February 1925, aspiring for a Kurdish state 
and the restoration o f the Caliphate. Martial Law was declared, and after the 
suppression o f the revolt, the Progressive Republican Party was found responsible. 
The first attempt for multi-party regime ended with the closure o f the Progressive 
Republican Party in June 1925.^
The second attempt for multi-party regime was the formation o f the Free 
Republican Party İn August 1930. Fethi Okyar was the founder o f the party “by the 
direct suggestion o f Mustafa Kemal who urged even his own sister to join the
See, Metin Heper, “The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982- 
1989,” Governance, 3 (1990): 301-304.
 ^ Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-party 
System, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 46.
 ^Ibid.
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p a r t y . T h e  Free Republican Party criticized the government especially on 
economic grounds and gained popularity among the people. According to Karpat, 
the criticisms o f the Free Republican Party was regarded by the RPP as a threat to 
the regime, and the Party was in a way forced to dissolve itself in November 1930.*  
This process coincided with the Menemen Incident, which was the rebellion o f the 
reactionaries that led to the beheading o f a reserve officer. Therefore, the 
justification for the closure o f the Free Republican Party was again related to its 
connection with the reactionary groups. Thus, the attempts for including opposition 
parties in the political life ended up in failure in the early Republican era, and no 
more attempts were made until 1946. Therefore, until 1946, the political 
participation o f the Turkish citizens, namely voting, which was regarded to be the 
most crucial duty and right o f the Turkish citizen in the early republican period, had 
been limited to a single party, the Republican Peoples Party.
5.1.1 The formation o f the Democrat Party
As mentioned above, both the international and domestic contexts 
influenced the transition to multi-party regime. According to Erogul, there were 
four main factors that paved the way for that transition. These were;
1) The desire to prevent outbursts by transferring the increasing unrest o f 
the people towards democratic means.
2) The desire to find a solution to the increasing pressures coming from the 
wealthy classes.
’ Ibid., 65.
* Ibid., 66-67.
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3) The international context and the threats coming from the Soviet Union 
left only one choice, that is the adoption o f Western model in the 
domestic administration.
4) The aim o f carrying on the Westernization program that continued since 
the Tanzimat period; reached its peak with Kemalism, and that became 
the official ideology o f the single party period.^
Within this context, the ex-members o f the RPP, who either split from the 
party or were expelled got together to form the Democrat Party. Their split from the 
RPP was because o f their opposition to the RPP during the discussions on the Land 
Law. As they were opposed to the Land Reform that aspired for the redistribution 
o f land to the peasants without land, they had challenged this proposal with a strong 
opposition. After those debates Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and 
Fuat Köprülü gave a proposal to the party group that was called Dörtlü Takrir. This 
proposal demanded:
A real control in the Grand National Assembly, which is the only place for 
the exercise o f national sovereignty, the amendment o f certain laws that 
prevent the emergence o f democratic institutions and violate the populism 
principle o f the constitution, and the immediate enactment o f those 
changes.
The proposal was rejected and the three deputies were expelled from the RPP. Their 
leader. Celal Bayar, resigned from the RPP and Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, 
Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü formed the Democrat Party on January 7, 1946.
 ^ Cem Eroğul, “Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu: 1945-71,’’[Formation o f the 
Multi-party Regime: 1945-71] in Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye [Turkey in Transition], 
eds. Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak (Istanbul: Beige Yayınları, 1992), 2"*^  ed., 
113-115.
Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi [Democrat Party: 
History and Ideology], (Ankara. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 
Yayınları, Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), 11; Tevfik Çandar, “Demokrat Parti,” 
[Democrat Party], Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia o f the 
Republican Turkey], 2064.
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The party programme focused mainly on liberalism and democracy.”  
Article 1 o f the party programme reflected the emphasis on the principle o f  
democracy by stating that “DP is founded with the aim o f the realization o f  
democracy in a wider and developed understanding, and for serving the general 
politics to be carried out with a democratic view and mentality.” *^  Basic human 
rights and freedoms were emphasized. Article 7 o f the party programme stated that 
“it is deemed necessary for the workers, farmers, merchants and industrialists, 
officials and teachers, university students to form associations, cooperatives, and 
trade unions.””  In Article 5, it was stated that the Turkish society relied on the 
premises o f family and property.
DP’s major target was furthering democracy, so they advocated “the 
restriction o f the governmental activities, widening o f the personal freedoms, and to 
safeguard that the political power stems from not above, but from below, from the 
‘people’.””  Besides, they aspired for economic development and more participation 
o f the private sector in the economy. According to DP party programme, it was the 
states duty to contribute to the development o f the private enterprise and capital 
(Article 17). Therefore, DP adopted a complete liberal understanding with respect 
to economics and noted that unless necessary there would be no interference in the 
market (Article 51).
Demokrat Parti, 13.
10 Demokrat Parti: tüzük ve programı, (Ankara: Doğuş Ltd. O. Matbaası,
1953), 47.
”  Ibid., 48.
”  Feroz Ahmad, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dönemi Siyasal Gelişmeleri” 
[Political Developments in the Era o f the Turkish Republic], in Cumhuriyet Dönemi 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7.
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When DP’s formation was permitted, it was thought that a loyal opposition 
would be created with a semi-liberal rightist party. However, it took wide support 
o f the press, intellectuals, business circles, and the masses. DP brought about 
certain changes to political life in Turkey, especially during its opposition period. 
As mentioned above, there was unrest among the society related with the policies o f 
the RPP as a single party. Due to this unrest combined with the rising opposition, 
RPP began to change some o f the laws and its policies.
In the 1947 Congress, RPP modified its definition o f nationalism as one 
based on language, common culture and history.*^ Recep Peker declared the views 
o f his party in a speech he made at the University o f  Istanbul;
Every individual in this group [nation] becomes part o f an 
indivisible whole on the basis o f common language and destiny bom from 
living together on this land and is equal in sharing duty, privilege, and 
honor. The idea o f considering the Christians second class citizens is part o f 
history now .. .It is not enough to regard as Turks, only in respect to the law 
and Administration, those whose religion is different. In our private lives 
too, we must come closer to each other with warmth, and intermingle. ... a 
[national] culture enriched by the science, technique, and art owned in 
common by all mankind will strengthen Turkish nationalism ... anti- 
Semitism w ill remain the shame o f the twentieth century, and if  in our 
legislation there are anti-minority provisions they will be amended. ... we 
are to accept as natural the different sects such as the Alevi and embrace the 
Kurds with fondness... racial nationalism is irredentist and entirely anti­
democratic and imperialistic... we should be careful o f  ideologies which 
trespass national boundaries and penetrate into the country to seek out and 
subject ideas and people to the service o f foreign states ... the best means o f 
fighting communism is nationalism.*^
Erogul, “Çok Partili Düzenin Kumluşu,” 115.
As portrayed in the previous chapter, the themes o f language, culture and 
history were prevalent in the early Republican understanding as well. However, the 
policies recruited in the 1930s were deviant from this definition and were close to a 
much racist understanding. In 1947 the RPP was tiying to strip itself from the past 
experiences and to modify its understanding o f nationalism towards a more 
inclusive one.
17 Ulus, March 29, 1947 cited in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 257-258.
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Following that speech, there occurred some changes on the legislation regarding the 
minorities and non-Turkish Muslim population. The status o f the minorities for 
military service was changed and the non-Muslims were allowed to serve as reserve 
officers in the army. The Kurdish tribes that were forced to migrate to the West by 
the Law on Settlement were allowed to move back to their hometowns in the East. 
In addition, the refugees and Greeks who had been subject to population exchange** 
were permitted to travel to Turkey.
The understanding o f secularism was relaxed to a certain extent. In 1949, 
religious courses were added to the curriculum o f the schools as two hours per 
week elective. There was a requirement o f written approval o f  the parents for the 
schoolchildren to attend the course on religion. Besides, Imam Hatip Kursları 
(Prayer Leader and Preacher Courses) were opened in 10 cities and a Faculty o f  
Divinity was opened in the University o f Ankara. By the decision o f the
oc\government the sacred tombs (türbe) were reopened for the visits o f the people.
As can be depicted from the policies implemented by the RPP, it is evident 
that the party tried to adopt itself to the changing dynamics o f politics by the 
formation o f the DP. In this attempt, the party took two important measures. The 
first is the changes made in certain laws, quite in line with the developments 
mentioned above. In June 1946, single member district electoral system was 
implemented. The pressure over the press was lifted by the removal o f  the authority
** According to the Population Exchange Agreement, the exchangees would 
not be permitted to travel to and resettle in respective countries without the 
permission o f the governments. See, Kemal An, Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye 
Zarunlu Göç 1923-1925 [The Great Population Exchange: Forced Migration to 
Turkey], (Istanbul; Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınlan, 1995), 18.
19 Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 258.
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o f the government for the closure o f the newspapers. This liberalization process 
continued with the autonomy granted to the universities. The second measure was 
the plot arranged for holding the elections a year earlier, which disabled the DP to 
organize in every part o f the country.
5 .1.2 DP in opposition
The 1946 election was one o f the most controversial elections. The secret 
ballot system was not exercised properly and there is an ongoing debate on in this 
election, that the elections had not been carried out properly or respected the 
principle o f secret ballot. Despite all those pressures, DP still won 62 o f the 465 
seats o f the Parliament and started their activities that transformed politics in 
Turkey.
DP on the one hand adopted a strong opposition within the Parliament, and 
on the other hand mobilized the masses through public meetings. In those meeting 
their slogan was Yeter! Söz Milletindir! (Enough! It is the Nation’s Turn to Speak!). 
This slogan was crucial as it explicitly declared that it was the nation, or the citizens 
who would take over the decision-making in Turkey. In that period, the major 
concern o f the DP was to show that “it was not ‘a party o f the tutelage’” and that İt 
was different from the RPP in representing the interests o f the people.^* Here lies 
the significance o f DP for both the political tradition in Turkey and for the notion o f 
citizenship. Their ongoing emphasis on political power as stemming from the
Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London, New York; I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993), 244.
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people moved the people to the core o f political arena in Turkey. People started to 
voice their demands in the streets by attending the meetings o f the DP. Erogul 
suggested that this mobilization o f the people by the DP is significant and 
interesting for political science. He points to the incorporation o f the people to the 
political struggle by a conservative, and sometimes a reactionary party, as a 
contribution to the raising o f the consciousness o f the people.
In their first Congress, the DP approved a document called Hürriyet Misaki 
(Pact o f Liberty). This Pact o f Liberty declared that “unless the anti-democratic 
decrees and the sentences that violate the Constitution are cleared; a new 
democratic election law is amended; the leadership o f a party and the presidency is 
separated; and the neutrality o f administration is safeguarded, the DP would resign 
from the Parliament and ‘return to the bosom o f the people’ and continue their 
struggle there. This Pact again placed the people at the core o f the political 
struggle.
The novelty o f the DP with respect to the status endowed to the people was 
the transformation o f the notion o f populism. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
populism was one o f the six principles o f the RPP, and one o f the key notions for 
the construction o f Turkish citizenship. Populism o f the RPP aspired for the 
rejection o f the stratification in the society as classes, and propagated that the 
Turkish society was classless, a merged mass. In addition, the understanding o f  
populism could be described as “for the people, despite the people.” '^* As Sunar
Kasaba, “Populism and Democracy,” 53.
Erogul, “Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu,” 117, note 8.
Eroğul, Demokrat Parti, 27.
Sunar, “Populism and Patronage,” 749.
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pointed, RPP tried to transform the social realities with an elitist historical project, 
and utilized populism in line with this aim. On the contrary, DP reformulated 
populism as an ideology that took the desires and interests o f the people into 
consideration, and mobilized the political participation o f the p e o p le .A ls o ,  by 
their policy to defend the rights o f the rising bourgeoisie and the landowners, they 
acknowledged the existence o f classes in Turkish society and became defenders o f 
their interests. As defenders o f the private sector and landowners, the DP criticized 
the economic policies o f the RPP in power. In response to the criticisms o f the DP, 
RPP made certain changes and amendments that were analyzed in the previous 
section.
The DP opposition and its aspirations for reconciliation with the Ottoman 
past led to a change in the Citizenship Law and Law on Passport. According to the 
proposal, “those who did not belong to the Ottoman dynasty by birth, but who had 
married a member o f the dynasty and later became widowed either through death or 
divorce, and do not have a child can return to Turkey by the decision o f the Council 
o f Ministers.”^^  Those who would return Turkey in accordance with this law could 
not claim any rights over the property that belonged to the Ottoman dynasty.^*
İlkay Sunar, “Demokrat Parti ve Popülizm”(Democrat Party and 
Populism), Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8, 2076-2088.
26 Ibid.
^^TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 18, 18.4.1949, 458. The members o f the 
Ottoman dynasty were expelled from Turkey 3 March 1924, by the abolishing o f 
the Sultanate and their re-entrance to Turkey was prohibited.
^^This had caused debates in the Parliament related with the Ottoman 
treasury and heritage. Osman Nuri Koni from the National Party (a party that split 
from the DP in 1948) questioned the government about the Sultan’s property. 
Karpat mentioned this discussion in Turkey’s Politics as related with the challenges 
towards secularism and notes that Koni wanted the property o f the Sultan to be
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The same year the second congress o f the DP was held. During this 
Congress, the primacy o f the voting rights was declared by a report. One o f the 
delegates declared that “those who violate the principle o f free elections should be 
punished like those who violates the honor and chastity o f the people. Milli 
Husumet Andı (National Hostility Oath) by noting that violation o f the election law 
was similar to the violation o f natural rights, and that any violation o f this kind 
would justify the self-defense o f the citizens, proposed that anyone who was 
engaged in that kind o f violation would be subject to the hostility o f the nation.^ ®
After long struggles with the RPP in power and intense opposition, the DP 
came to power with the elections o f  May 14, 1950. The participation rate in the 
elections were over 80 % and the DP got 53% o f the votes that led the party to hold 
408 seats in the Parliament composed o f 487 seats. The RPP got 39% o f the votes 
and could be represented by a rather small number o f seats, that is 60. The 1950 
elections were significant for the political struggle in Turkey. The transition to 
multi-party regime and the change o f government was achieved quite smoothly, and 
for the first time in Republican history, the people took hold o f their lives and 
expressed their desires by electing the DP. In addition, the political base o f  the 
government moved from the cities to the countryside. Toprak argues “the
returned to the heirs o f the Sultan. See, ibid., 443-487; Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 
281.
Tank Zafer Tunay^ Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 [Political 
Parties in Turkey 1859-1952]. Istanbul, n.p. 1952.
30 Erogul, Demokrat Parti, 47-48; Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 233; Kasaba, 
“Populism and Democracy,”56.
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mobilization o f the peasants that constitute two thirds o f the total electorate became 
the primary concern o f the political parties after 1950.” *^
5 .1.3 DP in power: 1950-1960
1950 elections were the beginning o f the ten years o f DP governments. 
Shortly after the elections Celal Bayar, who was the founding leader o f the DP was 
elected as the President, and Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister. The 
reasons behind the success o f DP was enlisted by Toprak as:
1. The economic policy which the DP program envisioned, with its 
emphasis on private enterprise and its professed priority for the 
agricultural sector, secured for the party the support o f important 
commercial and landed interests.
2. DP was able to reinforce its clientelist network by building an efficient 
political machine, which functioned on the basis o f  reward system for 
individual peasants or rural communities in exchange for votes.
3. By exploiting the long-standing elite-mass gap, the Democrats 
successfully established an image for themselves as the party o f the 
masses in contrast to the bureaucratic and elitist orientation o f the RPP.
4. DP politicized the religious issue, which helped build a mass following 
for the party.
As analyzed throughout the whole chapter, DP’s success mostly relied on the 
resentment o f the people towards the single party regime and its policies. DP’s 
major contribution to the political life in Turkey was the reincorporation o f religion 
to the Turkish identity as a critical component. Besides, the periphery (the rural 
population) was moved to the core o f politics, and from that time on the periphery 
had to be relied on by the political parties for achieving power. However, the aim o f 
the chapter is not to analyze all the politics o f DP, but rather highlight Turkish
Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, (Leiden; E.J. 
Brill, 1981), 88.
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citizenship and its transformations by benefiting from the relevant policies and 
implementations o f the DP period.
DP’s major feature was to attack the Kemalist principles defined by the six 
arrows o f the RPP. They had challenged and transformed those principles. During 
the DP power, the purified and Turkified style o f the Constitution was abandoned, 
and the earlier version was used. In 1951 the People’s Houses and People’s Rooms 
that were designed for raising the consciousness o f  the people with respect to 
citizenship, were closed down.
Even though DP utilized religion as a main component o f Turkish identity, 
it repeatedly declared that it was strongly against the reactionary and obscurantist 
religious movements, and took strong measures against some o f those religious 
groups when they were regarded as a threat to the regime. However, during the 
DP power, major changes were carried out with respect to religion. When they 
came to power the first change they made was on the call for prayer (ezan). They 
returned to the Arabic reading o f the ezan and annulled the Turkish prayer on June 
16, 1950.^ '* The radio became one o f the tools o f DP for propaganda, and Koran 
was begun to be read in the radio that gave pleasure among the rural people.^ ^
32 Ibid., 72.
This attitude was particularly evident during the events caused by a sect 
called Ticani that was involved in reactionary activities and assaults to Atatürk’s 
statues, and the events took place in the funeral o f  Marshal Fevzi Çakmak. DP 
distanced itself from those events and expressed that it was against those kinds o f  
movements that were challenging the Kemalist regime and an “Atatürk Law” was 
passed in the Parliament for the protection o f Atatürk’s memory. See, Karpat, 
Turkey's Politics, 283; Toprak; Islam and Political Development, 83.
34 Erogul, Demokrat Parti, 68.
See Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 286 and note 52 on the rise o f the 
publications and sales o f the religious books; also see Ali Yaşar Sanbay, ‘The 
Democratic Party, 1946-1960, “ in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds.
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Toprak showed the importance given to religion by the DP and the increasing 
religious freedom by listing the rise in the number o f the mosques constructed and 
the money spent for those and the rise in the sale o f religious books.’  ^ In addition 
the opening o f Koranic courses were tolerated and the attendance to religious 
courses in schools was changed. Previously the students could take religious 
courses upon the written request o f their parents, however DP changed this process 
vice versa, and the religious courses became somewhat compulsory, now the 
student would take the religion course unless his/her parents requested a 
withdrawal.
DP came to power with the support o f the minorities as well. In opposition, 
they defined the ‘Turk” as any citizen who considered him self as a Turk regardless 
o f religion and race.^  ^ In addition, they nominated deputy candidates from the 
minorities and some o f them were elected to the Parliament in the 1950 elections. 
Despite that approach, one o f the harshest attacks towards the minorities took place 
during the DP government.
In 1955, there occurred an international crisis related with the situation o f 
Cyprus, and a conference was being held in London between United Kingdom, 
Greece and Turkey, and attacks on Turks in the island increased. The DP 
government arranged a plot in order to influence the conference. The plot was to 
organize a mass meeting in Istanbul against Greece, and a newspaper declared that 
Ataturk’s house in Thessallanico was bombed. A mass demonstration against the
Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (London, New York: LB. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), 
128.
36 Toprak, Islam  and Political Development, 81-82.
Sevgen, Nazmi ed. Celal Boyar Diyor ki: 1920-\9S0 [Celal Bayar Says], 
Istanbul: n.p., 1951.
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Greeks broke in September 6, 1955 and the houses, shops, and firms belonging to 
Turkish Greeks were attacked, the churches were destroyed. The riot could only be 
calmed down by the military. Some o f the Greeks had to leave the country. During 
that period, anti-communism was also at its peak, and the communists were blamed 
for the September 6-7 Events. However, during the Yassiada trials after the military 
coup in 1960, it was understood that it was a plot arranged by the DP itself^*
The period o f the DP was marked with a desire to be “Little America,” 
policies adopted during that period were imitating the US. Due to the desire to be 
part o f the West, Turkey joined NATO in 1952. This led to the increase in foreign 
credit and private enterprise. As Erogul stated, the DP did its best to serve foreign 
capital, the bourgeoisie, and big landowners. Also, as Sunar stated, the attempts for 
economic development aggravated the social differentiation and contributed to the 
emergence o f civil society. This social differentiation led to the emergence o f 
classes and class-consciousness. The Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-t§) was formed in
1952 39
Although economic liberalism was applied to a large extent, the DP, which 
came to power with many promises for political liberalism, tried to tighten its hold 
over the society and politics. In 1953, by a decree the property o f the RPP was 
taken over by the Treasury. The press laws were tightened again and the opposition 
was crashed. DP and especially its leader Menderes tried to initiate almost a 
dictatorial regime. As unrest among the society increased, the military took over 
power in 27 May 1960. This was the first but not the last military takeover in
38 See Eroğul, Demokrat Parti, 124-125.
Alpaslan Işıklı, “Ücretli Emek ve Sendikalaşma,” [Wage Labor and the 
Formation o f Trade Unions] in Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye, 335.
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Republican history. The developments after the takeover will be evaluated in the 
following section.
The DP period introduced a new understanding for citizenship. While the 
early republican citizenship aspired for the passive citizen who would contribute to 
carry out the Turkish revolution and with his duties and obligations towards the 
community and the state, the DP emphasized the political participation aspect. 
Voting was given utmost importance, and the feeling o f influencing the 
government, or changing the government, through elections was inculcated to the 
people. The DP regime was not as liberal as it aspired for when it was in 
opposition. However, the citizens conceived the mentality that citizens are the real 
decision-makers during this period, which is the period o f transition to multi-party 
politics. Right before the military takeover, Menderes declared the importance o f 
elections and voting in his speeches:
A great and radical transformation took place. It used to be that only one 
person ruled and only a few hundred participated in politics. With our 
democratic revolution, with one leap, millions and millions o f citizens 
acquired the vote and became influential in the administration o f our 
country. They became real citizens (italics added).'*®
We trust in the Turkish nation, in its patriotism, political genius, and 
perception. When it becomes necessary, the Turkish nation knows to take 
matters in its hands and cry, “Enough! It is the nation’s turn to speak!” *^
If we believe in the maturity o f the Turkish nation and in the virtues o f 
democracy, we have to agree that the only way o f coming to power and 
leaving power is through elections.'*^
In addition, as mentioned throughout this section, the Republican definition 
o f citizenship, which aspired for an urban citizen, was challenged by the 
mobilization o f the rural people and the peasants. The early republican definition.
'*® Cumhuriyet, 2 February 1960, cited in Kasaba, ‘Eopulism and 
Democracy,” 56.
'** Cumhuriyet, 14 February 1960, cited in ibid., 57.
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by aspiring for the urban, modem and enlightened citizens was elitist and populism 
was implemented in order to carry out the modernization project. The Democrat 
Party, on the contrary, utilized populism by addressing the people that they were the 
decision-makers. As a reaction to this elitist vision, the periphery was valorized by 
the DP, and even though the early Republican dreams o f urbanization was achieved 
to a certain extent during the DP period, this did not lead to a modem and 
enlightened culture. In other words, the mral culture was carried by the migrants to 
the cities and this transformed the urban culture in an unpredictable way.“*^
5.2 The Period of 1960-1980
This section will dwell upon the period after the military intervention o f 
May 1960. This period could be regarded as the period when there was a liberal 
atmosphere to a considerable extent. A shift in the understanding o f citizenship was 
experienced during this period. The citizen o f the period was active and there was 
the primacy o f rights as compared with the duty-laden citizenship o f the early 
republican period.
Havadis, 26 May 1960, cited in ibid.
One o f the consequences o f this cultural transformation can be seen in 
music. The arabesque that was regarded as the music o f those migrants that became 
popular throughout the whole country can be an example. See, Orhan Tekelioğlu, 
“The Rise o f a Spontaneous Synthesis; The Historical Background o f Turkish 
Popular Music,” Middle Eastern Studies, 32 (2) April 1996.
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As DP was reaching ten years in office, unrest among the society, especially 
among the university students and the military was increasing. The military had 
already lost its dominant status in state affairs. Together with the bureaucracy they 
had been regarded as the key actors o f the state during the early Republican period. 
In fact, the tension between the political elites and the state elites had always been, 
and would be prevalent. The economic development model DP implemented had 
put the military and the bureaucracy in an economically disadvantaged position. 
Combined with the DP’s movement towards an authoritarian regime, and the 
sympathy felt to the RPP and its leader İsmet İnönü, who had served in the National 
Independence War, the unrest o f the military increased. To make matters worse, the 
DP tried to use the military against the demonstrations opposing its rule. Therefore, 
the first military intervention in the Republican history took place.'*  ^ The military 
takeover claimed that “they were safeguarding democracy and the state, and the 
legacy o f Atatürk” which would be justification for the coming interventions as 
well.'*  ^ Tachau and Heper pointed that the intervention reflected the guardian type 
o f military rule “which took control o f the government for the purpose o f  
preserving (or re-establishing) the status quo.”^
5.2.1 The 1960 intervention
^  See Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, ‘T he State, Politics, and the Military 
in Turkey,” Comparative Politics, 16 (1983); George S. Harris, ‘The Role o f the 
Military in Turkey in the 1980s; Guardians or Decision-Makers?,” in Metin Heper 
and Ahmet Evin (eds.). State, Democracy and the Military: Turliey in the 1980s, 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 182.
Kemal H. Karpat, “Military Interventions; Army-Civilian Relations in 
Turkey Before and After 1980,” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turlcey in 
the 1980s, 141.
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The National Union Committee (the junta) aimed to ensure that an 
experience like the DP power would not take place again. A new constitution was 
prepared by a committee composed o f academics, members o f the RPP and the 
junta. The Constitution took certain measures and developed institutions like the 
National Security Council (where the Head o f the General Staff, and the senior 
military commanders would be members) and the Constitutional Court, which 
would have the right to invalidate governmental decrees and legislation. In 
addition, bi-cameral system was introduced and the electoral system was changed 
as proportional representation with the aim o f preventing the authoritarian rule o f a 
party, which was experienced during the DP rule.
With respect to political parties, the Constitution noted that they were the 
crucial elements o f democratic political life. It was free to form political parties 
without any permission. However, those political parties should rely on human 
rights and liberties, to the principles o f a democratic and secular republic, and to the 
indivisibility o f  the state with its territory and nation, otherwise they would be 
closed. The decision for the closure o f the political parties would be made by the 
Constitutional Court (Articles 56, 57).
5.2.2 The 1961 Constitution
The 1961 Constitution is significant for the transformation o f the society 
and understanding o f citizenship. The Constitution was written in a rather detailed
Tachau and Heper, ‘T he State, Politics, and the Military,” 21. 
Ibid., 22.
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format, in order to eliminate the misuse o f power. During the preparation o f the 
Constitution, the Commission o f Constitution benefited from the two drafts 
prepared by the Faculty o f Law o f Istanbul University and the Faculty o f Political 
Science o f Ankara University. Also, the French, Italian, and German constitutions 
were utilized, in addition to Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, European 
Human Rights Agreement and the French Declaration o f Human And Citizenship 
Rights.'*® The Constitution was promulgated after a referendum held on July 9, 
1961.
The new constitution was based on the supremacy o f the rule o f law. It was 
stated repeatedly that every issue would be carried out in accordance with the law, 
and in certain cases in accordance with international law. The Constitution had a 
preface where the main characteristics o f the Turkish nation were defined by stating
that:
The Turkish nation, which had lived independently throughout histoiy and 
that had fought for its rights and liberty, and which had used its right to 
resist and had made the revolution o f May 27, 1960 against a power that had 
lost its legitimacy by violating the Constitution and law;
Inspired by Turkish nationalism that gathers all the individuals sharing the 
joy and grief as an indivisible whole around the national consciousness and 
ideals, and that aims at rising our nation with a spirit o f national unity as an 
honorable and equal member o f the world family;
Which has the consciousness o f the principle o f “peace at home, peace in 
the world,” the spirit o f the national struggle, and national sovereignty, and 
the devotion to the revolutions o f Atatürk;
In order to consolidate a democratic rule o f law with all its legal and social 
basis, that would safeguard the realization o f human rights and freedoms, 
national solidarity, social justice, welfare o f the individual and the society; 
Approves and proclaims this Constitution prepared by the Constitutive 
Assembly o f the Turkish Republic, and entrusts this Constitution to the 
guardianship o f its sons devoted to freedom, justice, and virtue.'*’
'*® Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi 
Yayınları, 1998), 2"‘*. ed., 374.
'*’ Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i 
İttifaktan Günümüze, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 171- 
172.
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It was evident from the preface that, this Constitution relied on universal norms, 
like human rights, social justice, and welfare and that the individual was given more 
importance and an active role, especially with the mention o f the right to resist.
Whereas the 1924 Constitution defined the Turkish Republic in article 2 in 
accordance with the Kemalist principles defined by the six arrows mentioned in the 
previous chapter, as “ the Turkish Republic is republican, nationalist, populist, 
etatist, secular, and revolutionary,” this article was amended in the 1961 
Constitution as “the Turkish Republic is a national, democratic, secular and social 
rule o f law, that relies on human rights and the principles mentioned in the 
preface.’’^ *^ This article and the Constitution as a whole reflects the desire for the 
introduction and the implementation o f universal standards and human rights, and 
for a social state that seeks the welfare o f its citizens.
The developments related with administration and the legislative, executive 
and judiciary are mentioned above. As this study focuses on the issue o f Turkish 
citizenship, this section will dwell upon the novelties introduced by the 1961 
Constitution with respect to citizenship. This detailed constitution placed 
importance on individual rights and liberties and aspired for a more active 
citizenship.
Article 54 o f the 1961 Constitution defined the Turkish citizen as “everyone
who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is a Turk” and continued as
The child o f a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship 
status o f child bom from a foreign father and a Turkish mother will be 
arranged by law. Citizenship is acquired and lost under the circumstances 
defined by law. No Turk can be expelled from citizenship, unless he/she
A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları, (Ankara, Turhan 
Kiatbevi, 1995), 56, 115.
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engages in activities contrary to the loyalty to the country. The decisions 
and implementations o f expulsion can be subject to appeal.^ *
This article is different from the Article 88 o f the 1924 Constitution that stated that
everyone who is admitted to citizenship through Citizenship Law is considered as
Turk. The 1312 numbered Citizenship Law stated that every child bom o f a Turkish
father or a Turkish mother would acquire Turkish citizenship. The 1961
Constitution, granted citizenship status only to those children bom from Turkish
fathers, and leaves the status o f the children bom o f Turkish mothers ambiguous by
stating that their status would be arranged by law. The citizenship law will be
analyzed below.
The 1961 Constitution differed from the previous constitution in many 
respects. Firstly, the 1961 Constitution was designed in a more inclusive, 
humanitarian and universal manner. In contrast to the 1924 Constitution that used 
“Turk” as the counterpart, the 1961 Constitution used “everyone” and grasped the 
foreigners as well, but designed their status and the limitations o f their freedoms in 
accordance with international law (Article 13).
The Constitution limited the interference o f the state into the affairs o f the 
individual and defined the duties o f the state towards the individual, which is a 
significant departure from the primacy o f the obligations o f the citizen towards the 
state. In this respect, this constitution was a liberal constitution and aspired for a 
more liberal kind o f citizenship.
The basic rights and liberties covered almost two thirds o f the Constitution 
and were written in a detailed format. In Article 10 it was stated that everyone has 
inviolable basic rights and liberties. The following article safeguarded these 
liberties as:
Gozubuyiik, Turk Am^asalan, 131.
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The basic rights and liberties can only be limited through law that is in 
accordance with the spirit and statement o f the constitution, however, this 
law can not restrain the core o f the rights or liberties even for the reasons o f 
morality, public order, social justice or national security.
The basic rights and liberties o f the individual were mainly the immunity o f
private life (article 15) and residence (article 16), the freedoms o f communication
(article 17), travel and settlement (article 18), faith and conscience (article 19),
thought (article 20), education (article 21), right to property (article 36) Under this
section the freedom o f the press was expressed. The right and freedoms o f meetings
and demonstrations, and formation o f associations without taking permission were
safeguarded (articles 28 and 29). The only limitations on these rights would be
drawn by law for the protection o f public order.
The emphasis on the social welfare state is evident in the section on Social
and Economic Rights and Duties. Here, the rights to work (article 42), to rest
(article 44), for just wage (article 45), to form trade unions (article 46), to go on
strike (article 47), and social security (article 48), and medical treatment (article 49)
were enlisted. Those articles reflect an evolution towards the social phase o f
citizenship in Marshall’s analysis. However, the social rights were again granted
from the above, as had been the case for both civil and political rights. The
atmosphere o f social welfare state would be curbed later, after the 1980 military
coup and with the 1982 Constitution, which limited most o f  the rights and liberties
granted by the 1961 Constitution for the reason that the 1961 Constitution was too
liberal for the Turkish society. Therefore, the period between 1961 and 1980 can be
viewed as the transitory social welfare state with active and liberal understanding o f
citizenship.
52 Article 11, ibid., 117.
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Those articles mentioned above also reflect the importance given to social
justice. The articles on land distribution and nationalization o f private properties for
public good were amended for this reason. In addition. Article 41 stated that;
The economic and social life is regulated in accordance with the aims o f 
Justice, the principle o f work, and a life standard for everyone that does not 
violate human dignity.
It is the state’s duty to realize economic, social and cultural development by 
democratic means, and for this reason it is also the state’s duty to increase 
national savings, to direct the investments towards the priorities, and to 
prepare developmental plans.
In addition, equal educational opportunities for every citizen, male or female, and 
sufficient nutrition were safeguarded by the Constitution. Tanor states that this 
social aspect was a novelty o f  the 1961 Constitution, the elements o f which were 
“the object o f social justice, social rights granted to the individuals and groups, the 
social duties bestowed upon the state, the developmental plans and the 
establishment o f State Planning Organization.” '^*
In the section on political rights and duties, firstly Turkish citizenship 
mentioned above was defined. This section covered basic duties o f the citizen 
towards the state. As mentioned in the previous chapter, participation in the 
electoral process was regarded as the fimdamental right and duty o f the citizen in 
Medeni Bilgiler, the book written for citizenship education by the directions o f 
Ataturk.^  ^ In Article 55 the right to be elected and to elect were enlisted. Same as 
the formation o f the associations, the citizens were granted the right to form or join 
political parties without taking any permission (article 56). Other basic duties were 
military service (Article 60) and taxation (Article 61).
”  Ibid., 128.
Tanbr, OTAG, 392.
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The 1961 Constitution points to the divergence from a republican 
understanding o f citizenship that focused on the duties o f the citizen towards the 
state, which was implemented during the early republican period, as highlighted in 
the previous chapter. By this constitution, the individual was given a higher value 
and the reconciliation o f the individual’s and the society’s rights and liberties had 
been the major target.^  ^By the widening o f the rights and liberties o f the citizen and 
the limitation o f the state’s interference, a more liberal and active understanding o f 
citizenship was introduced. During this period, a new citizenship law that is in use 
today was also amended.
5.2.3 Turkish Citizenship Law
The 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law was put in effect in February 
11, 1964.^  ^ It took around two years for the draft to be amended. The reasons for 
the new law were expressed as:
The 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law has certain shortcomings with 
respect to content and planning, it has to be reformed especially due to the 
principles accepted by the citizenship law. The 1312 numbered Turkish 
Citizenship Law did not take the principle o f “eveiyone should have a 
citizenship; everyone should have only one citizenship; and be free to 
choose his/her citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship
Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve MusUrfa KemaVin E l Yazmaları, (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 16.
56 Tanör, OTAĞ, 378.
The Law Proposal was dated May 28, 1962. It was debated in the 
Parliament several times, however those debates were merely around the wording 
and who would be the respective authority on the admittance or loss o f citizenship, 
the Ministry o f Interior or the Council o f  Ministers. See, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
vol. 20, periodl, 29.8.1963, 477-497, 507- 511. Also see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
vol. 26, period I, 11.2.1964, 504- 508.
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he/she does not want” into consideration sufficiently. There are 
incongruities among certain articles, as has been the case for the effects o f 
marriage on citizenship. Besides, the sentences on expulsion are not in 
accordance with the contemporary developments on citizenship law.
The 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law did not include any sentences 
on the judicial appeal for the decisions and procedures related with Turkish 
citizenship, and it is compulsory for a modem citizenship law to grant the 
right to appeal. In addition the 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law did 
not cover the issues o f the proof o f citizenship or cancellation o f admission 
to citizenship.
The 54* article o f the 1961 Constitution is so novel that the amendment o f a 
new citizenship law instead o f the 1312 numbered law is a necessity.^*
The new citizenship law was another step for the move towards the mle o f law. The
aim was to base the law on the universal principles o f citizenship and citizenship
rights. In line with this principle o f the mle o f law the right to appeal was included
in the 403 numbered and Febmary 11, 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law. The
proposal was based on three universal principles on citizenship law. The first was
the principle that everyone should have a citizenship and the situation o f
statelessness should be eliminated. The second was the principle that, everyone
should have only one citizenship. And third one was that everyone should be free to
choose his/her won citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship
he/she does not want.
Another novelty introduced by the 403 numbered citizenship law was 
iolated with the status o f Turkish women who married foreigners. As mentioned 
above, the 54* article o f the 1961 Constitution stated that the citizenship status o f a 
child bom from a foreign father and a Turkish mother would be arranged by law.
58 Vatandaşlığı kanunu tasansı ile Mardin Milletvekili Esat Kemal
AybarTn, 1312 sayılı Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu’na ek kanun teklifi ve Mardin 
Milletvekili Mehmet Ali Ankan’m, Vatandaşlık Kanunu’nun 10. Maddesine iki 
fıkra eklenmesine dair kanun teklifi ve İstanbul Milletvekili Reşit Ülker’in, Türk 
Vatandaşlığı Kanunu’nun 10. Maddesinin değiştirilmesine dair kanun teklifi ve 
Geçici Komisyon Rapom” [Draft law o f Turkish Citizenship and the additional law 
proposals o f deputies for Citizenship Law], TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Sequence No. 
267, period 2, vol. 20.
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The Statement o f Reasons for the new citizenship law noted that this article 
determined the principle o f blood (descent) for the acquisition o f citizenship and 
stated that there would be exceptions on the part o f the status o f women. It is stated 
in the Statement o f Reasons that, those children who were bom o f a Turkish mother 
and whose fathers were unknown, or who could not acquire the citizenship o f their 
foreign fathers would be Turkish citizens. However, the status o f those children 
who could acquire their father’s citizenship, could be arranged by law. It is noted 
that this procedure was designed in accordance with the principles o f citizenship 
law.^  ^This created a contradiction because in the beginning o f the article 54 it was 
stated that “the child o f a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk.” Ergin 
Nomer noted that this article no matter how it is interpreted did not prove 
successful because o f this contradiction.^
Although foreign women who married Turkish men could acquire Turkish 
citizenship automatically if  she was stateless or lost her former citizenship because 
o f this marriage (Article 5), the status o f Turkish women marrying foreigners was 
different. Article 19 stated that:
A Turkish woman marrying a foreigner loses her Turkish citizenship if  her 
husband’s national law grants the husband’s nationality to the woman and if  
the woman gives notification as indicated in Article 42^  ^ to the effect that 
she has chosen her husband’s nationality.
In the event the woman acquires her husband’s nationality upon the 
fulfillment o f certain conditions, she loses Turkish citizenship as o f that 
date.
59 Ibid.
^  Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku [Citizenship Law], (Istanbul; Filiz 
Kitabevi, 1989), 8"** ed., 48.
’^Article 42 stated that “If the declaration is made a) before the Turkish 
wedding authorities, they are to be rendered to those authorities in the course o f the 
wedding; b) before foreign wedding authorities, they are to be rendered in writing 
to Turkish marriage registration authorities within the month following the 
conclusion o f the marriage.”
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The women who lost their citizenship were granted the right to return to Turkish
citizenship within three years after the termination o f marriage by article 13.
The children who could not acquire the citizenship o f his father or the
country he/she was bom in through birth, or who was bom out o f wedlock are
considered as Turkish citizens by Article 1. Also according to Article 19;
Minor children who lose Turkish citizenship in connection with their mother 
who has withdrawn fi'om Turkish citizenship through marriage become 
Turkish citizens in connection with their mother in the event that the woman 
in question returns to Turkish citizenship.
The mentality o f this procedure was expressed in the meeting o f The 
Representative Assembly in 1961 as:
The child o f a Turkish mother and a Turkish father is a Turk. It is ensured 
that a child bom out o f wedlock or with an unknown father would be 
considered as Turk. Under this circumstance there is not a danger o f dual 
citizenship...W hat will happen if  the child is bom from a known foreign 
father? It would not be right to subject those children to the requirements for 
admission to Turkish citizenship even if  his/her father is a foreigner. We did 
not consider him/her as equal with a person whose parents are foreigners. 
We put here a general statement that this child would be subject to a 
different procedure in admission to Turkish citizenship. This procedure will 
be designed by a special law, the Constitution only gives the directions. 
There is no obstacle for this person to be admitted to Turkish citizenship 
automatically, but we did not cite it in the Constitution. We left this 
possibility open-ended. There are many Turkish mothers abroad, especially 
in the Middle and Near East. Their children should be subject to a control 
due to the interests o f the countiy and even for security. And the anomalies 
caused by dual citizenship should also be taken into consideration. Special 
measures and statements will be discussed later according to future 
developments. It might even be suggested that, those children might acquire 
Turkish citizenship after maturity if  he/she likes. All those will be arranged 
by law according to the needs.^ ^
It is evident from this quotation that the status o f the children bom o f foreign 
fathers was regarded as a matter o f security o f the state. In addition, during the 
1960s the Turkish State regarded citizenship to be unique, therefore dual citizenship 
was seen as a problematic situation and attempts were made to avoid it. Besides the
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issue o f dual citizenship, especially regarding the status o f the Turkish workers in 
Europe had not become a problem yet. In fact, the migration flow was at its start in 
other words, the dual citizenship problem o f the 1980s and 1990s had its roots in 
the 1960s.
The other feature o f the 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law was to 
distinguish between expulsion from citizenship and loss o f citizenship. The former 
1312 numbered Citizenship Law did not distinguish between those two, and all the 
citizens had been subject to expulsion under this law. Under the 403 numbered law 
those people, who acquired Turkish citizenship would not be subject to expulsion 
with the exception stated in Article 26. However, those who acquired Turkish 
citizenship could be subject to expulsion under the circumstances stated in the same 
article, that is;
A person abroad who has acquired Turkish citizenship afterwards and who 
has been engaged in activities violating the external and internal security o f 
The Turkish Republic, and it is not possible to file public action against him 
or to run public proceedings and who has failed to come back despite 
notification within three months, may, by the decision o f the Council o f 
Ministers, be expelled from citizenship.
This provision may also be applied when Turkey is in war, in regard to 
persons who have become Turkish citizens upon birth.
The properties o f those persons would be taken over by the Treasury and even
though their arrival was not prohibited, they were not permitted to settle in Turkey.
Those persons who acquired Turkish citizenship and were expelled from citizenship
due to the article mentioned above could not by any means be re-admitted to
Turkish citizenship.^^
Loss o f citizenship was designed within the parameters o f activities that are 
not in line with the loyalty o f the state. Therefore, those persons who were living
^^Temsilciler Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 23, 18.4. 1961, 344-349.
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abroad and did not apply to the Turkish embassies in the last five years^, or those 
persons who published criticisms o f the Turkish government abroad would not lose 
their Turkish citizenship.*^ In addition, loss o f citizenship was defined by Article 25 
that stated:
The Council o f  Ministers may rule that the following persons have lost their 
Turkish citizenship:
a) those who have acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining 
permission,
b) those who were in any service o f  a foreign country not in line with 
the interests o f Turkey and were notified in the name o f the government by 
embassies or consulates abroad or by local administrative officials at home 
to give up such services but declined to do so voluntarily during the given 
period which may not be less than three months,
c) those who continue to work without the permission o f the 
government in any service o f a country which is in war with Turkey,
ç) those persons abroad who are called by the competent authorities to 
do their military service or, in time o f war, to join home defense but have 
not done so within three months without excuse,
d) those who run away to foreign countries while being forwarded for 
military service or after joining their units and do not return within the 
legally prescribed period,
e) those members o f the Armed Forces or military incumbents who are 
abroad on duty, on leave, for changing climate or for medical treatment and 
fail to return home within three months without excuse after the expiry o f  
their terms,
Q those persons who after acquiring Turkish citizenship by the 
competent authority, live outside Turkey for at least seven years without a 
break and do not undertake any formal contacts and transactions to indicate 
that they have not cut o ff their interest in and ties with Turkey and that they 
have maintained their Turkish citizenship.
But formerly exercised transaction that they would have to leave Turkey and clarify 
their properties was annulled, and they were given the possibility o f re-admittance 
to Turkish citizenship. But before or during the re-admittance process, they would 
be considered as foreigners.
‘Türk Vatandaşlığı kanunu tasansı,” 3.
^  This provision was stated in the Article 11 o f the 1312 numbered Turkish 
Citizenship Law.
65 ‘Türk Vatandaşlığı kanunu tasansi,”2.
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There were also two interim articles o f  the 403 numbered and February 11, 
1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law. The first was related with those people who 
were registered as Turkish citizens legally, but who had left Turkey until the end o f 
the year 1930 and whom there is no information about, would lose Turkish 
citizenship after the enactment o f this law. The second interim article stated that 
those who were expelled from Turkish citizenship due to 1312 numbered 
Citizenship Law could apply for re-admission to Turkish citizenship within one 
year after the enactment o f the 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law.
The 403 numbered and February 11, 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law 
explicitly stated that the principle o f jus sanguinis was exercised in Turkey. It might 
be suggested that this principle was exercised at an almost extreme level, by 
discriminating Turkish women married to a foreigner from citizenship on the 
contention that father’s citizenship is the determinant. This would, however, be 
changed in 1981, perhaps due to the changing international dynamics and attempts 
for elimination o f discrimination for women. ^
^  However, Nomer argued that those articles were not discriminatory or 
contrary to the provisions o f the International Convention on the Elimination o f All 
Kinds o f Discrimination o f Women, which was enacted on September 3, 1981 and 
signed by Turkey in 1985. (Here it should be noted that this is a later development 
and during the 1960s there was almost no international debates on the status o f 
women). Nomer stated that the concerned articles granted a more “privileged” 
status to women than men, rather than discriminating or subordinating them. See, 
Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku, 46-47. Nevertheless, it seems a bit naive to 
suggest that an article that excludes the children bom o f Turkish mothers and 
foreign fathers from Turkish citizenship, or in a way urges the Turkish women in 
concern to admit her husband’s citizenship is a privilege.
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The Constitution o f 1961 introduced a liberal atmosphere for Turkish 
citizenship. Together with the rights and liberties to form associations, political 
parties, and trade unions, political participation o f the citizens increased. As 
mentioned in the sections on DP, this politicization and political participation was 
introduced by the transition to multi-party politics and through the policies o f DP in 
opposition.
During the first stage, that is the DP period, however, only rightist 
ideologies and religion found room for expression in political life. Leftist ideology, 
and especially communism was regarded as a threat, and anti-communism was 
prevalent during this period. However, during the 1960s and 1970s leftist ideology 
also became visible. The Turkish Workers Party (TtP) founded in 1961 was 
significant within this process. For the first time in Republican history, a socialist 
party could make its way to the Grand National Assembly, and was represented by 
15 seats after the 1965 elections, thanks to the electoral system o f proportional 
representation with 3% votes.^ ^ Also, Confederation o f Revolutionary Trade Unions 
(DISK) was formed in 1967.^* It held a socialist world view, and sought power for 
the working class, thus it supported TİP.^  ^ In 1963, a new law was passed that
5.2.4 The effects o f  the 1961 Constitution
Kemal H. Karpat, “Military Interventions; Army-Civilian Relations 
Before and After 1980,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.). State, Democracy 
and Military: Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin; Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 145; İlkay 
Sunar, State and Society in the Politics o f Turkey’s Development, (Ankara; Ankara 
University o f Political Science, 1974), 143-167.
Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1984), 219.
Clement H. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey, (Walkington, 
England; The Eothen Press, 1979), 159.
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The atmosphere o f the 1960s contributed to the rise o f interest groups. The 
sectors o f commerce and industry organized as well. The Union o f Chambers o f 
Commerce and Industry had already been founded in 1924. This was followed by 
the formation o f another Union o f Chambers o f Industry, and the Confederation o f 
Employers (TÎSK) in 1962.^’ It was also the period o f the politicization o f the 
students.
This period o f active and liberal citizenship was, however, marked with
ideological polarization and clashes. Therefore, a military ultimatum was issued on
March 12, 1971. This was not an overt takeover, but the military urged the
government to resign and stated that “the leading parties would enact a series o f
constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the hand o f the government in
dealing with the dissident, violence-prone groups.”^^  This was the beginning o f the
erosion o f the rights and freedoms granted by the 1961 Constitution. TİP was
closed, many people were arrested, and leftist publications were also closed.
The constitutional amendments were designed so as to limit the activities
o f the citizens. In order to strengthen the government for safeguarding national
security and public order the changes made sought
to reinforce the power o f the authorities to prohibit the exploitation o f 
“class, race, or language” to divide the nation; to restrict the press from 
promoting violations o f “national unity”, to limit the right to form unions 
and associations; to specify that university autonomy should not be
authorized the right to strike, which was included in the 1961 Constitution. This law
for the right to strike enabled “the organized labor to make significant gains.
Tachau and Heper, ‘The State, Politics, and the Military,” 23.
Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey, 164.
Tachau and Heper, The State, Politics, and the Military,” 23.
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allowed to shield perpetrators o f crimes; to strengthen state control over 
radio and television/^
All those constitutional amendments were against the spirit o f the 1961 
Constitution. Despite all those amendments and the military’s memorandum, 
political instability and polarization continued and increased. The clashes within the 
society moved towards terrorism. As the governments could not cope with this 
situation, the military took over power on September 12, 1980. This was the end o f 
the active citizen, and priority given to the citizens over the state. Together with this 
intervention, the rights and liberties o f the citizens would be curbed to a 
considerable extent. The period after 1980 would face other and much different 
problems and issues related with citizenship, which will be elaborated in the next 
chapter.
5.3 Concluding Remarks
The period between 1946-1980 was significant for the transformation o f the 
understanding and conceptualization o f citizenship. Turkish citizenship, which was 
constructed in the early Republican period as an integral part o f the nation-building 
process, and aimed to turn the citizens into the carriers o f the Turkish revolution 
and modernization, was transformed into a more Western conceptualization. Firstly, 
the people were mobilized in a way to feel that sovereignty rested upon them, and 
that they could change their destiny through elections by the influence o f the DP 
propaganda. Referring to Marshall, we can suggest that starting from the formation
George Harris, “The Role o f the Military in Turkey in the 1980s; 
Guardians or Decision-Makers?,” in State, Democracy and Military: Turkey in the
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o f the DP, Turkish citizenship had reached to the political level. In other words, the 
political element became a significant element o f citizenship. This feature 
continued afterwards.
By the enactment o f the 1961 Constitution, the individual was given a 
higher value, and was placed before the state. The duties that were given the 
priority during the early Republican period, were replaced by extended rights and 
freedoms. Therefore, during the period between 1960 and 1980 there was a liberal 
understanding o f citizenship. In Turner’s terms, there emerged a more active 
citizenship, which was also encouraged by the state. This period can also be labeled 
as the period o f the social element o f citizenship, as there were many provisions 
that safeguarded the welfare o f the people. However, this would also be a transitory 
period. After the 1980 military takeover, most o f those social rights would be 
curbed. This was the result o f the combination o f both the domestic atmosphere and 
the influence o f the rising new right ideology in the international context, which 
was a challenge to the welfare state.
To sum up, the period between 1946 and 1980 constitute a significant phase 
in the process o f citizenization in Turkey. Most o f the features o f citizenship were 
introduced in this period, like that o f political participation and the primacy o f  
rights against duties. However, after the 1980s, the citizenship debates in Turkey 
would acquire another dimension, which is the focus o f the next chapter.
J980s,m .
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CHAPTER VI
CHALLENGES TO OFFICIAL TURKISH CITIZENSHIP:
THE POST-1980 PERIOD
This chapter will focus on the developments and debates emerging around the 
notion o f citizenship in Turkey after 1980. The 1980s are important especially where 
the changes with respect to the role o f the state and political elites, adoption o f new 
economic policies and their reflections in the social and political life are concerned. 
The experiences o f 1980s in a sense paved the way for the discussions, debates and 
challenges towards the early republican Kemalist modernization paradigm. It is these 
discussions, debates and challenges that will form the framework o f the discussion on 
post-1980 experience with Turkish citizenship.
First the changes experienced after the 1980 coup and their reflections on the 
main theme o f this thesis will be analyzed. The challenges toward the Kemalist state 
view will be discussed, with reference to the emergence o f demands stemming from 
identities other than the Kemalist conceptualization o f official Turkish identity.
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Second, the debates over Turkish citizenship will be discussed; namely the questions o f 
dual citizenship and constitutional citizenship. Dual citizenship debates emerged as an 
outcome o f the ambiguous status o f a large number o f Turkish migrants, especially in 
Europe. Constitutional citizenship debates, on the other hand emerged as a suggested 
solution for the problems that arose due to the demands for the recognition o f distinct 
identities coming namely from the Kurds and Islamic groups. The reasons lying behind 
the flourishing o f these debates will be searched. This part will focus on the continuity 
with, changes ensued and deviations from the early republican notion o f citizenship. 
The overall aim is to reveal the crisis o f modernity with specific reference to the 
experience with the concept and practice o f citizenship and the problems that it creates.
In order to understand the post-1980 dynamics o f Turkish politics and the 
changes and deviations they brought to the practice and notion o f Turkish citizenship, 
it is necessary to recall briefly the founding early republican notion o f citizenship 
whose basis is embedded within the framework o f the Kemalist modernization 
paradigm. In the endeavor to construct a standardized nation-state identity naturally 
based on Western model. Westernization, nationalism and secularism were taken as the 
bulwark o f the Kemalist modernization policies. The aim was to accomplish this 
endeavor by the ideological and practical utilization o f this triangle and hence ensure 
the creation o f a sense o f unity and cultural consensus in a population inherited from 
the multicultural configuration o f the Ottoman past. The prototypical Turkish citizen 
was envisioned to be modem, civilized, non-religious and egalitarian so as to sweep 
away the received hierarchical stmcture divided across religious, ethnic and national 
cleavages. The citizenship understanding was a typical civic republican citizenship
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endowed with duties towards the state and with particular emphasis on community and 
general will. This project was not an anomaly within the context o f nation-state 
formation. However, when we dwell on the course it has taken throughout republican 
history and the issues that have formed the agenda in the post-1980 period, it becomes 
the core problematic sphere. In other words, what can be depicted as dubious for the 
latter period is that despite the emergent problems concerning identity within a new 
environment o f global dynamics, the conventional stance insists on a response within 
the parameters o f Kemalist modernization paradigm.
6.1 An Introduction to Post-1980 Political Dynamics
Turkey has experienced its third military takeover on September 12, 1980. The 
reason behind this takeover was expressed by the then head o f the General Staff, Kenan 
Evren as “to safeguard the integrity o f the country, to provide for national unity and 
fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility o f civil war and internecine 
struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority o f the state, and to eliminate the 
factors that hinder the smooth working o f the democratic order”. * At that moment 
there was ideological polarization and turmoil even to the extent o f terrorism within the 
country. Thus the military took over power in order to restore stability and return to the 
desired state based on ‘democratic principles.’
* 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, prepared by the General Secretariat 
o f the National Security Council (Ankara; Ongun Kardeşler Printing House, 1982), 
229, cited in Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics and Military in 
Turkey”, Comparative Politics, 16 (1983), 26.
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The 1980 coup was again a reflection o f the military’s role in Turkish politics. 
Same as the previous coup and memorandum, the military took over in order to stop 
the turmoil going on within the country and to restore democracy and democratic 
institutions which were perceived to be misused by the political elite. There was again 
a clash between the state elites and the political elites based on the long term interests 
o f the community and the short term interests and benefits o f different groups. Heper 
relates this opposition between the state elites and the political elites to the strong state 
tradition in Turkey.  ^Accordingly, the political elites throughout the republican history 
were perceived as those who undermine the long-term interests o f the community for 
the sake o f getting more votes and achieving power. By holding the view that the 
political parties should not be the spokespersons o f the particular interests but rather 
they “should be the instruments o f national unity, order and stability”  ^ the political 
parties were taken to be responsible for the bad conditions into which the country had 
fallen. Thus the military regarded itself as the guardian o f the state and intervened 
when they thought that the regime was in danger.
After the 1980 coup there was a three-year interregnum during which a new 
constitution was devised. The 1982 Constitution differed from the previous 1961 
Constitution on many grounds. Related with the distrust towards the politicians, the 
new constitution strengthened the position o f the President and endowed this position 
with extra powers. The President would be impartial, but he would be safeguarding the
1985).
See Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, (Walkington: Eothen Press,
 ^Kemal H. Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey 
Before and After 1980”, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. 
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 152.
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benefits o f the state. In doing so he had certain powers o f appointing the members o f 
certain state institutions such as the Constitutional Court, Council o f State, Higher 
Council o f Judges and Prosecutors and Head o f the General Staff. The President also 
had some judicial powers like submitting legislation to the Constitutional Court and 
calling a referendum for the laws he saw necessary.'*
The strengthening o f the authorities o f the Presidency was accompanied by a 
similar development in another state institution. National Security Council (NSC). 
Chaired by the President, the NSC was endowed with a more influential position in 
state affairs. When compared to the 1961 Constitution and 1971 amendments the 
recommendations o f  the NSC to the government were given higher priority, in 1982 
Constitution, strengthening the authority o f the former ever more.
Moreover, while the Article 105 o f the Constitution stated that “no appeal shall 
be made to any legal authority including the Constitutional Court against the decisions 
and orders signed by the President o f the Republic at his discretion” ^  the NSC was also 
secured against any judicial challenge as regards to its political deeds.^ The mentality 
behind the extension o f the authorities o f these two state institutions and the 
constitutional guarantees against outside attempts to thwart their insulation was shaped 
by the concern with safeguarding the state.
'* Art. 104 o f 1982 Constitution, Şeref Gözübüyük, T.C. 1982 Anayasası, 2"^* ed. 
(Ankara: Turhan, 1998)
 ^ Metin Heper, “State and Society in the Turkish Political Experience, “ in 
State, Democracy and the Military, 7.
 ^ Art. 4 o f Law on the Structure o f Constitution (Anayasa Düzeni Hakkında 
Kanun), cited in Gözübüyük, 1998, 15.
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This concern was to be substantiated by tailoring an official ideology for the 
coming period. The basis for the restructuration o f the political system was found in 
Atatürldsm, which connoted a reaffirmation o f the loyalty o f the post-1980 state to 
Atatürkist principles. Thus the President “had an active role o f supervising the working 
o f the Constitution in light not only o f the requirements o f democracy but in accord 
with Atatürkist principles- among which secularism is given particular mention”.  ^
Atatürldsm was revived, this time as a technique, serving as a justification ground for 
eliminating leftist and rightist ideologies. *  Besides, as Evin stated, it was reinterpreted 
continuously in order to be applicable to every occasion, and again according to Evin, 
the reason for that kind o f adoption o f Atatürldsm was the lack o f an intellectual basis 
in the military for any other substitute worldview.  ^As previously mentioned the main 
focus o f the state elites was the preserving the integrity o f the state, as a secular nation 
state.
In addition, the 1982 constitution might be regarded as a perversion from the 
original Kemalist discourse in the sense that it placed more emphasis on “Turkish 
historical and moral values”.’® Thus, Islam was recognized by the state elite with 
regard to its importance in, at least, maintaining Turkish identity and unity, and as a 
crucial antidote to communism and other fractional and divisive movements. In another
 ^ Clement H. Dodd, “Kenan Evren as President: From Conflict to 
Compromise,” Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, ed. by Metin Heper and Ahmet 
Evin (Boulder: W estview Press, 1994), 176.
* Ibid., p.8. Also see. Metin Heper, "A Weltanschauung-tumed-Partial Ideology 
and Normative Ethics: 'Atatürkism' in Turkey." Orient. 1 (1984), 83-94.
 ^ Ahmet Evin, “Changing Patterns o f Cleavages Before and After 1980, “ in 
State, Democracy and the Military, 212.
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respect, it has been used to address the failure o f the Kemalist progressive ideals to 
“propagate a social ethics” and to provide common cultural feelings and values that 
were “equivalent for the widely used Islamic idiom”.
Under these circumstances, in 1983 the military withdrew from power to leave 
the ground to civilian politics. However, the concern with stability continued and hence 
only three parties were permitted to participate in the elections. The pre-1980 political 
parties had already been closed down and were not permitted to re-open while their 
leaders were banned from active political engagement.*^ Thus, the elections formed a 
ground o f competition among three parties, the Motherland Party (MP) o f Turgut Ozal, 
the National Democracy Party (NDP) o f Turgut Sunalp and the Populist Party (PP) o f 
Necdet Calp. The winner o f the 1983 elections emerged as the MP, although the 
military seemed to favor the NDP.
6.1.1 The structure, politics, and the rise o f alternative priorities
MP is significant for understanding the other side o f post-1980s politics. The 
first side was the official structuration o f Turkish politics whereby the President and 
the NSC were the main actors. This structuration had its implications in the flow o f  
active politics after the transition to civilian rule, which formed the second facet. MP is
10 Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, 146.
*' Şerif Mardin, “Islam in Mass Society: Harmony versus Polarization”, in The 
Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, 163-164
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significant not only for the fact that it had the chance o f being the first carrier o f 
civilian politics. A more important factor is that it introduced the dominant political 
stance o f the coming period. The parties o f the 1970s and their leaders were banned 
from politics, which gave MP room for both gathering the supporters o f the previous 
parties under its umbrella, and for playing for the center. The party emerged with the 
claim o f representing the four worldviews o f the previous parties, namely nationalism, 
conservatism, “social democracy”, and liberalism. By combining together these four 
groups within itself, MP was a major attempt for the formation o f the center-right in 
the Turkish political arena. MP had to function in an environment where the economic 
rather than the cultural or political affairs were left to the conduct o f the political 
parties. This had a paradoxical impact on the running o f politics: On the one hand, it 
provided a breathing space for the party to ensure the liberal factor in its combination 
in the implementation o f market-based economic policies. It adopted export-oriented 
economy instead o f import substitution industrialization. On the other hand, since 
cultural and political issues had originally been perceived as matters o f state, this 
liberal stance was destined to stay within the economic sphere. The other two factors o f 
the combination, conservatism and nationalism would form the identity o f MP as far as 
the formers are concerned. However, this was not to secure the post-1980 official 
politics against conflicts that would rise on grounds o f identity. Despite the arbitrary 
statements o f Turgut Ozal as both the party leader and then as the President regarding a 
liberal approach to these conflicts, the structure set forth and the foundation o f the MP 
fell short o f providing the ground the for ultimate resolution o f these conflicts.
(Provisional) Art. 4 o f 1982 Constitution, Gozubuyiik, 1998. (This article 
was amended on 17 May 1987.)
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In fact, it can be argued that the structure that was set forth by the 1982 
Constitution, was further strengthened by the MP government. During the rule o f MP 
government there occurred certain changes on the position o f the state elites. MP went 
through a debureaucratization process through which it eliminated the traditional 
bureaucracy and replaced it with its own cadres and formed new institutions for 
bypassing the bureaucratic apparatus. This led to the withering away o f the 
effectiveness o f the traditional bureaucratic elites in state affairs. Made with the aim o f  
providing more space for independent action, the state elites seeking the interests, unity 
and security o f the state became limited with the military and the Presidency; the two 
institutions which had been given priority in the pursuit o f higher interests o f the state.
Still, neither market economics, nor the emphasis on the conventional higher 
interests o f the state could respond to the intensification o f the problems that arose in 
the politico-cultural sphere, in relation to identity. The problematic nature o f 
modernization whose major carrier has been the state came to the surface, accompanied 
by the prevalence o f globalization, multi-national companies and consumption society 
that erased the borders between countries. However, Turkish domestic political scene 
could not provide a matching point for the ongoing problem o f Turkey as related with 
the official ideology and the identity it introduced; i.e. ethnic, religious and gender
See Metin Heper, ‘The State and Debureaucratization: the case o f Turkey,” 
International Social Science Journal, (126) 1990; ‘The State, Political Party and 
Society in post-1983 Turkey,” Government and Opposition, (25) 1990; “Motherland 
Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey. 1983-1988,” Governance, 2(4) 1989; 
Ergun Ozbudun, “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey,” in Political 
Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, ed. by Larry Diamond, Boulder & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p.247-261. Motherland Party’s other 
significant accomplishments were privatization o f State economic enterprises and 
decentralization.
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identities and their struggle for recognition as distinct groups. To be more specific it 
was the identity crisis o f the Kurds, Islamists, Alevis, and women.
6.1.2 Desegregation o f the grand projects
During the 1980s, the leftist and rightist ideological stances o f  the previous 
period were suppressed, which in a way left room for the emergence o f movements, 
based on gender, religion and/or identity that had been treated as side issues o f  the 
grand project o f modernity. In this process, women’s movement emerged as 
significant. In the past women had always been incorporated to certain grand projects 
as symbols. *'* IXiring the Kemalist regime they were regarded as the carriers o f 
modernity, “sisters-in-arms” who would devote themselves to the regime and the 
Kemalist principles. Even the granting o f suffrage rights for women were not for the 
sake o f women’s rights but in order to achieve the visibility o f women in the public 
sphere as a modem symbol. Within other ideological movements women were still 
viewed as sisters stmggling for the grand projects. However, the 1980s opened room 
for the rise o f feminism and debate over the rights o f women. Feminists began to 
discuss issues such as more participation in public life, non-discrimination and 
equality. However, later these issues were to be incorporated into the state stmcture by 
the formation o f a State Ministry responsible for women and family and two state
Ayşe Kadioglu, “Women as Object o f Grand Social Projects in Republican 
Turkey,” in Deconstructing the Images o f “the Turldsh Women, ” eds. Zehra Arat and 
Sibel Erol; Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World,
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institutions, namely The General Directorate on Women’s Status and Problems and 
Family Research Institute. But the feminist movement stood as a movement which 
was not directly challenging the Kemalist notion o f citizenship, thus it found room for 
itself much easily.
The other significant movements were those which have been suppressed in 
order to acquire a homogeneous society. Islam from the very start o f the republic was 
seen as the reason for the backwardness o f the country and as a threat to the 
consolidation o f nation-state identity on secular grounds. For this reason religion was 
put under the control o f the state through the formation o f the Directorate o f Religious 
Affairs and the rest o f the religious groups like larikats and iekkes were closed down, 
and the politico-cultural role o f religion was pushed to the periphery. The first 
ephemeral instance o f the attempt to bring the periphery to the center was the 
Democrat Party (DP) experience in the 1950s. The DP came to power with a challenge 
to the Kemalist notions then represented by the Republican People’s Party (RPP). The 
periphery was mobilized and moved to the political agenda through appealing to 
religious sentiments. This experience ended with the 1960 military intervention, which 
was set to reaffirm the loyalty to Kemalist secularism.
The panorama o f the post-1980 period was quite different. On the social and 
moral level, there was a growing emphasis, particularly by the then president Kenan
(London, New Delhi: Zed Books Ltd., 1986); Nalan Soyarik, The Policies on Women 
and Family in the Early 1990s, unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, 1994.
Sibel Erol, “Feminism in Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 8, Fall 1992; 
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette) “Aile Araştırma Kurumu Kurulması Hakkında Kanun 
Hükmünde Karamame”[Decree in the force o f law on the formation o f Family 
Research Institute], no: 20387, December 29, 1989; Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)
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Evren, on religion, but this had its reflections also on the political level. In almost 
every speech, Evren mentioned Islam, and in a way praised Islamic values. Trying to 
act like a savior father figure for his people, he repeatedly stressed the compatibility o f  
Atatiirkism and religion by either quoting verses from the Koran or citing Atatürk’s 
speeches on religion. At that period, Islam was used by the state as a tool to keep 
people together, the attitude, which would change by the rise o f  political Islam in its 
moderate and frindamentalist styles. The Prime Minister o f the time, Turgut Ozal, gave 
credit to Islamic movements and to Kurdish problem as an attempt to transcend to a 
civilian regime. Besides, by 1987 the ban over political parties and their leaders were 
lifted, which led to the rise o f political Islam, with the formation o f the Welfare Party 
(WP). For the Islamists, the main problem has been the exclusion o f the Islamic ethos 
from public discourse and the inclusion o f an alien secular nationalism into the larger 
society. The Alevi community, which is a sect o f Islam as well, demands 
accommodation o f their religious identity within mainstream institutions such as the 
Directorate o f Religious Affairs, and they wish to establish their own religious 
institutions. In other words the Alevis also experience a crisis with regard to their 
identities. The common point o f these demands is a search for a socio-political setting 
free from alienation and anonymity where these distinct identities can enjoy their 
social, cultural and political rights.
As far as the main problématique o f this thesis shaped around the problematic 
nature o f Turkish citizenship is concerned, ethnic-based issues and thus the Kurdish
“Kadın Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğünün Kurulması”[Formation o f the 
General Directorate o f Women’s Status and Problems], No. 20679, October 7, 1990.
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movement come to the scene. In the 1980s, the Kurdish people started to voice their 
demands on the recognition o f their ethnic identities, the right to speak their language, 
and for education in Kurdish. Although the most frequently declared aims o f the 
Kurdish movement range from cultural and political rights to federalism and separate 
statehood, the basic problem seems to be Turkey’s failure to recognize Kurds as a 
distinct ethnic group.’’ The issue has been integrated into the political agenda o f both
the state and political parties. However, since the dominant structure ensured the 
control o f the state over political and cultural spheres, it was perceived in terms o f  
national and state security, which in a sense led to a deadlock. As mentioned above, 
this approach could not, and still does not match the discussions in the global context 
related to multiculturalism, ethnic identities and a change in the conceptualization o f 
citizenship. The gap concerned is between the priorities employed in the official stance 
on the one hand, and those employed with reference to democratic premises, on the 
other.
In short, by the 1980s Turkey has witnessed the shortcomings o f the Kemalist 
identity constructed during the nation formation. The attempt to construct a cohesive 
and homogeneous population o f citizens could only delay the problems o f identity. 
However, those problems came to surface by the 1980s. But instead o f trying to adopt 
more individualistic and liberal approach to citizenship by extending rights, especially 
in the late 1990s the state tries to adopt a stricter notion o f citizenship. The gap 
between the state and society is increasing persistently. The state can not keep up with
See, Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey’s Imagined Enemies: Kurds and Islamists,” The 
World Today, April 1996, 99-101.
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the demands coming from the society. During the republican period, the West was 
taken as the reference point and the major aim was to keep up with the civilization. 
Now the state is taking a position that is neither imitating nor taking into consideration 
the developments with regard to identity politics in the West. Efforts are taken in order 
to disregard the problems and return to the definitions o f the Kemalist period. The 
persistent problem o f the survival o f  the state still continues and the limits o f the 
citizenship are drawn within the boundaries o f that problem. The developments with 
regard to the conceptualizations o f citizenship will be discussed in the following 
section.
6.2 The Issue of Citizenship in the 1980s
After 1985, courses on citizenship were added to the secondary school 
curriculum. The transformation in the conceptualization o f citizenship was reflected in 
the course books on “Information about Citizenship.” Üstel points to the changes 
introduced after 1985 as “ there was a return to cultural citizenship strengthened by 
emphasis on Islam in the education o f citizenship.”'* According to Üstel’s analysis in 
the books published between 1985-1996, there was an emphasis on religion as a 
component o f a nation together with race, language and common historical heritage. 
The emphasis on religion as “an element that makes the people live together and in
See, Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, “The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey; Issues, Parties 
and Security Dialogue, 28/4 (1997), 439-452.
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harmony” was complemented by the emphasis on race. “Every nation believes in the 
superiority o f its race. This belief holds people together and enables them to be healthy 
and strong” was according to Üstel, the statement used as a reflection o f the anxiety o f 
cultural continuity. Another significant theme depicted by Üstel was the increasing 
concern on the internal and external threats to the Turkish Republic. The external 
threats were enlisted country by country, and a mentality o f “us and others” was tried 
to be inculcated. It was rather significant to come across that mentality which tries to 
pump “the militant reflex o f citizenship that had never been so strong even after the 
War o f Independence.”*^
After the 1980s, we witness four key issues related with the notion o f 
citizenship in Turkey. The first is the annexation o f new paragraphs to the Citizenship 
Law, which led to either widespread loss o f citizenship on the part o f some ex­
members o f Turkish Republic and admission o f some others to Turkish citizenship, 
which will be elaborated below. The second issue is the emerging demands o f different 
groups, like the Kurds, Islamists and women, as mentioned above. The third one is 
related with the former, the debates o f constitutional citizenship in Turkey, expressed 
from time to time by the political leaders as a solution to the ongoing problems o f 
Turkey. Finally, the fourth issue is centered around a TV serial named ‘The Diary o f a 
Citizen” broadcasted on the official TV channel o f  Turkey TRT2 during October 1998, 
which depicts the desired citizen o f the Turkish state at the 75* anniversary o f the
** Füsun Üstel, “Yurttaşlık Bilgisi kitaplan ve Yurttaş profili”[Books on Civic 
Information and the Profile o f the Citizen], Yeni Yüzyıl, 25 April 1996.
19 Ibid.
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republic. This chapter will dwell upon these core issues for understanding the Turkish 
citizenship after the 1980s to the present.
6.2.1 Changes in the Turkish Citizenship Law and outcomes
According to the 1982 Constitution the fourth section is related with political
rights and obligations. Article 66  o f this section state that:
Everyone who is annexed to the Turkish State with citizenship ties is a Turk. 
The child o f a Turkish father or a mother is a Turk. Citizenship is acquired and 
lost by the reasons clarified by law. None o f the Turks can be expelled from 
citizenship unless behaving against the loyalty to the country. The judicial 
process can not be closed to the decisions and proceedings o f expulsion from 
citizenship.
But before the amendment o f the constitution, citizenship had been the issue in 
the state level. The debates around citizenship started in February 1981, right after the 
military coup. At that time the National Security Council was in charge o f state affairs 
and they made an amendment in the Turkish Citizenship Law together with the 
Consultative Assembly. Even though the Turkish Citizenship Law was amended in 
1964, there were considerable changes and annexations made during this interregnum 
period, therefore most o f the data used in this section is limited to this period o f 1981- 
1983. The changes were on three significant aspects. First was the improvement 
towards dual or multiple citizenship. With the amendment on February 13, 1981 
“withdrawal from Turkish citizenship is subject to permission by the Council o f 
Ministers when ... citizenship o f a foreign country has been acquired in any manner or 
when there is a convincing evidence that someone is going to acquire a foreign
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country’s citizenship”. “I f  the person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is at 
the same time a citizen o f another country, the withdrawal documents are immediately 
issued to him. If the person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is not a citizen o f  
another country, the Ministry o f Interior Affairs issues him a document o f permission. 
When the person in question brings the documents showing that he has acquired 
foreign citizenship, the same Ministry gives him a withdrawal certificate. In 
accordance with the rationale set by the Council o f  Ministers, the Ministry o f Interior 
Affairs may issue permission document to a person who wants to acquire another 
country’s citizenship. The permission document is valid for three years. Those who 
receive permission documents have to turn over the competent Turkish authorities the 
required information and documents within this period”.^ ^
This amendment was particularly significant for the Turkish people who had 
gone to, for instance, Germany as guest workers but who had eventually settled there. 
Previously holding dual or multiple citizenship was not permitted, however as the 
problems arising out o f the situation o f the Turkish emigrants settled in other countries 
this new law was designed as a solution.^^ According to this law, people who would
Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu [Turkish Citizenship Law], Article 20 (c). Trans. 
İsmet Tezcan.
21 Ibid. Article 2 2 .
^  See for instance, N. Abadan-Unat and N. Kemiksiz, Türk Dış Göçü: 1960- 
1984 (Turkish External Migration: 1960-1984) (Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 
1986). For the issue o f dual citizenship see, Ahmet İçduygu “Becoming a Citizen in an 
Immigration Country; The Case o f Turks in Australia and Sweden and Some 
Comparative Implications”/nte/7îai/ona/ Migration 2 (1996); “Citizenship at the 
Crossroads. Immigration and the Nation-State” Galobalization: Theory and Practice, 
eds. E. Kofman and G. Youngs, (London: Pinter Publications, 1996); and Ahmet 
İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak, Nalan Soyank “What is the Matter with Citizenship? -  A 
Turkish Debate” M/dyZe Eastern Studies, 35 (4), October 1999.
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acquire the citizenship o f another country would first apply to the authorities and get 
the permission documents for withdrawal from Turkish citizenship. However, after 
they acquire another country’s citizenship, there is still an opportunity to keep the 
Turkish citizenship by returning the required documents to the Turkish authorities 
within three years period after they get the permission papers. According to İçduygu et 
al., Turkey decided to exercise dual citizenship for its citizens living abroad because o f 
the practical national interests o f “the wish to keep close contacts with its citizens 
abroad, and therefore encouraging the emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer 
it to their children.”^^  Even though the implementation o f dual citizenship is a 
challenge to the general definition o f citizenship that “citizenship should be unique” '^* 
Turkey had an adoptive attitude on this dual citizenship debate. Even though the 
Turkish emigrants had some uncertainties related with dual citizenship^^ they 
responded quickly to the new developments. Starting from the amendment o f the law, 
until the transition to multi-party politics in November 1983, a total o f 1171 people 
applied for withdrawal permission.^^
İçduygu et al., “What is the Matter with Citizenship?”
William Rogers Brubaker, ‘Introduction” in Immigration and the Politics o f 
Citizenship in Europe and North America, ed. by William Rogers Brubaker, Lanham, 
New York, London; The German Marshall Fund o f the US University Press o f 
America, Inc., 1989
See Ahmet İçduygu “Becoming a Citizen,” and “Citizenship at the 
Crossroads”
^  Decision No. 8/  2425, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), March 18, 1981, No. 
17283 - 42 persons; Decision No. 8/  4183, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), February 
10, 1982, No. 17601 -  21 persons; Decision No. 8/  4399, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gi^ette), April 8 , 1982, No. 17658 -  21 persons; Decision No. 8/  4548, Resmi Gazete 
(Official Gazette), May 4, 1982, No. 17684 -  32 persons; Decision No. 8/  4635, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), May 24, 1982 No. 17703 -  20 persons; Decision No. 8/
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Another significant development was related with the circumstances the 
country went through after the military coup. The military leaders o f the period, as 
mentioned above in the beginning o f the chapter regarded the ideological polarization 
in the country as the real cause o f the situation, especially the left. Therefore many o f  
the leftist intellectuals and people were arrested and put into prison. Some fled the 
country, however a new law was put into effect which would leave them without 
Turkish citizenship. The meeting on these changes on the citizenship law was held in 
camera, therefore the debates were not public.
According to the law numbered 2383 and dated February 13, 1981, which was 
annexed to the article 25 o f the Turkish Citizenship Law dated February 11, 1964 and 
numbered 403:
4930, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), July 14, 1982, No. 17754 -  12 persons; 
Decision No. 8/  4989, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), August 1, 1982, No. 17769 -  
13 persons; Decision No. 8/  5178, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), September 12, 
1982, No. 17810 -  38 persons; Decision No. 8/  5177, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 
September 13, 1982, No. 17811 -  40 persons; Decision No. 8/  5358, Resmi Gazete 
(Official Gazette), October 15, 1982, No. 17839 -  62 persons; Decision No. 8/  5452, 
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), November 6 , 1982, No. 17860 -  51 persons; Decision 
No. 8/  5889, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), January 19, 1983, No. 17933 -  4 
persons; Decision No. 8/  5%2>%JResmi Gazete (Official Gazette), January 20, 1983, No. 
17934 -  60 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5646, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), January 
28, 1983, No. 17942 - 53 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6015, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), March 6 , 1983, No. 17979 -  80 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6182, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), April 5, 1983, No. 18009 -8 0  persons; Decision No. 83/ 
6470, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), May 21 , 1983, No. 18053 -  48 persons; 
Decision No. 83/ 6493, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), May 24, 1983, No. 18056 -  
38 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6778 and Decision No, 83/ 6793, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), July 9, 1983, No. 18102-19  persons and 35 persons respectively; Decision 
No. 83/ 6694, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), July 10, 1983, No. 1 8 1 0 3 -4 4  persons; 
Decision No. 83/ , Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), August 28, 1983, No. 18149 -  57 
persons; Decision No. 83/ 6974, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), September 9, 1983, 
No. 1 8 1 6 0 -2 6  persons; Decision No. 7118, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), October 
16, 1983, No. 18193 -  106 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7384, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), November 25, 1983, No. 18232 -  155 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7380, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), November 27, 1983, No. 18234 -  14 persons. Total; 1171.
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a person who has been engaged in activities violating the internal and 
external security o f the Turkish Republic or the economic and financial 
security o f the country in the form o f an offence described by the law or a 
person who, after being engaged in such activities at home, has in any 
manner gone abroad such that it is not possible to file public action against 
him or to initiate penal proceedings or to enforce a ruling and who has failed 
to come back despite notification within three months, or in the case o f 
Martial Law or Emergency Situation within one month” would lose his 
citizenship.^^
In line with this law people who had fled the country for fear o f being arrested because 
o f ideological affiliations or offence lost their Turkish citizenship.^* This law and its 
enactment are significant for the sense that many people were left without citizenship 
to this extent for the first time, and it would lead to problems after the transition to 
civilian rule. Another significant aspect related with this law is that it determined “who 
would deserve the membership o f the state and who would not” besides this law was 
used as a kind punishment towards those who did not act in accordance with the 
principles o f the regime.
Starting from 1981 there is a large scale o f loss o f citizenship on the part o f the 
non-Muslim elements o f the republic for the reasons expressed in the Article 25 o f the 
Citizenship Law paragraphs (a)^  ^(9), (d) and (e). According to this article.
^  Published m Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), March 21 , 1981, 17286.
Decision No. 8/  5262, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), September 10, 1982, 
No. 17808 -  15 persons; Decision No. 8/  5762, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 
January 10, 1983, No. 17920 -  10 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6045, Resmi Gazete 
(Official Gazette), March 2 , 1983, No. 17975 -  10 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6704, 
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), July 8 , 1983, No. 18101- 26 persons; Decision No. 
83/ 6878, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), September 7, 1983, No. 18158 -  13 
persons; Decision No. 83/ 7425, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), December 12, 1983, 
No. 18246-4 persons.
This paragraph is amended per law No. 2383/6 on February 13, 1981, like 
paragraph (g) o f the Article 25 o f the Citizenship Law. However, as mentioned in the
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the Council o f  Ministers may rule that the following persons have lost their 
Turkish citizenship;
(a) those who have acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining permission, 
(9) those persons abroad who are called by the competent authorities to do 
their military service or, in the time o f war, to join home defense but have not 
done so within three months without excuse (d) those who run away to 
foreign countries while being forwarded for military service or after joining 
their units and do not return within the legally prescribed period, and (e) those 
members o f the Armed Forces or military incumbents who are abroad on 
duty, on leave, for changing climate or for medical treatment and fail to return 
home within three months without excuse after the expiry o f their terms”.
The amendment o f this paragraph indicates the increasing concern for those who have
left the country and have not returned back. However, the two articles o f the
Citizenship Law- Article 20  for withdrawal permission and Article 25 (a)- seems
contradictory. While one states that “ a person who had acquired the citizenship o f a
foreign country in any manner can have withdrawal permission” Article 25 (a) states,
as mentioned above that “those who have acquired foreign citizenship without
obtaining permission”. As the former does not mention any form o f permission before
the acquisition o f foreign citizenship, it becomes problematic to decide who would lose
his/her Turkish citizenship and who would get the withdrawal permission. Rather it
seems to be a kind o f method used to get rid o f those non-Muslim citizens who were
living abroad, even though this argument may seem rather tough.^  ^ On the other hand.
text the original copy o f the law is unreachable as the meeting was held in camera. 
Turkish Citizenship Law and the Official Gazette are used in this text, as references.
^  ‘Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu” [Turkish Citizenship Law], Yürürlükteki 
Kcamnlar Külliyatı [Collection o f the Laws in Action], Başbakanlık Yayını, v.3, 
p.3851.
^Mt is hard to enlist all the names in this text but they are available in Decision 
No. 8/  2425, Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette), March 18, 1981, No. 17283 - 114 
persons; Decision No. 8/  4183, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), February 10, 1982, 
No. 17601 -  53 persons; Decision No. 8/  4399, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), April 
8 , 1982, No. 17658 -  62 persons; Decision No. 8/  4548, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), May 4, 1982, No. 17684 -  143 persons; Decision No. 8/  4635, Resmi Gazete
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there was the naturalization o f large people o f “Turkic origins” in a significant manner. 
When the decisions o f  the Council o f Ministers are issued in Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette) it is quite easy to find pages o f lists o f people from Bulgarian, Yugoslavian or 
Afghan nationality who were admitted to Turkish citizenship.^^ The legal reason for
(Official Gazette), May 24, 1982 No. 17703 -  118 persons; Decision No. 8/  4930, 
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), July 14, 1982, No. 17754 -  57 persons; Decision No. 
8/  4989, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), August 1, 1982, No. 17769 -  70 persons; 
Decision No. 8/  5178, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), September 12, 1982, No. 
17810 -  265 persons; Decision No. 8/  5177, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 
September 13, 1982, No. 17811 -  53 persons; Decision No. 8/  5358, Resmi Gazete 
(Official Gazette), October 15, 1982, No. 17839 -  207 persons; Decision No. 8/  5452, 
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), November 6 , 1982, No. 17860 -  65 persons; Decision 
No. 8/  5889, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), January 19, 1983, No. 17933 -  87 
persons; Decision No. 8/  5SSS Jlesmi Gazete (Official Gazette), January 20, 1983, No. 
17934 -  196 persons; Decision No. 8/  5646, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), January 
28, 1983, No. 17942 - 180 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6015, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), March 6 , 1983, No. 17979 -  113 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6182, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), April 5, 1983, No. 18009 -  173 persons; Decision No. 83/ 
6470, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), May 21 , 1983, No. 18053 -  216 persons; 
Decision No. 83/ 6493, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), May 24, 1983, No. 18056 -  
78 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6778 and Decision No. 83/ 6793, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), July 9, 1983, No. 18102 - 20 persons and 47 persons respectively; Decision 
No. 83/ 6694, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), July 10, 1983, No. 18103 -  93 persons; 
Decision No. 8 3 /, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), August 28, 1983, No. 18149 -  119 
persons; Decision No. 83/ 6974, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), September 9, 1983, 
No. 1 8 1 6 0 -3 1  persons; Decision No. 7118, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), October 
16, 1983, No. 18193 -  97 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7380, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), November 27, 1983, No. 18234 -  57 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7402, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), December 9, 1983, No. 18246 -  573. Total: 3092. I would 
like to thank Oğuz Tarhan for his remarks related with those developments.
Decision Mo. 8/ 2583, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), April 11, 1981, No. 
17307 -  33 persons; Decision No. 8/ 2874, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), June 6, 
1981, No. 17358 -  27 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4084, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 
January 22, 1982, No. 17582 -  13 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4271, Resmi Gazete 
(Official Gazette), March 2, 1982, No. 17621 -122 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4424, 
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 17658 -5 4  persons; Decision No. 8/ 4978, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), July 30, 1982, No. \1161 -  121 persons; Decision No. 8/ 
5326, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), October 10, 1982, No. 17834 -  151 persons; 
Decision No. 8/ 5325, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), October 11, 1982, No. 19835 -  
12 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5444, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), November 7, 1982, 
No. 17861 -  672 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5474, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette),
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this admission was found in the Law on Settlement, which enabled the easy 
naturalization o f those people who are close to Turkish culture or one o f Turkic 
origin. By analyzing those two developments we can draw some significant 
conclusions. Even though it seems as merely a legal process, while making non- 
Muslim citizens lose their citizenship, admitting others to citizenship reflects more than 
that. It resembles to the process o f Turkification o f the population in the early 
republican period, especially when the increasing emphasis on Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis in the 1980s is taken into consideration.
One example o f that naturalization process mentioned above was the admission 
o f the Afghan migrants with Turkic origins in 1982. This issue was debated in the 
Parliament. Because o f the Russian invasion o f Afghanistan, those people fled to 
Pakistan. After a debate in the National Security Council it was decided that they 
would be taken into Turkey with all their belongings and settled here.^ "* The decision
November 12, 1982, No. 17867- 452 persons; Decision No. 8/  5492 and 8/  5493, Resmi 
Gazete (Official G^jette), November 20 , 1982, No. 17874 -  184 and 257 persons 
respectively; Decision N o.8/  5516, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), November 21, 
1982, No. 17875 -  433 persons; Decision No. 8/  5503, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), November 22, 1982, No. 17856 -  956 persons; Decision No. 8/  5485, Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette), November 24, 1982, No. 17878 -  276 persons; Decision No. 
8/  5617, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), December 11, 1982, No. 17895 -  184 
persons; Decision No. 8/  5618, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), December 14, 1982, 
No. 17898 -  224 persons; Decision N o.8/  5642 and 8/  5661, Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), December 20, 1982, No. 17904 -  18 and 27 persons respectively; Decision 
No. 83/ 6237, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), April 17, 1983, No. 18021 -  78 
persons; Decision No. 83/ 6785, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), July 28, 1983, No. 
18118 -  11 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6976, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 
September 7, 1983, No. 18158 -  103 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7187, Resmi Gazete 
(Official Gazette), October 27, 1983, No. 1 8 2 0 4 -2 7  persons. Total: 4199 persons.
The Law on Settlement was put into effect during 1934. And it led to some 
significant changes in the population structure o f the Republic. See Chapter IV.
Tutanak Dergisi, March 2, 1982, v .6
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was based on 2510 numbered Law on Settlement and annexed law numbered 1306. 
They would be accepted as migrants and be settled in appropriate places where they 
would be productive. This law was to be applied only for once. However, as 
understood from the decisions published in Resmi Gazete, later those people were 
admitted to Turkish citizenship. It is a significant example o f the admission o f people 
with “Turkic” origins to Turkish citizenship.
Within this three years period there were also those who were admitted to 
Turkish citizenship according to articles 6 , 7 and 8 o f the Citizenship Law. Those 
articles suggest that:
Article 6 - Foreigners who meet the following requirements may be admitted to 
Turkish citizenship by the decision o f the Council o f Ministers.
a) Such a person must be an adult according to his/her own national law, or if  
he/she is stateless, according to Turkish law.
b) He/she must have resided in Turkey for 5 years at the time o f application.
c) He/she must have shown with his/her behavior that he/she has decided to 
settle in Turkey.
d) He/she must be o f good morals.
e) He/she must not have a disease, which would jeopardize public health.
f) He/she must be able to speak Turkish adequately.
g) He/she must have an income or a profession, which would provide for the 
livelihood o f him self/herself and o f his/her dependents.
Article 7- In the following cases foreigners may, upon their wish, by the 
proposal o f the Ministry o f Interior and the decision o f the Council o f Ministers 
be admitted to Turkish citizenship without having to fulfill the requirements 
cited in paragraphs (b) and (c) o f Article 6 .
a) Adult children bom afterwards o f persons who have lost Turkish 
citizenship for any reason,
b) Persons married to a Turkish citizen and their adult children,
c) Persons o f Turkish stock (origins) as well as their spouses and adult 
children,
d) Persons settled in Turkey with the intention o f marrying a Turkish citizen,
e) Persons who have brought industrial installations to Turkey and persons 
who have been or are expected to be o f extraordinary service to Turkey in 
social, economic, scientific, technical or artistic fields.
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f) Persons the admission o f which has been deemed imperative by the 
Council o f Ministers.
Article 8- The Council o f  Ministers may re-admit to citizenship persons who 
have lost their Turkish citizenship as per this law with no need to fulfill the 
residence requirement.
During the period o f 1981-1983 many people were admitted or re-admitted to 
Turkish citizenship in line with the laws mentioned above. Within this three years 
period there was an ongoing process o f both making some people lose their citizenship 
and admission o f others to citizenship. When compared to the previous periods there is 
an increasing concern on the issue. It seems as if  by taking hold o f the state the military 
regarded itself responsible for the issues related with citizenship and started to bring 
about new solutions to the problems. However, the changes made during this period led 
to other problems after the transition to civilian rule.
The issues o f citizenship did not come to the agenda o f the Parliament until 
1989. In January 1989, a group o f deputies from the Socialist Democratic Populist 
Party proposed a change in the Citizenship Law. It was based on the practice o f Article 
25 (g) which made people lose their citizenship. The new proposal after criticizing the 
practices o f the interregnum period and regarding them as arbitrary and anti-democratic 
suggested that “no bom Turkish citizen should be subject to expulsion from 
citizenship” however, this proposal was rejected with the following reasons; firstly 
even though people from other parties accepted that some o f the laws amended during 
the military regime were anti-democratic and against human rights, they noted that “no 
Turk can be expelled from citizenship unless those behaving as contradictory to the 
loyalty to the country”, thus they did not accept the change o f this paragraph. Secondly, 
as the Constitution stated that “The judicial process can not be closed to the decisions
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and proceedings o f expulsion from citizenship” it was decided that there was no need 
to state that “no bom Turkish citizen should be subject to expulsion from citizenship”. 
Even though the proposal was rejected it paved the way for discussions on the practices 
o f the military regime on citizenship.
Three months later, on April 20, 1989, the controversial paragraphs o f the 
previously used Citizenship Law numbered 1312 and the contemporary law numbered 
403, were put in order. The Law numbered 1312 did not distinguish between loss o f 
citizenship and expulsion, in other words, there was no mention o f loss o f citizenship. 
People were only expelled from citizenship. When the law changed and law numbered 
403 was put into effect there emerged problems. The contemporary law distinguishes 
between loss and expulsion, and only those who have acquired citizenship afterwards 
are subject to expulsion. The bom Turkish citizens on the other hand, are subject to 
loss o f citizenship. As there were numbers o f people who were expelled from 
citizenship by the law no. 1312, there was a need to change the law, and find a solution 
to those people who have suffered from expulsion. All parties in the Parliament agreed 
on the transitory article aspiring for the solution o f the problem as “those people who 
were Turkish citizens by birth and were subject to expulsion under the law no. 1312, 
within two years after this law is issued, can apply for re-admittance to Turkish 
citizenship; the Council o f  Ministers is responsible for the implementation o f law no. 
403 article 8”. In this meeting, citizenship was expressed to be a basic human right and 
that no one should be expelled from citizenship arbitrarily. Also, those 
implementations were seen as an obstacle in Turkey’s relations with the EC, and the
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military regime was criticized for its implementations on citizenship.^^ It was a period 
when the citizenship issues o f Turkey were began to be discussed with reference to the 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, international law, and Europe.
At that time another law was annexed to the Citizenship Law. According to 
Article 10, “unconditional admission to citizenship may be valid as o f the date o f the 
decree o f the Council o f  Ministers. Admission to citizenship by a decree o f the Council 
o f Ministers having conditions attached; may be valid as o f the date the Ministry o f  
Interior establishes that the conditions have been fulfilled. In the event the conditions 
have not been fulfilled within two years, the decree o f the Council o f Ministers for 
admission shall be annulled upon the proposal o f the Ministry o f Interior”.^ *^
The annulment o f the Article 25 paragraph (g) came 11 years later, on May 27, 
1992. The proposal was discussed in the Parliament on February 13, 1992. In the 
proposal it was stated that a total o f 227 people had lost their citizenship in accordance 
with paragraph (g). By regarding those practices as anti-democratic and as against 
individual rights and liberties, its annulment was proposed. In the proposal it was 
suggested that this process was duplicating the penalty for those people who were 
subject to investigation for other offences. Making people lose their citizenship, in this 
sense, was viewed to be against universal citizenship laws. Besides, articles 140, 141, 
142 and 163, according to which those people were punished, were annulled. Thus
Speech o f Ali Haydar Erdoğan (SDPP -  Istanbul Deputy), TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, V.25, April 20, 1989,period: 18, p.309-312.
36 Turkish Citizenship Law.
These articles are from the criminal law. Article 140 is related with the 
criticisms published abroad which are violating the honor o f the state, articles 141 and 
142 are on the formations o f associations and organizations that aspire for the 
oppression o f one social class over the others, and article 163 is related with those
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there remained no offence. The reason behind this proposal was declared as, in order to 
make this law and practices o f  human rights in Turkey compatible with universal 
traditions, international treaties, Turkey’s political regime and with the society’s 
aspirations for integration with the modem world.^* Thus, the annulment o f paragraph 
(g) o f the article 25 was accepted and the documents and records o f  the people 
concerned were updated, besides all their properties, which were taken over by the 
government, were given back.
Short after this decision, a question was raised by Adnan Kahveci on 286 
people who lost their citizenship by the decision o f the Council o f  Ministers issued in 
Resmi Gazete on March 14, 1992. Kahveci was questioning the government’s 
seriousness about democratization, and criticizing the contradictory decisions and 
desires o f the government as related with the citizenship issues. The answer came from 
the then Minister o f Interior as those people lost their citizenship not because o f Article 
25 paragraph (g), but in accordance with Article 25 paragraphs (a) (ç) and (d). The 
details about those people were that, 43 people had acquired Israeli citizenship without 
the permission o f the Turkish government, 240 o f them did not return to do their 
military service despite the calls, and 3 people had mn away to foreign countries while 
being forwarded. Those people could re-admit Turkish citizenship if  and when they 
fulfill their duties or obligations. Sezgin stated that this process is related with the
activities that are against secularism and that promote the adoption o f religious 
principles in the conduct and judicial affairs o f the state. See, Türk Ceza Yasası, ed. 
Hüseyin Yıldırım, (Ankara; Olgaç Matbaası, 1981-1982).
38 Vatandaşlık Kanununun 25inci Maddesinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına
İlişkin Kanun Tasarısı ve İçişleri Komisyonu Rapom (1/ 345)” [Proposal for the 
amendment o f article 25 o f the Turkish Citizenship law and the report o f  the Ministry 
o f Interior], TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol. 12, February 17 1992, period: 19.
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sovereignty rights o f the state, and based on the mutual obligations stemming from the 
citizenship ties between the state and the individual.^^
During the 1990s, the Parliament was concerned mostly about the dual 
citizenship problem and legal procedures. Many times questions were raised about the 
process o f withdrawal from citizenship, the problems and shortcomings o f  the system. 
In 1995, for instance, when Germany decided that the Turkish people living within this 
country could apply for German citizenship that year, the Turkish parliament had to 
reformulate the laws concerned with dual citizenship. There have been debates on the 
situation o f the Turkish people living abroad and the problems they face. Even though 
those people had settled in other countries like Sweden, Germany, Netherlands and 
Denmark for about thirty years and have raised their children in those countries, they 
could not benefit from the economic, social or political rights fiilly as they were not 
citizens o f those countries. Some countries were not implementing dual citizenship and 
the Turkish people living in those countries were in a dilemma o f either withdrawing 
from Turkish citizenship or remaining as aliens in the countries they lived.
In order to solve this problem and find a solution to the status o f the people 
living in other countries, withdrawal from Turkish citizenship was made easier. The 
requirement o f completing military service before withdrawal was annulled."*® Besides,
‘Istanbul M illetvekili Adnan Kahveci’nin, vatandaşlıktan çıkarılma işlemleri 
ve bu konudaki kararnamelere ilişkin Başbakandan sorusu ve İçişleri Bakam İsmet 
Sezgin’in Yazılı Cevabı” [Question o f İstanbul deputy Adnan Kahveci submitted to the 
Prime Minister on expulsions from citizenship, and the answer o f Minister o f Interior], 
TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.4.1992, Vol. 9, period: 19,126-127.
"*® Paragraph (b) o f Article 20  was annulled on June 7, 1995. But there were 
discussions on this change. It was argued that this change was against the Constitution. 
Article 72 states that “military service is the right and duty o f every Turk”. A deputy 
representing the Welfare party stressed that every Turkish citizen should do this
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Article 29 o f the Citizenship law stating that “A person who has lost Turkish 
citizenship as per this law is to be treated as a foreigner as from the date o f such loss. 
Such a person may only benefit from the rights o f the foreigners as recognized by the 
Turkish laws in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, 
inheritance and labor” was changed by adding the statement that “However, those who 
held Turkish citizenship by birth, and acquired another country’s citizenship after 
getting the withdrawal permission by the decision o f the Council o f  Ministers and their 
inheritors may benefit from the rights o f the Turkish citizens in matters such as 
residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labor, while the 
provisions for the national security and public order o f the Turkish Republic are 
reserved”.'*^
The underlying desire in this change was to encourage dual citizenship among 
the Turkish migrants living in other countries. This encouragement however, was based 
on the promotion o f the interests o f Turkey in those countries by placing those people 
in key positions in, for example, political life. When the proposal was being debated in 
the Parliament, all party representatives emphasized the importance o f the Turkish 
people’s votes, if  they would have been naturalized in the countries concerned, for the 
formations o f coalitions. In other words, those people were regarded as the 
representatives o f Turkish interests in the countries they lived. It was not an attempt to 
solve the problems o f those people’s statuses in the countries and help them enjoy
military service, and if this law is changed for dual citizenship then many people would 
try to go abroad in order not to do the military service. He noted that he was not sure 
about the benefits o f this change. See, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, June 7, 1995, period; 
19, Vol. 38, 98-101.
TBMM Tuianak Dergisi, June 7, 1995, period: 19, Vol. 38, 88-109.
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equal rights with the natives o f those countries.H am m ar notes that debate over dual 
citizenship involves the debate over the meaning o f citizenship.'*^ In the dual 
citizenship debates in Turkey, citizenship in this sense was limited to a legal definition, 
that o f acquiring the receiving countries legal membership. However, the social and 
cultural aspect was perceived to be reserved for Turkish citizenship. In other words, it 
was believed that those people who acquired another country’s citizenship would still 
serve the benefits o f Turkey in the receiving country.
While this change was being debated, some people expressed their distress 
about the non-Muslims who have lost their citizenship. They have pointed that if  this 
law is enacted then those Greek, Jewish or Armenian ex-citizens o f Turkey would also 
claim Turkish citizenship, their properties and the places they have lived previously 
back. Even though it was noted that those people lost their citizenship according to 
other articles, like that o f not taking withdrawal permission before acquiring other 
countries’ citizenship, some deputies were rather anxious about the law. The tones o f 
their speeches were rather antagonistic about those people, and they were regarded as a 
threat for the security o f the country. Nevertheless, those non-Muslims were not 
included in this change.
Starting from the early 1980s, citizenship became a significant issue in the 
Parliament. At first it was used as a kind o f control mechanism and as away o f  
punishment on those who were “against the regime”. After the transition to democratic
42 See the Parliamentary debates in ibid.
Tomas Hammar, “State, Nation and Dual Citizenship,” in Immigration and 
the Politics o f Citizenship in Europe and North America, ed. William Rogers Brubaker, 
(Lanham, New York, London; The German Marshall Fund o f the US University Press 
o f America, Inc., 1989), 81.
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multi party system, it was again an issue, but this time to meet the requirements o f 
democracy. As it had always been the case, the Parliamentary and legal concerns on 
citizenship were limited to European or Western point o f view. The legal codes and 
implementations were criticized and annulled because they were seen as obstacles for 
the modernizing and developing Turkey. The changes for dual citizenship, as 
mentioned above, were made with secondary thoughts o f the Turkish people seeking 
the benefits o f Turkey in the countries they lived and became citizens. As can be 
depicted from the changes made, dual citizenship was encouraged. It was stated that 
the citizenship laws stem out o f the internal and special needs and features o f each 
county. However, the internal problems o f citizenship were not even debated in the 
Parliament. But as identity problems increased, and almost new and different problems 
related with Turkish citizenship defined by the state emerged, new discussions and 
debates came to the agenda.
6.2.2 The problems related with identity claims and constitutional citizenship
As mentioned in the first section o f this chapter, after the 1980s there emerged 
movements that were challenging the official understanding o f Turkish citizenship. 
These movements had claims for the recognition o f their identities, as different from 
the homogenizing citizenship concept. Especially the Kurds and the Islamic groups 
were challenging this notion. Even though those problems might be evaluated under 
the “identity” aspect o f citizenship, they were also closely connected to the “legal
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status” aspect. Not only the Kurds and Islamic groups, but also others were demanding
the liberalization o f the laws, and more emphasis on social rights.
By the emergence o f the problems o f citizenship, some political leaders began
to discuss and respond to these issues. The debates started in the early 1990s. In
December o f 1994, the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller reformulated the statement o f
Atatürk “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk” as “How happy is the one who
says I am a Turkish citizen”."*^ In the speech he made in the International Press Institute
General Meeting in Budapest in 1992, Demirel for the first time mentioned that:
constitutional citizenship is a notion which embraces all the citizens o f a state in 
the common denominator o f equality with regard to rights and duties. Thanks to 
constitutional citizenship all citizens o f a state regardless o f the differences o f  
religion, language, race, or gender get the right o f aspiring for and achieving 
duties. Every individual regardless o f ethnic origins, language, religion and 
gender, is connected to a state with constitutional citizenship ties, and shares the 
joy and sorrow, thus by bringing about his/her cultural belongings gets the right 
o f both contributing to social welfare and to get its benefits.“*^
Since then from time to time President Demirel mentioned constitutional
citizenship as the solution for internal peace in Turkey. The speech he made in the
OSCE meeting in December 1996, like most o f his statements on constitutional
citizenship received attention o f the journalists and scholars. This speech summarizes
what Demirel understands from constitutional citizenship, when taken into
consideration with the quotation above.
The best method to keep the differences and to establish harmony is to establish 
an understanding o f a nation that has a feature o f a collectivity o f  citizens
cited in Ahmet İçduygu, “Çokkültürlülük: ‘Türkiye Vatandaşlığı Kavramı 
İçin Toplumsal Bir Zemin”[Multiculturalism: a Social Basis for the Notion o f Turkish 
Citizenship], Türkiye Günlüğü, 33, March -  April 1995
Füsun Üstel, “Anayasal vatandaşlık, hangi anayasaya vatandaşlık?” 
[Constitutional Citizenship, Citizenship to Which Constitution?], Radikal, December 
17, 1996.
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endowed with universal and democratic values. Citizenship ties made up with 
that kind o f understanding is the only mechanism that would provide and keep 
true democratic pluralism. Also, the best definition o f the parameters o f 
democratic citizenship can be found in the conceptual fi-amework o f 
constitutional patriotism and citizenship identity. This approach leaves no room 
for ethnic discrimination. Those should be undeniable values that gather the 
democracies around a common political vision.'*^
Even though Demirel’s statements may provide a rough definition o f  
constitutional citizenship, it is not quite clear what he means or the intentions behind 
those statements. It seems that there is a debate going over an undefined notion without 
discussing its suitability or usability in the Turkish context. For instance, recently on 
July 15, 1999 during his visit to Israel, this time Demirel suggested that Turkey have 
constitutional citizenship. He noted that “the nation in Turkey is the Turkish nation. 
Even though people come from different origins this nation is the Turkish nation. We 
do not make discrimination, racism or religious differences are not exercised. We do 
not accept nations within a nation. Our citizens have rights and obligations, and the 
constitution determines everything within this fi-amework. And this is Constitutional 
Citizenship”. It is quite evident from this statement that the notion o f constitutional 
citizenship is not understood well in Turkey.
However, those statements opened room for new debates on citizenship among 
the academic sphere in Turkey. The constitutional citizenship debate emerged firstly in 
a rather different context. It stemmed from the debate between the German historians 
on how to read the German past. The 1980s were the period o f the rise o f the new right 
and those people claimed that the Nazi past had nothing more than the past o f the 
Bolsheviks with regard to the terror or holocaust. Historians from the right wing
46 Ibid.
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suggested that the duty o f the historian was to write a history that would increase the 
national consciousness. On the other hand, historians from the left, especially 
Habermas, suggested that the past should not be disregarded. Besides the duty o f the 
historian is to help the society to reconcile with its past, rather than to support national 
cohesion.^^ Thus, Habermas noted that “Nazism was not a simple era o f madness in the 
German history but was the final point o f the longstanding anti-democratic 
inclinations.” *^ So, Habermas suggested that the best national identification would be 
constitutional patriotism, that is, the exclusion o f every kind o f cultural or linguistic
. . . .  49
monopoly in the democratic institutions.
In his article “Citizenship and National Identity” Habermas relates the renewal 
o f interest on the relation between citizenship and national identity on two 
developments in history. The first one is the unification o f Germany, the liberation o f 
the Central Eastern European states and the rise o f ethnic conflicts especially in Eastern 
Europe. The second is the European Community under which the European states are 
integrating and getting close to each other more and more. After elaborating the 
historical evolution o f citizenship and its relations with national identity in the 
European context, Habermas introduced a new conceptualization. As a reflection o f his
Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Alman Yeni Sağı; Bir Başka Tarihbilim 
Tartışması”[German New Right; Another Debate Over History], Toplumbilim
'** Füsun Üstel, “Anayasal vatandaşlık”
Ibid.
Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” The Condition o f 
Citizenship, ed. by Bart Van Steenbergen, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi; Sage
Publications, 1994.
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theory on communication,^^ he stresses the changing dynamics for the sovereignty o f  
the people as “a procedure o f discursive opinion and w ill fo r m a tio n .In  addition, he 
proposes a set o f thinking patterns for a new type o f citizenship. In a context o f liberal 
and political culture, a communicative pluralism will be achieved which w ill lead to 
constitutional patriotism. In order to achieve this, Habermas noted that “deliberations 
within the decision making bodies need to be opened for and sensitive to the influx o f  
issues, value orientations, contributions and programmes from their informal 
environments.”^^  Only then the notion o f citizenship can be transformed and become 
more meaningful. In a parallel and more detailed article “Struggles for Recognition in 
the Democratic Constitutional State” Habermas stresses the significance o f the 
constitution in the solution o f the problems o f citizenship and ethnic, linguistic and 
religious identities. Here Habermas points to the importance o f acquiring an 
understanding o f constitutional patriotism. Habermas proposes a new type o f 
communication among people through which a consensus would be reached and the 
different cultures or identities would be embraced under a common understanding and 
responsibility o f the constitution.^'*
As noted above, the issue o f constitutional citizenship received the attention o f 
some academics as well. The debates varied from the non-applicability o f
See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Tran^ormation o f the Public Sphere: 
an inquiry into a category o f bourgeois society, (Cambridge, Massachusetts; MIT 
Press, 1989).
Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,”
” lbid. p.32
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constitutional citizenship to Turkey as it was proposed for a common notion o f  
European citizenship^^ to stressing the non-democratic character o f the Turkish 
constitution, which can be viewed as a barrier for constitutional citizenship.^^ Among 
those studies, two articles o f İçduygu and Keyman provide both a theoretical definition 
o f constitutional citizenship, and discuss its applicability for Turkey. As a result o f  
globalization and the emergence o f identity politics and multiculturalism, together with 
the “legitimacy crisis” most countries experienced, there occurred certain changes on 
the conceptualization o f the spirit o f constitutionality. Rather than the protection o f  
individual rights and liberties, constitutionality now stands for the “ethical code that 
puts into effect the cultural differences in a common denominator, a common identity 
code, and moves the demands o f difference to the public sphere”. Thus, they point to 
a change in the definition o f constitution, a transition from a common identity to 
difference. The constitutional state now stands for both, respect to individual rights and 
for moving the demands o f difference to a democratic environment. According to 
İçduygu and Keyman, constitutional citizenship is “the recognition o f different ethnic, 
religious or faith groups within the nation state and safeguarding social preservation 
and development o f each groups’ existences socially and politically, based on a kind o f
Jürgen Habermas, “Struggles For Recognition in the Democratic 
Constitutional State,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition, ed. 
by Amy Gutmann (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1994)
Nur Vergin, “ ‘Anayasal vatandaşlık’ ne demektir?” [What does 
Constitutional Citizenship vasAvPX M illiyet, 26 December 1996.
Füsun Üstel, “Anayasal vatandaşlık”
Ahmet İçduygu and E. Fuat Keyman, “Globalleşme, Anayasallık ve 
Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Tartışması”[Globalization, Constitutionality and the Debate
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social contract, like through a constitution.” *^ They also suggest that “constitutional 
citizenship is reconstructing the understanding o f citizenship, which was constructed as 
a political identity in meta-historical and meta-cultural level by the Kemalist 
modernization w ill, on the basis o f rights.”^^  As Ííduygu and Keyman suggest the 
application o f constitutional citizenship in Turkey can be viewed as a solution to the 
problems the regime experiences these days. It can be implemented in order to form a 
democratic environment where the different identities are recognized and safeguarded, 
rather than being seen as threats to the regime. But in doing so, first a democratic and 
pluralistic understanding should be prevalent within the society, and a new constitution 
should be formed which would respect all kinds o f  differences. It should be pointed out 
that the recognition o f differences would help solve the deadlocks the regime has.
6.2.3 The Diary o f the Citizen
The TS“* anniversary o f the proclamation o f the republic was celebrated as a 
reassertion o f the Kemalist ideals. There was a revitalization o f interest towards the
over Citizenship in Turkey], Doğu Batı 5 (November- December- January 1998-9), 
p.l47.
58 Ibid., p .l53.
E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik 
Sorunu: Anayasal Vatandaşlık ve Demokratik Açılım 01asılığı”[Turkish
Modernization and the problem o f National Identity; Constitutional Citizenship and the 
Possibility o f a Democratic Solution] 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş'a Doğru [From
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early Republican period, however that period was depicted as the golden age. Most o f
the celebrations emphasized the successes o f the Kemalist regime. Among those
activities few were crucial for this study. One o f them is the exhibition o f a prominent
bank called “to create a citizen.” In the catalogue o f the exhibition there were various
photographs related to the early republican period and showing the change the country
went through. The themes were not categorized with direct relation to citizenship.
However, it was noted that the process o f creating a new citizen o f the Turkish republic
was a success. The ongoing desires for recognition o f differences were ignored and the
success o f the process was related to the creation o f a citizen devoted to the Kemalist
principles. The newspaper advertisements o f the 75* anniversary o f the Republic said:
We are meeting at the Republic, because it has citizenship.
October 29, 1923 is a birthday... A birthday o f a nation... It is the day when a 
modernization project, a major dash has started... we have made a story o f  
success in a 75 year long dash...
The major feature this success has granted us is “citizenship” we achieved by 
the proclamation o f the Republic. To be a nation composed o f modem persons, 
free citizens rather than subjects is our success.
Our success story has not ended, it continues. Today, our target is to have 
every generation, every stratum and every individual to develop the 
consciousness o f citizenship, and to hold it. And our republic is the meeting 
point for this target.
We, as the citizens who made up this success story w ill carry on this 
development. Because, we have our republic, and because we are meeting at 
the republic, at citizenship.”
Another significant element was the broadcasting o f a serial called “The Diary 
o f a Citizen.” It was shown in the state channel TRT2 that aspires for a more 
intellectual style. However, the program resembled the programs in the 1980s designed 
in accordance with the literacy campaign in the country. The emphasis was on how a 
citizen should be; therefore the tone o f the program was rather didactic. The narrator
Subject to Citizen in 75 years] ed. Artun Ünsal, (Istanbul; Tarih Vakfı Yayınları,
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was an actor, and a professor, Süheyl Batum was the consultant o f the program. Süheyl 
Batum appeared after every key notion about citizenship and declared his views.
The notion o f citizenship was repeatedly defined as a legal tie that bound 
people with the will to live together, the people should not necessarily be from the 
same identity, religion, or race. The citizen was defined as “the one who has the power 
to determine both his/her future and the future o f the country; who declares his/her 
reactions without any reservation; who struggles for his/her rights; who is participant.” 
Besides, the citizen lives in a territory with set boundaries, protects his rights, who is 
working for his/her country and is endowed with certain duties. The program aspires 
for the rising o f the consciousness o f Turkish citizenship among the people, in the 75*^  
anniversary o f the republic.
In the nine parts watched, there was an ongoing emphasis on the lack o f a 
consciousness o f citizenship rights. However, the understanding o f rights was not 
voiced in a liberal understanding o f citizenship. The emphasis on rights rather stems 
from an inherent devotion for the well being o f the country. It was from time to time 
pointed that the Kemalist regime granted sovereignty to the people, but they are 
ignorant about it. Therefore, the importance o f organizing was declared. The examples 
o f non-governmental organizations were selected from those that are rather close to the 
system and devoted to the spread o f Kemalist principles, like that o f Çağdaş Yaşamı 
Destekleme Demeği [Association for the Promotion o f Modem Life] and ТЕМА. It 
seems that the underlying message is “organize, but within the parameters prescribed 
by the state.” Besides, the distrust o f the political leaders was again prevalent, and the
1998), 180.
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formation o f committees, which would monitor members o f  the parliament, was 
promoted. Organization was regarded crucial for the solution o f many problems in 
daily life as well. The formation o f local committees in the settlement regions 
imahalle) for the betterment o f daily life was given as examples. Here, the emphasis 
was on the revival o f neighborhood ties in a very nostalgic manner. Modem life 
loosened neighborhood ties, but they should be revitalized in order to take control over 
the place people live, and for the betterment o f the quality o f life. The images used 
under the theme o f organization were interesting, the most commonly used image was 
from the protests o f “One minute o f darkness for light” whose major aim was the 
solution o f the problems related with the relations between the state and mafia. It is 
evident that the state did not welcome those kinds o f protest, however the program 
depicted it as a reflection o f the rise o f consciousness o f citizenship, without making 
any comments on the issue. Other images were taken from the protests o f the state 
officials who from time to time protest either the wages or the ban over their right to 
from syndicates, usually at which the people are beaten by the police. There is a 
dilemma here, on the one hand the program aspires for the republican citizen who 
would perform his/her duties efficiently, but the exemplary images are taken from 
protests toward the state. The citizens were called to be active citizens, but in this 
active citizenship understanding the underlying aim was to carry on the modernizing 
mission, and responsibility towards the community, as has been the case in the early 
republican period.
The globalization process was regarded as the real cause o f the emergence o f  
micro nationalisms, politicization o f religion and the rise o f Islamic movements. Sencer
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Ayata, a sociologist, expressed the distress about globalization; “as the social state 
withdraws, the individual starts to search for protection, and approaches to movements 
based on ethnicity or religion. Those movements have close solidarity and use the 
resources within themselves, but those are not distributed equally in those groups. 
These lead to brutal social and political clashes. The globalizing world shapes around 
religious or ethnic values and gives birth to a clash.” Here, it is evident that the theory 
o f globalization has been turned vice versa, and is blamed as the cause o f  the identity 
crisis. In other words, this program regarded those developments with regard to 
identity as evil. Therefore, the proposed citizenship had nothing new. By preserving the 
distinction o f  public and private spheres, religion and tiirban was viewed to be the 
issue o f  the private sphere. Here there are many pictures o f people dressed in Islamic 
manner.
The Diary o f  a Citizen aspired for the creation o f  a citizenry who would be 
aware o f his/her rights -defined in the constitution- and defend those rights or voice 
their demands. The ambiguous understanding o f citizenship is still at large, and seems 
to be limited to a legal definition, and a republican understanding that binds the 
individuals with duties in return for which they get rights. While constitutional 
citizenship was being debated at the top level o f  the state by the President, and there 
were many problems related with the problems o f identity within the country, the ideal 
citizenship portrayed in the program was still a common and homogenizing identity. 
Globalization as mentioned above was regarded as the real cause o f  the problems 
related with identity. The changing dynamics in the international context related with 
identity, or the recognition o f  distinct identities was completely ignored. Besides, the
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problems o f  citizenship were regarded as stemming from the lack o f  the consciousness 
o f citizenship. This consciousness o f citizenship, however, has similar connotations to 
the early republican notion, it is laden with duties towards the state.
The 75^ anniversary o f  the republic was celebrated as a reassertion o f the 
Kemalist principles and the revival o f  the Kemalist notion o f  citizen. The problems 
were discarded, or sometimes paid lip service. As mentioned previously, some sections 
o f the society stated that the citizenization process was a clear success o f  the Kemalist 
regime. This statement is true in some sense. If the citizenization process is regarded as 
a process for the inculcation o f citizens obedient and devoted to the principles o f the 
Kemalist regime, and those who carry on .their duties defined by the state, and achieve 
their rights in return, this is a successful process.
We can view the problems experienced related with citizenship in the 1990s as 
a clash between two understandings o f  citizenship. On the one side there is the official 
definition o f  citizenship and those who adopted this understanding, based on the 
republican understanding o f  obligations to the state in return for which rights are 
achieved. Besides this understanding aspires for a homogenization o f the society under 
the unitary identity o f  the ‘Turkish citizen” obedient to Kemalist principles. On the 
other side there are the movements arising out o f the shortcomings o f  the official 
understanding. That is, the demands for a more liberal understanding o f  citizenship 
based on the priority on rights and recognition o f  differences within a new definition o f  
citizenship, rather than a single identity o f  a “citizen.” This clash can also be viewed 
from the perspective o f Turner’s two axes o f active/ passive and from above or
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below.^ The distinction between radical and formal citizenship highlights the 
active/passive and public/private distinction. Radical citizenship is the outcome o f the 
developments o f  the nineteenth century in Europe, that o f class struggles, wars, 
migration, and the emergence o f new egalitarian ideologies, which paved the way for 
revolutionary-democratic states. Formal citizenship on the other hand, by laying 
emphasis on who qualifies to be a citizen, is a criterion formed and initiated by 
governments with the aim o f  exclusion and control o f  the masses.^* The problems 
faced in contemporary Turkey as related to citizenship can also be regarded as the 
clash between those two definitions. There is a challenge towards the passive and 
formal type o f  citizenship fi"om below that can be viewed as a move towards an active 
citizenship.
The case o f Merve Kavak?! reflects the clash between those two approaches. 
After being elected as a member o f the parliament from the Virtue Party, she occupied 
the agenda for a long time. The first problem was related with her dressing. She was 
wearing a headscarf and even though there was not any regulation related with the 
headscarf in the parliament, her entrance to the parliament led to protest. Later, it was 
found that she admitted citizenship in the USA without permission. With a quick 
decision o f  the Council o f Ministers, she lost her Turkish citizenship. Her dressing, 
marital status and other aspects o f  her private life were covered in the media. However, 
the process that made her lose Turkish citizenship was not covered thoroughly. The 
case o f Merve Kavakfi is significant on many aspects related with citizenship practices
60 Bryan Turner, “Outline o f a Theory o f  Citizenship”
Bryan Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: the debate over reformism
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
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in Turkey. First o f  all, she was elected as Member o f  Parliament, therefore she had 
judicial immunity, so it was legally not appropriate to take a decision about her 
citizenship status in the Council o f  Ministers. On the other hand, the article o f  the 
Citizenship law about having the permission o f the Council o f  Ministers for having 
dual citizenship was designed to enable Turkish citizens living in countries that did not 
accept dual citizenship. Besides, as noted above, the article related with permission o f  
withdrawal suggests that those who already hold another country’s citizenship can 
benefit from this withdrawal permission. She was a woman with headscarf and elected 
as MP from a religious party. When all those features were taken into consideration it 
was believed that she was not suitable to . hold Turkish citizenship. The approach 
towards the issue can be interpreted as “who deserves the membership o f a state, and 
who does not.” That approach was significant during the early 1980s when most o f  the 
leftists were made to lose their citizenship as mentioned in the above section. It seems 
that it was not specific to the military regime to try to determine who is fit for 
citizenship and who is not.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
After the 1980s, citizenship became a widely debated and contested issue in 
Turkey. The interest on citizenship firstly emerged during the interregnum period, by 
the amendment o f new laws. The first change was designed in a pragmatic way, in 
order to find a solution to the problems o f  the Turkish migrants living abroad. This
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attempt was partly due to the historical coincidence, as the problems resulting from the 
20 year-long migration flow became much more visible during the 1980s, and 
especially with the second-generation migrants. By the amendment o f  the new articles, 
admitting another country’s citizenship was made easier. In addition, those people who 
had acquired another country’s citizenship were given the chance to hold Turkish 
citizenship simultaneously.
The second legal change reflected the mentality o f  “who would deserve 
membership or not.” The numerous expulsions o f both the leftists who had fled the 
country after the 1980 coup and the non-Muslim citizens who were living abroad were 
a significant development. It was a unique experience in Republican history.
Another novelty o f  the period after 1980 was the emergence o f identity politics, 
or, in other words, claims for the recognition o f  different identities by the state. This 
was particularly in line with the rising demands for identity, multiculturalism, and 
globalization in the international context as well. Even though constitutional 
citizenship was proposed as a solution to these problems by the politicians, it was not 
fiilly described or theorized. It was rather a lip service paid by the politicians, 
especially when it is noticed that Demirel was talking about constitutional citizenship 
in international meetings. However, the issue o f constitutional citizenship is still a 
significant issue for Turkey, and there may be more to study on it.
Despite those challenges towards the official definition o f citizenship, in the 
late 1990s we come across a reassertion o f  loyalty to this definition. Citizenship is still 
perceived within the parameters set by the early republican definition, that is, civic 
republican understanding is still predominant. Although, a more active citizen was
215
promoted, the requisite that this activity should be in line with the duties for and 
concern over the community, and the Kemalist regime was stressed. However, the 
active citizen that flourished from within the society is quite different fromwhat is 
desired.
Finally, returning to Marshall and the critique o f  Marshall developed by Işın 
and Wood, we can suggest that by the end o f  the 1990s, Turkey has entered the 
“identity” level o f  citizenship. In the end o f  the year 1999, with the candidacy status to 
the European Union, the issue o f citizenship seems to occupy the agenda, both in the 
political and academic level. Even the issue o f the minorities that was undermined 
throughout the republican history began to attract the society. The President for the 
first time celebrated the Christmas o f  the Christian citizens o f  the Turkish Republic.^^ 
Also, the idea o f granting the right for broadcasting in Kurdish was declared by the 
Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, right after the Helsinki Summit. In August 
2000, the International Convention on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
been ratified by Turkey. As integration with the European Union is the ultimate goal o f  
Turkey, perhaps we might be more hopeful for the future for a new definition of 
citizenship.
62 24 December 1999, Radikal.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This study was carried out with a concern for the status and identity that official 
Turkish citizenship has put onto its subjects. It has aimed to provide an in-depth 
analysis o f the evolution o f citizenship both as a notion, and a status and/or identity, or 
civic virtue with a view to the official ideology. In the conduct o f  such a task, legal 
documents, parliamentary debates and studies o f the prominent intellectuals on 
citizenship are analyzed. This documentary selection has helped to explore certain 
questions regarding the state’s role in the conceptualization, construction and evolution 
o f citizenship; 1. What are the criteria that were taken as principal ground for the 
construction o f Turkish citizen? 2. How was Turkish citizenship defined? 3. How do 
the components o f officially defined Turkish national identity like language, culture, 
and ideal effect the definition o f citizenship? 4. Was the desired Turkish citizen an 
active citizen, or a passive one? 5. How were the religious minorities incorporated into 
Turkish citizenship? 6. How was Islam incorporated into the construction o f Turkish
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citizenship, and the how did its importance increase/decrease in the citizenship 
conceptualization? 7. Which model does the construction o f  Turkish citizenship fit 
into; French or German? 8. Was the Turkish citizenship inspired from republican 
understanding, or liberal understanding? 9. Are there any disjunctions between the 
official definition o f  citizenship and practice? Except for the first three questions, 
which were answered in Chapter IV, all the questions were (re-)asked in subsequent 
chapters with the aim o f  depicting the continuities and changes throughout the 
Republican era. The historical periodization o f the study has been made in this respect, 
in order to reach a conclusion to understand the continuities and changes in the official 
conceptualization o f  citizenship. One determinative factor in this task was the changes 
in the social and political life o f  Turkey; for instance, the transition to multi-party 
politics, or military interventions, as well as the priorities that have been imposed by 
the changing international context.
In the study, the late Ottoman period was analyzed with a view to the 
emergence o f  the notion o f citizenship (Chapter III). The aim was to provide an 
historical background for the study o f the Republican era. The enactment o f  Tanzimat 
Edict (1839) was selected as a symbolic starting date since it initiated the enactment o f  
a set o f  legal reforms that were followed by the Reform Edict o f  1856, Ottoman 
Citizenship Law (1869) and finally, Kanuni Esasi, the constitution. The main intention 
behind the enactment o f these legal reforms was a concern for strengthening the 
Ottoman State in the face o f the intensifying discontent o f different millets within the 
territories o f  the Empire, which started to re-form their organic ties with the nationalist 
revival in Europe. Thus, the underlying aim was to save the Empire from collapse by
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gathering the religiously and ethnically fragmented subjects o f  the Empire under a 
certain identity, that is the “Ottoman citizen.” The individual rights and liberties were 
safeguarded by the laws concerned. However, this did not cause a change in the actual 
status o f  the ruled from subject to citizen. The identity o f  “Ottoman citizen” did not 
serve the aim o f  creating a common Ottoman identity, either, which was very well 
exemplified during the First World War.
The early Republican era (1923-1946), analyzed in the fourth chapter, has 
displayed almost the same problem o f  creating a common identity, i.e. the nation, 
which would be one o f the acute problems facing the Turkish Republic. This period 
was taken as one o f construction o f the identity o f the Turkish citizen. In fact, the 
fourth chapter has formed the key reference point for this study, since the nature o f  
citizenship in the Turkish context and the different problems that it has presented 
throughout the decades, depending on the (inter)national dynamics under 
consider ation, have been elaborated on the basis o f  the peculiarity o f  the construction 
period. Throughout the chapter, the answer to the first question was formulated with a 
view to the “top down” official mentality. The identity o f  the citizen was drawn along 
the boundaries o f Turkish nation-state. Until the 1930s, the approach towards 
citizenship was a reflection o f the French model, that was based on territory. However, 
together with the changing legislation (Law on Settlement, Law on Family Names, 
etc.) which brought in an emphasis on Turkish language and culture, there occurred an 
inclination towards the German model. This had significant implications for the 
religious (and ethnic) minorities. The Law on Settlement subjected those minorities to 
forced migration, in order to homogenize the population and to create Turkified
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territories. There were intense campaigns for the use o f Turkish language, which was 
reflected also in the Law on Family Names. Based on such examples, it can be argued 
that the early Republican era had displayed a shift from the French model to German 
model. The ideal citizen o f the republic was to be “new, modem, conscious and 
responsible.” As far as this definition is concerned, the public and private spheres were 
merged together in the constmction o f  the citizen, and the private sphere o f  the 
individuals was organized as well. In line with the adoption o f  Western parameters and 
Enlightenment mentality the citizen would be secular. However, it can also be argued 
that Islam remained as an unpronounced feature o f the Turkish national identity. The 
admission o f  the migrants from the Balkans who were Muslims, but not o f Turkish 
origin to Turkish citizenship, while the refusal o f  Gagavuz Turks who were Christians, 
reflects this silent existence.
Due to the structure o f  the state-society relation molded in a strong state 
tradition this new citizen was defined more in terms o f  his duties and obligations and 
his rights were derived from the fulfillment o f these duties. The early republican 
understanding o f citizenship can be portrayed as “civic-republican.” The duties made 
up the core o f the qualification for citizenship. The allegiance to the community and 
the common good were the main criteria for the exercise o f  citizenly activities.
Referring to Marshall, the early Republican era, together with the late Ottoman 
Empire, can be evaluated as the period for the emergence o f  the civil element o f  
citizenship. The second phase, that is the emergence o f  the political element would 
come about by the transition to multi-party politics (Chapter V).
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The fifth chapter was comprised o f  two sub-periods; one between 1946 and 
1960, and second the aftermath o f  the 1960 military intervention until 1980. The first 
sub-period is important for the transformation in the conceptualization o f  citizenship. 
This period can be regarded as the political phase, by the stimulation o f  the political 
participation o f  the citizens as their fundamental right. This was symbolized in the 
propaganda o f Democrat Party while in opposition: ‘lEnough! It is the Nation’s Turn to 
Speak!” During that period the rural population or in other words, the periphery was 
incorporated into the political life. It was especially during the period in concern that 
the people got the feeling that the real sovereignty belonged to them. Besides, Islam 
was incorporated to the Turkish identity and Islamic principles were reasserted under 
the Democrat Party rule. In the second sub-period, active and liberal citizenship was 
promoted by the 1961 Constitution. Based on the rule o f law and social justice 1961 
Constitution and the 403 numbered and 11.2.1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law 
amended during this period together had its social and cultural reflections. In this 
sense, the formation o f the trade unions, the extensions o f  the right to go on strike, to 
form political parties and associations freely reflects the emergence o f the social 
element in Marshall’s terminology.
This was a transitory development in the Turkish context, since by the 1980 
military intervention the political and social elements were restricted to a great extent. 
The evolution o f citizenship issue as displayed in official rhetoric vis-à-vis rising 
demands both from the society and as a result o f international dynamics has formed the 
main topic o f  Chapter VI. The post-1980 period is important since it witnessed the final 
clash between the official conceptualization o f citizenship and its practical dimension,
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as exemplified in the intensification o f  challenges to the former. First, the period under 
military rule faced the problem with respect to a relatively unproblematic issue as 
regards the citizenship status, that o f dual citizenship, which was handled merely by a 
legalistic approach. The second point o f  attention was related to the question o f  “who 
would deserve to be the Turkish citizen?” This can be taken as the main determinant 
for understanding the restrictive character o f  post-1980 military rule. Read from a 
negative aspect, the amendment to 1964 Citizenship Law (article 25-g), which defined 
the criteria for making someone lose his citizenship status also clarified the identity o f  
the ideal citizen. In this sense, the citizen shall not be perceived as to have been 
“engaged in violating the internal and external security o f the Republic, or the 
economic and financial security o f  the country in the form o f an offence described by 
the law” was one example for the shattering o f  both political and social elements that 
were on the agenda in the post-1960 period. The third point that fiirnishes the period 
with significance is the rise o f  identity politics as an issue worldwide and its reflections 
on the debates concerning citizenship in the Turkish context. This was not a one-sided 
development, since the claims for the recognition o f different identities by the state has 
gained accelaration throughout the 1980s, especially as in the case o f Islam, Kurdish 
and women issue.
In this respect, especially the second and third points gain significance for 
elaborating on the problematic nature o f  Turkish citizenship, and prospects for possible 
alterations in the mainstream approach that would provide extensions for a new 
understanding o f  citizenship. To begin with, the second point connotes the insistence 
on Kemalist mentality as concretized during the early-Republican era. In this respect, it
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can be argued that the emphasis on the ideal citizen who is loyal to his state and who 
has internalized his organic ties with the nation and his responsibilities implies the 
predominance o f  civic republican understanding. This has most recently been 
manifested during the celebrations for the 75*** anniversary o f  the proclamation o f  the 
republic. The desired citizen o f the republic has been defined in terms o f  secular and 
patriotic citizens who would devote themselves to the Turkish nation-state, and who 
would be the protagonists o f  the enlightenment o f  the public. On the other hand, as 
exemplified in the TV program produced for the celebration o f 75*** years o f  the 
republic. The Diary o f  a Citizen, it is possible to trace the signs o f  an emphasis on the 
requisite o f  active citizenship. However, this active standing has still been defined in 
terms o f the nation-state, rather than the citizen in his individual identity, that again 
restricts the issue to the predetermined principle o f sustenance o f  the state. 
Additionally, official standing have at times approached the problems that have been 
voiced within the context o f  claims for the recognition o f  distinct identities, in a rather 
arbitrary fashion, without challenging the early republican mentality. This can be 
observed in the introduction o f the term constitutional citizenship by the former 
President Süleyman Demirel, alongside with an attempt to tailor the conceptual 
fi-amework to republican requisites, which in the final analysis renders the term itself 
superficial.
However, neither the insistence on the established definition o f citizen, nor such 
superficial suggestions for the handling o f the problem preempt the continuity o f  the 
identity claims. On the contrary, what is at hand is a rupture between the desired and 
actual active citizen. Briefly, the active citizen that flourished from within the society is
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quite different from the desire. It is possible to argue that 1990s have witnessed the 
emergence o f  a citizen portrait, eager to question the relative positioning o f duties and 
authorities accorded to the state vis-à-vis the society and voice his demands. This can 
be read in terms o f a liberal shift, whereby the state is perceived as an institution 
established for the well being o f  its citizens.
Quite contrary to the demands coming from the society the state still tries to 
hold on to the early Republican parameters for citizenship. It can be argued that 
Turkish citizenship is perceived as unchangeable and that cannot be challenged. This 
view is not only held by the state but by a certain section o f the society that had 
adopted this civic republican definition o f  the early Republican period. Therefore, we 
can argue that the inculcation o f Turkish citizenship was a success in some respects. 
We can also argue that there is a clash between those citizens who have adopted the 
republican understanding o f  citizenship based on Kemalist principles and those who 
voice their demands for a more liberal understanding.
The problem Turkey faces these days with regards to citizenship is based on the 
state’s attitudes and responses toward the developments both within the country and in 
the international context. Starting from the first modernization attempts in the late 
Ottoman period, the West was taken as the reference point. This had intensified during 
the early republican era, when Westernization was regarded as a must. Therefore, the 
Western models o f  citizenship were adopted, together with the Civil Code, Western 
calendar, Latin alphabet, in short almost every daily aspect. This had continued until 
the late 1990s. Most o f the problems about citizenship were approached by referring to 
the international context, international documents and EC. However, as related with the
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demands for the recognition o f  distinct identities, the state took a reactionary attitude. 
This reactionary attitude was taken both towards the pressure coming from the West 
and to domestic demands. It might not be wrong to suggest that the relationship with 
the West has changed, and that the West had become the counterpart who encourages 
and sometimes presses for the adoption o f  Western values for Turkey. This condition 
points to a turning point in the Turkish modernization process. This requires 
reconsideration and re-definition o f  citizenship in the Turkish context. However, the 
reluctance o f  the state for an alternative and more compromising stand towards the 
issues that stem from the conventional understanding o f citizenship asks for and 
triggers the emergence o f new debates.
There is a close relation between citizenship and the problematic o f the survival 
o f the state in Turkey. In the Ottoman Empire the implementation o f a new identity o f  
the “Ottoman citizen” was for the sake o f  preventing the Empire from collapse. All the 
modernization attempts o f  the Empire can be summarized as “progress for order” by 
quoting the phrase Ayşe Kadioglu used in her book.* By the proclamation o f the 
Republic and the attempts for nation-building the aim was turned vice versa as “order 
for progress” ,^ in other words the construction o f the notion o f  citizenship became part 
o f the grand project o f modernization. Thus, the construction o f Turkish citizenship 
was not a process for the sake o f citizenship together with its rights and duties, but was 
almost a synonym for the nation that was being constructed. When we come to the end 
o f the 1990s, citizenship is again viewed within the parameters defined by the state.
* Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Cumhuriyet Epistemolojisi ve Aşırı-Gerçekçi Kimlikler,” in 
Cumhuriyet İradesi -  Demokrasi Muhakemesi (İstaıhuV. Metis Yayınları, 1999), 24-26.
Ibid., 27-29.
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and this time the demands from various sections o f the society for a different 
understanding o f citizenship are usually regarded as a threat to the regime.
Nisbet suggested that there was a process o f citizenization in the West, by 
arguing that it is more than a condition or status, and that it has certain phases and 
historical contexts in which it connects with other processes. Finally, we can argue that 
this citizenization process is not peculiar to the West, and that we can observe this 
process in the Turkish case as well. In Turkey this process was merged with nation­
building, modernization, and democratization processes. Reflecting on the claims for 
the recognition o f  distinct identities, we can predict that the future o f this process will 
be closely interrelated with the identity level o f citizenship. However, the legal status 
and civic virtue aspects will also attract the future studies, especially when the 
demands for a more liberal understanding are concerned. It is in this respect that this 
study gains significance; in other words by outlining the process o f citizenization with 
an analytical concern it stands as a pioneer study for citizenship debates in the Turkish 
context.
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